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Civil wars have become more prevalent in modern times and present unique 
challenges to conflict resolution.  Third parties often intervene in civil wars attempting to 
insure that peace is imposed and will persist.  However, the impact of third parties on 
intrastate conflicts remains incomplete.  The civil conflict literature does not sufficiently 
distinguish how third parties promote peaceful outcomes during a peacekeeping 
operation and why a state remains stable after the peacekeepers leave.  By examining 
data on third party interventions from 1946-2006 and individually examining the case of 
Sierra Leone, this research concludes that peacekeeping missions promoting 
transparency, credible information sharing, and strong signals of commitment present the 
best possibilities for peace during and after the mission.  Analysis from empirical tests and 
case study support that peacekeeping missions are most effective when they allow for 
credible and reliable communication between domestic adversaries.  Ultimately, third 
parties must promote a political solution between rebel and government factions in civil 
wars so that peaceful methods of dispute resolution are promoted in the absence of a 
third party preventing the recurrence of war. 
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Chapter 1: Intervening to Stop Civil War 
Resolving Civil Conflict 
 
 Though the international community remains united in its desire to permanently 
end civil conflicts, there exists uncertainty about what outsiders can do to solve the 
internal problems that make nations prone to civil war.  While some have noted the need 
and effectiveness of outside intervention (Fortna 2004; Walter 2002), others are more 
skeptical that producing a negotiated settlement from outside intervention improves the 
political discourse among the internal actors at war (Werner and Yuen 2005; Cockayne, 
Mikulaschek, and Perry 2010; Toft 2010).  Foreign interventions into civil wars have the 
well publicized goals of ending violence and resolving underlying conflict, but how does 
the composition of these interventions contribute to the efficacy of third party 
intervention?   
 This question must be addressed by first examining the fundamental processes 
that make third party intervention effective.  Foreign interventions produce structural, 
informational, and normative incentives toward conflict resolution.  By establishing how 
the composition of third party interventions affect conflict resolution, the structure and 
function of third party intervention can be better connected.  By analyzing data on 
intervention into civil conflicts based on the rate of successes, it can be established why a 
third party intervention is effective in resolving civil conflicts.  Determining what third 
parties do to promote peaceful outcomes in civil conflicts could benefit future 
interventions and peacekeeping missions. 
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Civil War Hurts Everyone 
 
 The international community has a decisive interest in ending civil conflicts.  Since 
the end of the Cold War, a central focus of the international community has been to 
stabilize civil (intrastate) conflicts and prevent the humanitarian disasters that often come 
as a result (Heldt and Wallensteen 2005).  Civil conflicts produce extraordinary economic 
and social costs for the conflict country as well as the greater international community.  
There are obvious costs such as the loss of life and damaged infrastructure.  However, 
countries emerging from civil war are dominated with a vitriolic and violent political 
discourse, so at war’s end, they have a unique set of challenges to overcome.   
Civil wars typically last 7 years and reduce a country’s economic growth by 2.3% 
each year.  That makes the average country undergoing civil conflict approximately 15% 
poorer at the war’s end (Collier 2007: 27).  War-ravaged countries must deal with a 
population displaced and psychologically scarred from war atrocities ranging from child 
soldiering to rape.  They must manage an economy structured around coercion and 
extortion, unaccustomed to negotiation and bargaining.  Given the extent of these 
problems, it is not surprising that countries enduring civil war find themselves in a 
downward spiral of development with repeated iterations of violence.   
Civil war produces more problems beyond a country’s borders and the costs can 
be felt globally.  Displaced refugees present economic and logistical challenges in 
countries where refuge is sought.  Mass migrations of peoples not only deplete countries 
undergoing conflict of human capital, but place additional burdens on those that must 
administer makeshift areas of habitation and supply resources to those in need.  Mass 
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displacements of peoples increase instances of disease and global health epidemics 
among the populations in countries that they go to (Collier 2007: 28).      Countries 
undergoing civil conflict contribute to illicit activities that have global ramifications.  Failed 
states find themselves to be hubs for international terrorist groups and it is estimated that 
ninety-five percent of global production of hard drugs comes from countries undergoing 
conflict.  Collier (2007: 32) approximates that civil wars annually cost the international 
community twice the global aid budget.  Breaking the cycle of conflict is both a collective 
interest as well as a moral imperative of the international community. 
What Can Be Done? 
 
Once civil wars have stopped, how can the international community insure that 
they end for good?  Civil wars are particularly difficult to permanently end.   Active 
hostilities might come to a close for multiple reasons, but civil wars have a tendency of 
making successive recurrences within the same country.   A country having endured civil 
war makes war recurrence about twice as likely and about only half of the countries 
managing to end their conflicts can only maintain peace for the duration of the next 
decade (Collier 2007: 27; Collier et al 2008; Paris 2010).  This means that the end of war is 
not necessarily the end of the conflict and that maintaining a peace is as difficult as 
implementing a peace (Collier 2007: 27; Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2008; Paris 
2010).   
One increasingly popular remedy to prevent recurrences of war involves external 
military intervention through peacekeeping.  This type of third party involvement includes 
the participation of a state or states prepared to use violence for political ends (Cochrane 
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2008: 41).  External military intervention has shown tangible progress in alleviating the 
worst consequences of civil conflicts.  The amount and intensity of civil conflicts have 
markedly declined since 1992 by almost 25%, while the number of peacekeeping 
operations has dramatically risen (Heldt and Wallensteen 2005: 17-20; Cockayne, 
Mikulaschek, and Perry 2010).  Determining precisely how peacekeeping contributes to 
this trend is worth further investigation.   
Peacekeeping serves three important roles in securing and pacifying a country 
enduring civil conflict; restoring order, maintaining post conflict peace, and preventing 
politically destabilizing acts, like coups (Collier 2007: 124).  Restoring order serves the 
important task of providing security to an otherwise lawless area.  Civil wars severely 
impair a government’s capacity to enforce the rule of law.  A country devoid of legal 
constructs opens itself up for mass atrocity crimes (crimes against humanity), illicit trade, 
and even genocide.  To effectively restore order to a dysfunctional state, a peacekeeping 
operation must have the strength to deter violence.  Maintaining post conflict peace is 
facilitated by negotiating political grievances and preventing accidents.  When civil wars 
stop, those at war have tremendous deficits of trust which can inhibit cooperation and 
implementation of a resolution.  Accidents can be misinterpreted as deliberately hostile 
actions leading to a resumption of war.  In order to maintain peace, peacekeeping forces 
must be capable of effectively relaying credible information among the belligerents to 
demobilize combatants, implement negotiated agreements, and reestablish trust.  Finally, 
a peacekeeping contingent can protect against the illegitimate seizure of political power.  
Deployment of a peacekeeping operation signifies the international community’s approval 
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of a current government by recognizing and protecting it.  By legitimizing the government 
of a post conflict country, peacekeepers can protect it from domestic threats when it is in 
a state of vulnerability.  Ultimately, interventions by third parties in civil conflicts help 
countries overcome obstacles toward implementing and maintaining peace. 
The Future of Peacekeeping 
 
Despite a strong desire to maintain the public good of peace, external military 
intervention remains a contentious topic among both domestic and international actors.  
Countries are reluctant to accept foreign troops on their soil, undermining sovereignty. 
Intervening states supplying troops and materiel do not wish to sacrifice blood and 
treasure for situations that do not directly affect their immediate security.  Peacekeeping 
requires a balance of action among the parties involved.  Intervening forces must display 
strength and resolve when enforcing a peace, but must also be cautious not to infringe 
upon local state sovereignty.   
Peacekeeping should also have staying power.  The goal of a peacekeeping 
operation should not only be to impose a peace, but also to set up an adequate system of 
self governance.  Peacekeeping serves as a crutch for a local government.  However, that 
crutch cannot remain in place indefinitely and an effective peacekeeping operation should 
perform the dual tasks of maintaining security and restoring a new political regime that is 
self sufficient.  If a military intervention only provides security based on its presence, it 
has not resolved a country’s long-term problem with self governance.  Effective 
peacekeeping missions should improve the short term and the long term security 
prospects within a conflict state. 
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Since peacekeeping provides a cost effective method to divert states from 
continued civil war, it is worth examining how best to provide it (Collier 2007: 128).  
Distinguishing how peacekeepers are effective at permanently ending civil wars would 
provide a blueprint to design future peacekeeping missions, insuring that the 
peacekeepers are not sent on missions unlikely to succeed, and that post conflict 
countries are provided the best opportunities to avert future civil war.  The purpose of 
this research is to provide supportive analysis evaluating how peacekeeping operations 
are most effective while peacekeepers are present and after the peacekeepers leave. 
Who Are the Best Peacekeepers? 
 
Installation of a foreign military presence provides the means to forcefully oppose 
insurgency, a neutral intermediary for negotiation, and a legitimate entity to recognize 
the new framework of the state.  However, not all peacekeeping operations are equal to 
the task.  The qualities that make them effective intermediaries are embodied in different 
capacities.  A peacekeeping operation may claim the moral high ground in protecting a 
population from impending genocide, but lack the military capability in preventing rogue 
elements from carrying it out.  Would such a peacekeeping operation be as effective at 
preventing violence?  Examining which peacekeeping operations best keep the peace 
helps identify which of these causal mechanisms make peacekeeping operations effective 
in curtailing post conflict violence.    
Because peacekeeping missions vary in their composition, one can determine why 
peacekeeping is effective by distinguishing who is effective.  Evaluating the makeup of 
peacekeeping missions and identifying which missions can be characterized by strength, 
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cooperation, and legitimacy, helps determine which qualities fare best in preventing 
recurrences of violence.  A peacekeeping mission sponsored by a more universal 
international organization like the UN may command greater legitimacy, but not carry the 
strong operational command strength that a single state mission could provide.  
Establishing which intermediaries make the best peacekeepers can serve as an 
instructional guide for composing future missions in civil conflicts.   
 There are two primary methods of analysis used in the research.  First, empirical 
analysis using large-n data permits us to draw general conclusions from a broader 
universe of observations involving third party peacekeepers.  Second, process tracing in 
the specific case of Sierra Leone’s civil war is employed to analyze how different 
peacekeeping missions in that country contributed to an immediate and ongoing peace in 
that country.  Each of these methods carries specific advantages and disadvantages in the 
research.   
 The quantitative analysis is based on numerous observations of particular 
phenomena attempting to objectively distinguish instances, seeking more general 
description, and containing measurements and analyses that are replicable by other 
researchers (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).  This method attempts to provide more 
universal findings by including a larger selection of data.  However, the shortcoming 
behind this kind of analysis derives from its generality.  In order to generate broad 
observations, the analysis assumes that all of the observations in the analysis are 
fundamentally similar in their context and orientation.  This is not always the case.  This 
research uses the TPI Intrastate Dispute Dataset because it not only expands the universe 
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of peacekeeping observations to permit large-n analysis, but it also provides data 
necessary to compare interventions.   
 The qualitative case study focuses on a limited set of observations, intensive 
analysis of historical accounts and data, with a comprehensive account of the particular 
event (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).  Contrasted with the quantitative approach, a 
more thorough analysis of a particular event attempts to unearth the causal mechanisms 
at work.  Though it produces specific explanations of the case at hand, it may lack broader 
explanatory power outside of that case in question.  Case study analysis must, also, make 
greater inferential assumptions to determine counterfactual analysis.  Careful case 
selection is important to isolate the causal factors one would like to identify.  The civil war 
in Sierra Leone provides a strong case for study because it contains sufficient variation in 
the independent and dependent variables under review.   
Chapter Overview 
 
 The plan of the dissertation follows.  Chapter 2 details the theoretical 
underpinnings of the research.  Bargaining theory provides the approach for examining 
the effects that third party intervention on producing durable conflict resolution.  Based 
on the theoretical understandings of the effects of third parties in civil conflict, Chapter 2 
will demonstrate that multinational peacekeeping missions led by nations that are strong 
in their commitments, transparent in their orientation, and legitimate in their purpose 
should have more promising effects on lasting peace.   
 Chapter 3 provides a close description of the data employed for the empirical 
research.  Determining what constitutes a peacekeeping mission and what does not is an 
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important distinction to make in this research.  Analyzing the observations of 
peacekeeping missions and the composition of the data will clarify what information can 
be extracted from using data taken from the Mullenbach and Dixon’s Third Party 
Intervention data on Intrastate Disputes.   
Chapters 4-6 present the findings from the empirical analysis of the data.  The 
results of the logistical regressions are presented in table format and described in the 
subsequent chapters.  The findings separate into three chapters, each section elaborates 
upon the major theoretical components and their corresponding explanatory variables.  
Chapter 4 examines the findings related to the strength of the intervening states.  Chapter 
5 analyzes the effect that information clarity has on peacekeeping outcomes.  Chapter 6 
discusses how legitimacy affects peacekeeping outcomes. The statistical analyses use 
logistical regression to estimate which aspects associated with a peacekeeping mission 
make peace most likely.  The analyses of the data are presented from the statistical tests 
identifying which variables contribute to and the findings are described.  Furthermore, 
analyses of control variables examine additional factors important to peacekeeping 
success.  Finally, an explanation of quality control statistics scrutinizes the cogency of the 
empirical model.  Imperfections and model misspecifications will address any lack of 
precision in the findings.   
 Chapter 7 presents a case study on the peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone.  
Sierra Leone provides an excellent case since the 10 year civil war included multiple 
peacekeeping interventions from various international actors.  Some of the interventions 
successfully stopped violence and other interventions failed to resolve the civil war.  By 
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examining the impact that each of these interventions had on recurrences of civil war, 
inferences can be made about that critical characteristics of peacekeeping necessary to 
end civil conflict and maintain the peace.   
Finally, a concluding chapter summarizes the findings and explores some of the 
policy implications based on the results of the statistical tests and the case study.  The 
main conclusions drawn from both the statistical tests and the case study analysis 
demonstrate that the real value of a peacekeeping mission is its ability to provide credible 
signals and relay information to hostile factions in civil war.  A strong military presence 
may be capable of stopping violence, however post conflict states can only successfully 
reorganize into functioning states when intermediaries cultivate and maintain transparent 
and credible bargaining processes.  Third party peacekeeping missions that are most 
capable of relaying credible information among belligerents best produce sustained peace 
after civil wars.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright     2013     Barrett J. Osborn  
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Chapter 2: Theory of Peacekeeping 
Solving Commitment Problems in Civil Conflict 
 
 When violence ceases in civil war, third parties are often introduced to assist in 
consolidating the peace and demobilization process.  While some current scholarship 
analyzes the success rates for third party interventions, little research analyzes the 
characteristics of those third parties that make them successful arbiters of conflict 
resolution.  During any cessation of civil conflict, tensions are high and trust is low, so the 
likelihood for resolving these conflicts peacefully is difficult and complicated.  I contend 
that for a third party peacekeeping mission to insure that peace will endure in a post 
conflict environment, it must be able to provide effective means for communicating and 
relaying credible signals among various parties to convey resolve and foster trust among 
the belligerents.   
 This chapter introduces the argument that peacekeeping missions with 
organizational strength, institutional clarity, and international legitimacy stand a better 
chance for reducing the recurrence of future conflicts.  The chapter begins with a review 
of prior work in areas of peacekeeping and civil wars, primarily enumerating what 
methods have been effective in reducing recurrences of violence.  The chapter then 
summarizes the theory suggesting why peacekeeping is an effective means for conflict 
management.  This argument will be extended by applying the theoretical arguments for 
peacekeeping operations.  To clarify the material related to peacekeeping, key terms will 
be defined and specified.   
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 Mediation and peacekeeping are two of the major approaches that third parties 
take in post conflict.  The primary difference between approaches lies within their 
commitment to the intervention.  Mediation is more generally defined as assistance by a 
third party to numerous interacting parties in order to help facilitate a mutually 
acceptable settlement to a conflict (Greig 2005: 250).  That assistance can manifest itself 
in numerous ways, including consultation, acting as an intermediary, or hosting 
negotiations between the belligerents.  While these are not costless gestures, they do not 
alleviate the commitment problem that remains between belligerents to actually 
implement a negotiated solution.   
 Peacekeeping is a costlier form of intervention by the third party intermediary; a 
commitment of human resources to oversee the implementation, enforcement or 
construction of the peace process.  Although two opposing sides may agree on a 
negotiated settlement, they still lack trust over actually implementing those agreements 
(Walter 2002).  Consequently, a third party can help alleviate that distrust by monitoring 
the implementation of a peace agreement and clarifying the intentions of each party 
involved in the peace effort.  Research on third party efforts at peacekeeping using 
empirical data have examined questions related to whether or not peacekeeping works 
(Fortna 2008), but other research has been limited to examination of case studies 
determining how peacekeeping works and how it works effectively (Coleman 2007; 
Howard 2008).  By using the theoretical concepts enumerated in the mediation and 
peacekeeping literature, the universe of peacekeeping cases in civil conflict can be 
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reexamined to provide an empirical assessment of third parties that promote successful 
peace settlements.   
 It is unrealistic to think that all third parties will be equally effective in convincing 
belligerents in a civil conflict to permanently stop fighting and implement an agreement 
that satisfies both parties.  Some third parties may have greater military capabilities or a 
more resolute ambition to end the violence, seeking to “strong arm” the disputants into 
ending the fighting.  Some third parties may share cultural or linguistic similarities to the 
disputants making them more effective or trusted ombudsmen.  Some third parties may 
be distrusted because of a prior colonial legacy in the region.  Analyzing whether or not 
third party intervention into civil disputes is effective is important, but it is also important 
to analyze how third parties best promote a peaceful resolution. This research argues that 
the strength of the intervener, the credibility of signaling from the intervener, and the 
authority of the intervener all have positive effects in promoting peaceful outcomes in 
civil disputes.    
Scholarly Research on Resolving Conflict through an Intermediary 
 
 Numerous studies in resolving interstate and civil conflicts examine the roles that 
third party intermediaries play when bringing about lasting and peaceful settlements to 
disputes (For example, Walter 2002; Fortna 2003, 2008).  While actors engaged in conflict 
may be capable of resolving these disputes by themselves, they are motivated to pursue a 
more favorable outcome in the bargaining process and are often unable to credibly 
 14 
commit to a tenable resolution outside of war.1  Information asymmetries, mistrust 
between parties, and issue indivisibility all present formidable obstacles when negotiating 
a peaceful settlement to a dispute, but they are not insurmountable (Fearon 1995).  Such 
bargaining difficulties and commitment problems among hostile actors have prompted 
research into the roles that third party intermediaries can play to alleviate these 
complexities through negotiation and implementation of peaceful settlements. 
The research associated with third party intervention offers several explanations 
for the effectiveness of outsiders on establishing an enduring peace. Smith and Stam 
(2003) contend that third parties can be effective in insuring a cessation of conflict by 
providing an artificial boundary between the belligerents.  Employing peacekeeping forces 
increases the associated costs of attacking, though informational asymmetries still exists 
among the warring parties.  Consequently, Smith and Stam (2003) consider the value in 
third parties to be in separating the belligerents as opposed to solving informational 
problems between the hostile parties.   
Such an analysis is useful when belligerents can be separated, but among warring 
factions in civil disputes, a third party may be unable to separate the belligerents since 
they are usually scattered throughout the country undergoing civil strife and must 
ultimately cooperate to establish a stable government.  The inability of a third party to 
simply separate the actors involved in the conflict presents an even greater challenge on 
the third party to relay information to the parties involved.  Fortna (2003), distinguishing 
                                                 
1
 In civil wars, war may be sought as an end in itself, particularly as a profitable enterprise (see Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004).  However, I assume that war is a political tool used to accomplish political goals.  Given that 
war is a costly form of political expression and ultimately ex post inefficient (Fearon 1995), belligerents 
should prefer peace to war when all things are considered equal.   
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between peacekeeping deployments in both interstate and intrastate conflict, finds that 
peacekeeping is, indeed, effective in both types of conflict, once a peace agreement has 
been forged.  Such a finding suggests that an intervention by a third party promotes 
peaceful outcomes in wars beyond merely separating the belligerents.      
 The most notable studies on the effectiveness of third party intervention through 
peacekeeping do not distinguish missions based on the composition of the forces.  
However, prior studies contribute to the understanding of the overall impact of 
peacekeeping operations (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2003, 2008).  While 
determining that outside intervention has a positive effect on peaceful resolution to 
conflicts, these studies treat all missions as if they were equal in terms of which countries 
intervened and how these missions are viewed as legitimate in the eyes of the local 
populations.  Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006) include all UN peacekeeping missions, 
whether few or many countries participate.  Fortna (2003) differentiates peacekeeping 
missions based on the UN mandate and era that the mission took place.  But she limits her 
study to UN interventions.  Interventions by regional organizations or individual states are 
not included.  These studies provide evidence that peacekeeping missions help promote 
peaceful outcomes between hostile actors compared with leaving the belligerents to work 
out a deal on their own, but these studies do not tell the complete story why 
peacekeeping missions are successful. 
 Despite a significant research program aimed at distinguishing the role third 
parties play and empirically analyzing the effects that they have upon bringing about a 
peaceful resolution, few researchers have tested the characteristics of the intermediary to 
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ascertain which kinds of third parties most effectively resolve these disputes.  Mediation 
techniques, cease-fire terms, preferences of the third party, and an intermediary’s ability 
to increase the costs associated with resuming violence have all been scrutinized as 
tangible means to insure that the parties will not resume hostilities (Dixon 1996; Kydd 
2003; Fortna 2004; Gent and Shannon 2008).  An intermediary must tangibly establish 
trust and confidence among the belligerent, who must accept that they are neutral and 
honest brokers of conflict resolution.  How might a third party enhance trust among 
domestic parties that have every reason to mistrust one another?   
 Using a third party intermediary is additionally important among civil war 
combatants, since these disputants are less easily separated among preexisting 
boundaries and must reincorporate themselves within the governing framework of the 
state.  While the power for third parties to coerce belligerents into an acceptable 
settlement is significant, the “soft” power to effectively persuade the parties to 
permanently end hostilities through a bargaining outcome may also be important (Nye 
2004).  Even so, if a bargain is struck or disputants have revealed extraordinary amounts 
of information regarding both capability and resolve, what guarantees can they effectively 
give about their commitment to enduring peace?  How warring parties interpret 
information once war has reduced its utility to transmit credible information is worth 
further investigation (Slantchev 2004). 
 Several studies speculate the impact that third parties have on reducing hostility 
and invoking a peace, albeit, with varying theoretical expectations and empirical results.  
Cunningham (2007) suggests that the involvement of more parties in negotiating a peace 
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reduces the range of acceptable outcomes for the belligerents, thereby lengthening the 
duration of conflict.  Werner and Yuen (2005) contend that a third party alters the cost 
structure associated with war, artificially imposing a peace, but does not resolve the 
informational asymmetries that only war can reveal.  Kydd (2003; 2006) concludes that 
biased mediators solve informational problems among belligerents, but neutral mediators 
are better at alleviating commitment problems.  Svensson (2007) furthers the argument 
by demonstrating that an intermediary’s bias in civil conflict toward the government has a 
greater impact on peace than does bias toward rebel forces.  Despite these exploratory 
efforts, the effect that third parties have on conflict resolution remains unclear.   
 How an intermediary is perceived by local populations may also affect the 
intermediary’s ability to end a civil war.  For instance, a third party intervention into a civil 
conflict by an outside state that was a former colonial ruler may delegitimize the third 
party among warring factions because local nationals may consider the intermediary to 
have self-interested intentions, compromising the perceived neutrality of the intervening 
state.  Yet, former colonial rulers could have greater interests in the unstable region and 
therefore be viewed as a more credible security guarantor in a fragile peace.  However, if 
the former colonial power acts in collaboration with numerous other countries to broker a 
peace, the hostile parties may have greater confidence that states are not acting out of 
self interested motivations and, rather, are enforcing established and accepted global 
norms of conduct.  Who intervenes in a conflict as a third party and how they distinguish 
their resolve as an intermediary is likely to determine the kind of reception they will 
receive by the belligerents.  Neutral third parties with effective means for relaying 
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information, and greater resolve in promoting peace, all while projecting a high degree of 
strength should pose the least risk to the sovereignty of conflicting nations when 
arbitrating and implementing a settlement.   
 Though research on the effects of third party intervention in conflict resolution 
contends that intervention is effective at resolving disputes, there is less research about 
the reasons why these states are effective in promoting peace.  Ultimately, it is unclear 
what characteristics of third parties intervening into a conflict might prevent future 
occurrences of violence and promote a lasting peace.   Dixon (1996) examines the 
techniques that third parties use to initiate peaceful settlement of disputes, but does not 
involve the implementation methods for securing such agreements.  This is not meant to 
suggest that implementation methods are “either unimportant or irrelevant for evaluating 
conflict management; in fact, some management techniques (eg. peacekeeping) may be 
most applicable at the implementation stage” (Dixon 1996: 657).  Once warring parties in 
civil conflicts come to an acceptable solution after years of conflict, they may find it 
difficult implementing agreements and are equally apprehensive about a resumption of 
violence.  The implementation stage of conflict resolution involves the same kinds of 
commitment and information problems that make bargaining and negotiation 
problematic.    
 Fortna (2008) provides the most complete analysis of peacekeeping and its effects 
on forging a lasting peace agreement in civil conflict.  Her analysis concludes that third 
party interventions through peacekeeping are an effective means for overcoming 
commitment problems among belligerents at the cessation of civil conflict and reduce the 
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likelihood for recurrences of conflict while peacekeepers are present and after they have 
left.  The causal mechanisms that she identifies include changing the cost structure among 
the belligerents, reducing fear and uncertainty among the belligerents, reducing the 
impact and perception of accidental outbreaks of violence, and insuring political 
representation of all actors in the post war government.  Consequently, an effective 
peacekeeping mission should be undertaken by a trustworthy and transparent 
peacekeeping force.  Additional research should further examine the causal mechanisms 
she specifies by distinguishing which types of third parties are best at reducing 
recurrences of violence.  Fortna’s (2008) analysis only establishes that peacekeeping is 
more effective than if the belligerents are left to their own devices.   
Theoretical Foundations of Cooperation and War 
 
 This dissertation rests on several assumptions regarding dispute resolution.  First, 
that states and non-state actors are rationally led; second, that war is a costly endeavor 
and not sought as an end in itself; and third, that while disputants have incentives to 
cooperate, fear and mistrust lead them to believe the other might deceive them in any 
agreement.   By indicating that states and non-state actors are rationally led, it is assumed 
that leaders base their decisions on what information they have at hand and cognitively 
measure the expected costs and benefits of their actions.  While they may not understand 
all of the implications of their actions, they are not likely to make decisions that are 
inherently detrimental to their self interests.  Bargaining theory helps explain the 
incentive structures that lead to both cooperation and war.  
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 Bargaining theory presents war as a costly method of bargaining.  When 
belligerents in a dispute have competing interests and divergent preferences, they must 
make costly signals of their willingness to achieve their preferred outcomes.  Those signals 
must illustrate their motivation and capability of securing their ideal preferences by force, 
although they would prefer to achieve their goals through capitulation.  Each signal of 
capability and resolve changes the dynamic of negotiation.  If a belligerent is less 
convinced that they can achieve their preferred outcome by force, they will be willing to 
deviate further from their preferred goal.  Conversely, if a belligerent is convinced that 
they can achieve more through force than by negotiation, they will pursue their goals by 
force.  Bargaining theory identifies war as a costly extension of the bargaining process, 
rather than a breakdown of the bargaining process (Filson and Werner 2002; Powell 
2004).   
 Bargaining strategies are altered throughout a civil war.  The course of the conflict 
alters the costs and benefits of continuing conflict or engaging in negotiation strategies.  
Adding a third party to the conflict changes the bargaining calculations of the belligerents.  
If the belligerents believe they can gain more through conflict, they will resume conflict.  If 
they believe they can achieve more through peace and negotiation, they will engage in 
diplomacy.  A brief description of bargaining theory clarifies how changes in a conflict’s 
combatants and international interventions alter the willingness for the government and 
rebels to negotiate and commit to peace.     
 Bargaining theory explains conditions that motivate participants in war to pursue 
strategies of negotiation and strategies of war (Filson and Werner 2002; Powell 2002).  
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Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate simple models clarifying when a settlement is likely and 
unlikely.  Consider that each participant in a conflict carries a single-peaked preference 
ideal point (IP).  In the case of civil war, the IP most likely constitutes total control of the 
government and resources of the country for both the government and the rebels.  
However, because war is costly, each actor is willing to deviate from that ideal point to 
forgo the expenses associated with war.  As Figure 2.1 illustrates, when neither actor is 
willing to deviate far enough from their preferred outcome, negotiation is not possible 
and war will ensue.  Over the course of war, information regarding capability and resolve 
becomes public and clarifies the overall strength and motivation of each group.  War 
constitutes a costly method of information sharing.   
Figure 2.1: Unsuccessful Bargaining between Government and Rebels: Result War  
 
 
 
 Eventually, the costs associated with war will lead one or both parties to deviate 
further from their ideal preference point making an acceptable bargain between the 
groups undergoing conflict possible.  Civil wars present unique challenges associated with 
the bargaining model of war.  First, governments are often reluctant to officially recognize 
rebels because their existence poses a threat to its authority.  Second, rebels often have 
more to gain in profit through war than through peace (Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 
2004).  This is especially true in Sierra Leone, where RUF rebels engaged in some of the 
worst war atrocities ever witnessed and funded their rebellion through the illicit trade of 
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conflict diamonds.  Furthermore, rebels are often reluctant to implement an agreement 
out of fear that once demobilization occurs and their strength is sapped, the government 
will renege on its agreements (Walter 2009: 246).    These challenges in civil wars make 
brokering a peace extraordinarily difficult and often require a third party to alter the cost 
and benefit structure associated with the belligerents.   
Figure 2.2:  Bargaining Possible between Government and Rebels 
 
 
 
 
  
The bargaining model of war is important when examining how the entrance of a 
third party alters the civil war outcome.  When a third party enters a civil war, it makes 
renewal of hostilities costlier for the belligerents.  A third party adds conflict costs since 
there is another foe to worry about.  A third party is able to facilitate negotiation, 
clarifying information asymmetries when coordinating a settlement.  Involvement of a 
third party also increases reputational costs, should the belligerents renege on the 
agreement.   
That war is costly and not sought as an end in itself assumes that leaders will forgo 
the expenses of money and lives should they be able to achieve their goals without 
suffering the costs (Fearon 1995).  Leaders will go to war only if their expected benefits 
through war outweigh their expected benefits through cooperation.  Despite the 
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existence of low cost alternatives to war, bargaining problems among disputants make 
negotiation and cooperation difficult (Walter 2009).  Assuming that enemies have deficits 
of trust when they have competing interests does not seem an extraordinary assumption, 
but it is important in resolving conflict.  In order to enact an acceptable peace agreement 
among belligerents, each side must be faithful that the other is willing to commit to the 
agreement and cease fighting.  Mistrust prevents either side from honoring their 
agreements.   
 Once belligerents reach a cessation of violence in a civil conflict, peace is not a 
foregone conclusion (Werner 1999).  In the bargaining model of war, war is a costly 
method of displaying information and commitment to pursue preferred interests.  
Because war is costly, over time belligerents should be willing to deviate from their most 
preferred outcomes and agree to a settlement (Wagner 2000).  Though a settlement may 
be reached, bargaining problems remain.  Bargaining theory stipulates that wars persist as 
a result of informational asymmetries, difficulties among disputants to make credible 
commitments, and the indivisibility of stakes in the conflict (Fearon 1995; Walter 2009).  
Belligerents seek to withhold information and misrepresent their commitment, presenting 
the possibility of reigniting war in a post conflict area.  These incentives for shirking rather 
than cooperating during the peace process in civil wars are explained in greater detail.   
 First, each of the belligerents has an incentive to cheat on any negotiated 
settlement.  Even though both sides prefer cooperation to war, each of the belligerents 
prefers victory to cooperation.  Bargaining theory suggests that belligerents will attempt 
to alter the terms of a settlement in their favor by strategically releasing private 
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information.  Belligerents will misrepresent their commitment to fighting and capability to 
win a war in order to signal future costs to their opponent.  Fighting provides an 
informational window about the capability, resolve, and bargaining willingness of each of 
the sides involved.  Rather than war being outside the realm of cooperation, bargaining 
theory contends that it is merely an extension of the negotiation process.  War 
commences when a negotiating impasse occurs and ends when a deal is struck (Reiter 
2003).  
 A crucial component to the bargaining model of war is the role that both public 
and private information play in the onset and cessation of conflict.  If war is viewed as a 
bargaining process, each side must consider what their ideal outcome of the bargaining 
process is, as well as the ideal outcome of the opposing side.  Parties have incentives to 
hide or misrepresent this information to give themselves an advantage in either 
bargaining or war.  Because of the incentive to misrepresent, actors have difficulty 
assuring each other of the merits of their intentions.  These features of bargaining theory 
highlight the informational and commitment problems that ultimately lead to conflict 
(Filson and Werner 2002: 819-820).  As conflicts cease, it is natural to assume that 
sufficient information has been communicated among the belligerents to alter their 
preferences to seek negotiation because war has become too costly.  However, it is logical 
for one or both sides of the dispute to attempt to cheat or shirk on their present 
agreements in order to improve their future negotiation capability. 
 Second, each of the belligerents involved in a cessation of conflict has an inherent 
incentive, not only to strategically initiate and win a conflict, but also to fear that the 
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opposition is likely to do the same.  These fears over the intentions of the adversary 
motivate both sides to engage in activity that destabilizes peace.  Uncertainty over 
intentions can have two detrimental effects on peaceful resolution to conflict: it provides 
incentives for attack and it leads each actor to take defensive security measures that are 
construed as offensive in nature.  These are aspects associated with the security dilemma.  
When temporary cessations in conflict occur, uncertainty over intentions leads to fearful 
behavior by the parties involved.  This may lead each of the belligerents to engage in 
defensive measures, like rearmament or conscription, aimed at protecting themselves.  
While these actions may be defensive in nature, the opposition may view them as signs of 
renewing aggression (Jervis 1978).  While each of the belligerents can benefit from mutual 
cooperation, they also know that forcing the hand of the opposition can lead them to an 
outcome that is more consistent with their most preferred outcome (total victory).  
Having incentive to be the first to take offensive action further complicates the security 
dilemma.  If either of the belligerents believes that by being the first to break the peace, 
they can cripple the adversary in order to dictate the terms of the new agreement, they 
will attack.  When this advantage exists for both parties involved in the conflict, neither 
side can trust the other as faithful in their intentions to honor a peace.   
 Third, when conflicts cease, the belligerents are essentially frozen at their current 
points of hostility.  This presents a very unstable situation for the parties involved and, 
consequently, accidents occur and can be misconstrued as conscious acts of war.  Highly 
mobilized and armed factions inside a country with little effective means for self policing 
yield a scenario where accidents are not only likely, but have severe repercussions.  
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Generally, civil wars employ individuals from various factions that do not necessarily 
follow a specific chain of command.  They may not follow orders that command a 
cessation in conflict.  Events in Northern Ireland illustrate this point.  Though the Good 
Friday Agreement settled much of the underlying dispute between the warring factions, 
prevented violence, and prompted political reconciliation in Northern Ireland, it could not 
stop rogue Irish Republican dissidents from murdering military and police personnel in 
early 2009.  Even such random small scale acts can rapidly escalate when tensions and 
anxieties are high in conflict areas.  Effective means for communicating between 
belligerents can mean the difference between recurring war and lasting peace. 
 Finally, distribution problems can inhibit prospects for peace in conflict areas.  
Relative distributions from gains by cooperating are often unequal in nature, particularly 
in civil wars where even small factions can cause big problems.  Belligerents that seek 
secession, greater minority representation, or more equitable distribution of wealth 
inherently provide gains for some at the expense of others.  When a minority group gains 
political autonomy over a region, another group loses it.  Zero-sum situations make 
bargaining difficult, particularly when leaders need to answer to constituencies.  Making 
distributional concessions might make a leader appear weak or unpopular, jeopardizing 
their political survival.  More democratic constituencies might use their domestic 
audiences to press for greater concessions in negotiations (Martin 2000).  Less democratic 
regimes may worry about distributional losses and their ability to redistribute private 
goods to their domestic audiences (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).  Indivisibility of 
political and economic resources that provide relative gains may make cessation of 
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conflict unlikely in the first place, but they also make cooperation and trust more unlikely 
once the fighting has stopped by exacerbating attack incentives, fear of cheating, and the 
risks of accidents (Fortna 2004: 19). 
 The preceding factors illustrate that while cessations in civil conflict provide an 
opportunity for peaceful resolution to conflict, they are fragile.  While a stalemate or 
cessation in conflict reveals enough information to temporarily make war an unsuitable 
option, mistrust and fear may lead belligerents to continue to protect themselves from 
one another.  These protective measures intensify the inherent mistrust and make 
renewed violence a more likely scenario.  In order for peace to fully take hold and endure, 
third party intervention must address these commitment problems associated with 
conflict resolution.   
How a Third Party Can Help 
 
 Intervention into conflicts by third parties is an old practice.  Early examples of 
peacekeeping involve individual states combining their efforts or acting autonomously to 
insure the enforcement of agreements.  Sweden/Norway (a single country at the time) 
sent a peacekeeping force of approximately 4,000 soldiers to the disputed region of 
Schleswig from 1849-1850, while Prussia and Denmark negotiated the details of a peace 
treaty (Gafvert 1995).  France administered a police force in the German Saar region in 
the years following World War I, which was later transferred to a force of 3,300 from the 
Netherlands, United Kingdom, Sweden, and Italy, while a referendum on the status of the 
region was held in 1935 (Heldt and Wallensteen 2005).  Despite the popularity of using an 
intermediary to help resolve a dispute, proving the causal mechanisms that define an 
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intervention’s success or failure remain elusive to scholars  (Smith and Stam 2003: 116). 
Third parties should help alleviate bargaining obstacles by relaying reliable information to 
both actors, promoting credible commitments, and assisting in the implementation of 
settlements.  These actions help belligerents reduce fear and hostility, while insuring that 
belligerents are serious about committing to the peace process.  However, the impact that 
a third party has on this informational and commitment dynamic is difficult to 
extrapolate.  Third parties may not only assist in settlement negotiation, but also aid in 
implementing that settlement once a deal has been struck.    
 There are three primary explanations that account for the effectiveness of a third 
party when enforcing a lasting peace in a post-civil conflict zone.  First, a third party can 
escalate the costs among the parties for reigniting violence.  When a stalemate is reached 
among the belligerents, the incorporation of a third party security guarantor increases the 
prospect of greater cost to a belligerent that initiates a breach of the cease fire.  Second, a 
third party can facilitate the transfer of information among the combatants.  Bargaining 
theory suggests that war is a result of misconceptions and an inability to effectively 
transmit credible information outside of war.  Third, a third party can “shame” 
combatants into ceasing hostilities and accept a tenable compromise.  The belligerents 
should be concerned over reputational costs they may suffer by resuming violence against 
the wishes of the greater international community.  This idea is highlighted by the notion 
that when the international community speaks with a more unified voice that they are 
able to convince, rather than coerce, combatants into accepting a more universal 
international norm of conduct.  Combined, these three components represent the 
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theoretical basis for the following research agenda aimed at distinguishing the effects of 
third parties on the cessation of civil conflict.   
Increasing Costs for Reneging on an Agreement 
 
 A third party intermediary, first, changes the cost structure for the combatants 
involved in civil conflict when determining whether or not to resume violence.  Not only 
must they consider the possibility of overcoming their domestic foe, but they must also 
consider the resources and assets introduced by the third party.  Depending on the 
strength and resolve in the third party seeking to implement a peace agreement, 
resumption of war becomes a more costly endeavor for the belligerents.  Doyle and 
Sambanis (2006) use various theoretical and empirical metrics for peacebuilding success 
in post conflict zones to show that the probability of peacebuilding success increases as 
the commitment of the international community increases.  This finding remains 
consistent with the theoretical model that identifies war as a bargaining process.  When 
added costs are incorporated into a state’s calculation for attaining its political objectives, 
it will alter its bargaining behavior to forego such costs.  Rather than aggressively pursuing 
a strategy to achieve gains through war, increasing the prospective costs by a third party 
will alter the negotiation spectrum making peaceful settlement a more risk adverse 
option.  When each of the belligerents increases the spectrum of acceptable bargaining 
outcomes, the likelihood that they will be able to come up with an acceptable agreement 
also increases.  Walter (2002) classifies the credibility of these third party security 
commitments based a third party’s willingness to use military force and the interests that 
the third party has within the region undergoing conflict.  These factors enhance the 
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probability that the third party will commit to the implementation phase of securing a 
lasting peace.   
 Fortna (2008) adds to the importance of this causal mechanism in her study of the 
fragile peace in Sierra Leone.  Under the initial Abidjan cease fire agreement, no third 
party was present, the cost structures did not change, and violence resumed.  When the 
next cease fire agreement under Lomé was signed, UN peacekeepers were sent to the 
region but their mandate and resolve were perceived as weak by the rebel forces and 
they still did not adhere to the agreement.2  Only after the UN mandate was strengthened 
and additional contingents of British peacekeepers were sent to the region was a peaceful 
resolution implemented under the Abuja Agreement.  Fortna’s primary objective is to 
identify the overall impact of peacekeeping, comparing steps taken in Sierra Leone with 
studies on Mozambique and Bangladesh and the comparison shows that strength in 
commitment of an intermediary is a crucial factor for deterring violence (Fortna 2008: 
125).  
What Makes an Intermediary Strong? 
 
Increasing the costs to the belligerents by means of a peacekeeping force 
manifests itself in multiple ways.  To determine the strength of an intermediary, one must 
consider both capability and motivation of the intermediary.  Strength in peacekeeping 
missions can be approximated based on the numerical size of the peacekeeping mission, 
the military capability of the country leading the peacekeeping campaign, and the 
                                                 
2
 The inability for the RUF to adhere to the cease fire was not only related to the strength of the peacekeeping 
mission, but also the benefits and profits associated with their lucrative diamond mining operations.   
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incentive associated with the country leading the campaign.  Testing these metrics of 
strength in a mission may shed light on the deterrent capacity in a peacekeeping mission. 
 The most basic element that could conceivably contribute to the strength of the 
peacekeeping mission is the size of the force sent to the conflict.  When there are more 
peacekeepers sent to a conflict, there are potentially greater numbers of adversaries 
should the belligerents choose to violate the cessation of conflict.  Bargaining theory 
maintains that belligerents will have the incentive to attain their goals through conflict if 
they think it will be more beneficial than negotiation.  Introduction of a strong third party 
provides a clear and tangible establishment of added costs to the belligerents to achieve 
those goals.  Introduction of added costs should plausibly compel belligerents to increase 
their willingness to bargain for and commit to a settlement.  If there is explanatory value 
to bargaining theory, the stronger the third party is, the more likely each of the 
belligerents will deviate from their ideal outcome (Werner 1999).  Simply stated, added 
costs introduced by means of peacekeeping personnel make resumption of wars less 
attractive as a means for accomplishing objectives.   
Less clear is whether or not the size of the force will impact peace beyond the 
tenure of the peacekeeping mission.  A large mission can serve as an indication of the 
commitment of the international community to the promotion of a settlement pressuring 
the belligerents to adopt an agreement and seeing it through.  However, a large mission 
can also create an “unnatural” settlement or a settlement driven entirely by an 
intermediary being present (Werner and Yuen 2005).  Once peacekeepers are removed, 
the return to unbalanced bargaining structures may lead to a resumption of violence.  A 
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large peacekeeping mission increases the bargaining space for the individuals during the 
mission, but might not persist once the mission is over.   
H1a:  Larger peacekeeping missions should reduce the likelihood for 
recurrences of conflict while the peacekeepers are present  
 
H1b: Larger peacekeeping forces should not reduce the likelihood for 
violence after the peacekeepers have left the region. 
 
 Peacekeeping missions can also be defined by the country that is leading the 
international peacekeeping campaign.  The lead country in the peacekeeping mission 
should be defined as the country that provides the most peacekeepers to the mission.  
The country leading a peacekeeping mission serves as the primary source for military 
personnel and presents itself as the political representative of the peacekeeping force.  If 
a state is willing to make tangible commitments to a peacekeeping mission, it has a 
significant stake and interest in the outcome of the mission.  Using the lead country as a 
proxy for the overall peacekeeping mission provides an adequate substitute for trying to 
approximate the general composition of the peacekeeping force which routinely changes 
throughout the course of a mission.   
 Peacekeeping missions led by countries with significant strength based on military 
capability possess the ability to enforce a peace agreement. Since most peacekeeping 
operations have been authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), much of 
the focus of peacekeeping missions has placated the interests of the Permanent 5 (P5) 
members.  Previous studies suggest that these members must have an interest in the 
conflict to take action (Durch 1993; Diehl 1993; Oudraat 1996).  But authorizing a mission 
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to take place is a fairly modest commitment to an internal conflict compared to 
intervention itself.  Additional studies show that UN missions are less likely to take place if 
one of the “great powers” has intervened in the conflict directly (Oudraat 1993; 
Mullenbach 1995).  Great powers have the excess military capacity to intervene, but do 
not necessarily want to have their authority obstructed by an international organization.  
When one of the P5 members is committed to a conflict, enough to contribute troops to 
the region, it is safe to say that it is making a costly commitment to pursue its foreign 
policy interests (Diehl 1993; Durch 1993; Oudraat 1996). 
 The impact that former colonial rulers have in pacifying a conflict ridden country 
can also shed light on the importance of state interests.  Former colonial powers, like the 
great powers, have multiple interests in pacifying a state at war.  Former colonial rulers 
often maintain trade and cultural ties to their former colonies as well as military ties.  
These ties provide the necessary capacity to intervene with a sense of purpose.  However, 
sovereignty can be tricky.  One must assume that these former colonies gained their 
independence for a reason and that any hint of neocolonialist ambitions would inflame 
nationalist sentiment among citizens of the former colony.  Since the former colony is 
emerging from civil war, one may assume that former colonial peacekeepers would be 
equally willing to withdraw without permanently resolving the conflict.   
H2a:  Peacekeeping missions led by major powers or former colonial rulers 
should reduce the likelihood for recurrences of conflict because they bring 
more immediate resources to bear.   
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H2b:  Peacekeeping missions lead by major powers or former colonial rulers 
will not significantly impact recurrences of conflict after the peacekeepers 
leave. 
 
Countries that border the conflict countries have both the immediate means and 
long term motives to prevent resumptions of violence because they are more directly 
affected by the harmful consequences of the civil war.  A country’s interests are critical 
when conflicts occur in their own backyard (Fortna 2008: 34).   While the previous factors 
related to strength rest upon the capability of the intermediary, involvement of a 
bordering country adds another dimension of motivation.  Indeed, location enhances the 
capability of an intermediary.  Resources can be efficiently allocated to a peacekeeping 
mission because of proximity and the spillover elements of civil conflict can be better 
confined.  Bordering countries will more likely desire a long term solution because their 
wellbeing is closely linked to conflict country.  Bordering countries likely share significant 
trade and cultural ties, making neighborhood stability beneficial to the peacekeepers and 
the citizens within the conflict country (Barbieri and Reuveny 2005).  Additionally, the 
adverse consequences of civil war can affect the populations of the conflict countries and 
their neighbors.  Refugees seeking asylum present logistical and financial burdens to 
neighboring countries and mass population displacements multiply regional health 
epidemics and the spread of disease (Collier 2007: 28).  When contiguous countries 
intervene as peacekeepers, they do so out of immediate and long term self interest 
(Barbieri and Reuveny 2005). 
H3a:  Peacekeeping missions led by contiguous countries will reduce the 
likelihood for recurrence of violence while peacekeepers are present. 
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H3b: Peacekeeping missions led by contiguous countries will reduce the 
likelihood for recurrences of violence after the peacekeepers leave. 
 
 Peacekeeping constitutes a costly signal of intent by the intermediary, however, 
less costly or “cheap” signals may also change the bargaining dimensions of a civil war 
(Thyne 2006).  Willingness to mediate a dispute presents a signal to the belligerents that 
outside groups seek resolution to conflict.  Mediation serves as a method of conflict 
resolution by means of communication between the belligerents, providing a process and 
procedure for conflict management, and by issuing directives and ultimatums to the 
belligerents (Bercovitch and Gartner 2006).  Compared with the previous indicators for 
strength, major power mediation is a rather weak signal of resolve, since it requires little 
direct action by the intermediary.   
 States constantly interact with one another and these interactions act as signals of 
intent.  “Signaling involves actions or statements that potentially allow an actor to infer 
something about unobservable, but salient, properties of another actor” (Gartzke 2003: 
1).  Mediation by an intermediary constitutes a “cheap” method for conveying a signal to 
the belligerents because it does not require the signaler to make any significant 
investment to reinforce its position (Thyne 2009: 27).  By attempting to mediate an 
agreement between the warring factions, an intermediary is making a statement of 
intent.  The stronger the intermediaries, the more salient that signal should be.  If a major 
power was involved in the mediation process, the belligerents may be responding to 
strongly worded directives or ultimatums from a powerful nation.  Consequently, it is 
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expected that when a major power becomes involved in the mediation process between 
the belligerents, it deters the belligerents from resuming the conflict out of fear that a 
much stronger nation might involve itself.   
H4a:  When a major power is involved in the mediation process between 
the belligerents, resumption of violence will be less likely both during the 
peacekeeping mission. 
 
H4b:  When a major power is involved in the mediation process, resumption 
of violence will be less likely after a peacekeeping mission. 
 
 The strength of a peacekeeping mission serves as an overt signal of the 
international commitment to ending the conflict.  Establishing which peacekeeping 
missions are stronger than others can be determined by looking at who intervenes and 
how they intervene.  Intermediaries that have capable and resolute military forces 
committed to ending a civil conflict should alter the costs of war for the disputants 
enough to dissuade future violence.  However, there is question about the durability of 
those commitments.  Do peacekeepers that exhibit strength dissuade violence while they 
are present, or can they alter expected future costs to disputants based on their previous 
actions?   Testing how peacekeeping missions defined by strength of the intermediary 
during and after the intervention should clarify the power of strength. 
Enhancing Credibility of Information 
 
 Introducing a third party into a dispute helps solve informational problems among 
the combatants since monitoring the implementation of an agreement demonstrates the 
combatants’ commitment to a peace settlement.  Access to information is important, but 
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also important is the source of that information.  Because of the importance of credible 
information, an effective intermediary must be able to present transparent and credible 
signals to the actors involved.  When opposing factions work toward implementing a 
permanent peace settlement, they strategically release information to the opposition so 
that they do not give the other side an advantage should conflict recur.  The conflicting 
factions should be willing to release information to a neutral third party since releasing 
such information would not likely compromise the security of the belligerents.  The 
belligerents will only release information when they do not feel threatened by the third 
party.  Third parties may also be able to generate independent and objective assessments 
of the capabilities and resolve of the factions related to the dispute.  This capability rests 
upon the neutrality and objectivity of the third party involved in the implementation of a 
peace settlement as well as its capacity to effectively transmit credible information.   
 Despite the mutually harmful consequences of conflict, rational actors may find 
themselves in the midst of conflict despite attempts to negotiate a settlement.  Actors 
have a tendency to misrepresent private information about their capability and resolve to 
pursue a more beneficial outcome in the bargaining process.  Even in the context of 
perfect transparency of information, disputing factions often lack trust when credibly 
committing to an agreement.  Each actor has an incentive to renege, once an agreement 
has been reached (Fearon 1995).   These obstacles in bargaining present challenges to 
resolving conflict and intermediaries may clarify information and promote credible 
commitments among the disputants.  However, identifying how an intermediary improves 
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bargaining behavior among conflicting factions will explain the role that information and 
signaling have in peacekeeping in civil wars. 
 Civil wars present particular problems associated with information sharing 
because rebel groups are often regarded as illegitimate political factions.  Svensson (2007) 
notes this asymmetry in credibility among factions and takes into account the bias of the 
mediator when brokering peace.  Though he contends that government biased mediators 
should provide the most effective signals of trust, his results indicate that neutral arbiters 
of peace have the greatest effect in overcoming the commitment to peace.  The reason 
behind this may be that the rebels require credible signals from a third party intermediary 
just as the government does, even though the rebels may have greater incentive to 
renege on bargains struck with the government.  
Howard (2008) contrasts this image by identifying “organizational learning” as the 
tool that best suits an intermediary in civil conflicts.  Further analysis suggests the primary 
components of organizational learning relate to the ability of an intermediary to relay 
credible information and signal intentions.  According to Howard, an intermediary that 
effectively gathers information on the ground, coordinates peacekeeping components of 
the mission, communicates intentions to local populations, and manages engagement 
between the leadership offers the best prospect for success in a peacekeeping operation.  
Peacekeeping operations that master these components of operational learning yield 
better rates of success in preventing violence. Organizational learning is rooted in an 
intermediary’s ability to coordinate and facilitate credible information among the 
disputants.   
 39 
 Peace may additionally be tenuous in a post conflict zone because of the 
disputants’ inability to commit to terms of agreements already negotiated (Walter 2002).  
Uncertainty about the intentions of the opposition prevents either party from initiating 
the terms of an agreement out of fear that the other side might renege on the negotiated 
deal (Schelling 1960).  This is a significant difficulty associated with the implementation of 
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) coordination.  Once one side 
disarms, the other side might press for more stringent conditions due to their 
disproportionately strong bargaining capability.  Coordinating simultaneous 
implementation of agreements upon both parties is another task that neutral third parties 
can help facilitate.  If the third party associated with facilitating the implementation of an 
agreement is regarded as biased toward one of the factions, uncertainty over intentions 
exist and commitment problems remain.  However, if the third party is trusted by both of 
the factions involved, it allows greater certainty that when it relays information that 
factions are adhering to or disobeying the terms of an agreement, its information is 
credible.  Democratic states acting in concert with organizational norms are transparent in 
their institutions and intentions.  Thus, they are viewed as credible coordinators of 
agreements (Fortna 2004). 
Domestic institutions change the political calculus when establishing credible 
commitments in foreign policy (Putnam 1988; Simmons 1994).  The structural and 
normative components of democratic states provide added insight into the prospective 
outcomes of post conflict zones when engaging in peacekeeping operations.  Democracies 
tend to have transparent institutional structures intended to enhance their perceived 
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neutrality as a third party.  Their institutional structure and transparent media outlets 
inhibit them from hiding imperialistic or illicit motives and the open discourse within their 
domestic political institutions enhances their ability to openly and credibly relay 
bargaining terms among the disputants in the civil conflict (Schultz 1999).  Democratic 
states should not only promote the kinds of legitimized outcomes determined to be 
acceptable in the greater international community, but they also have institutional 
structures making them more credible and sincere arbiters of monitoring and sanctioning 
the implementation of a peace agreement.  Institutional transparency that comes with a 
democratic intermediary enhances the likelihood that credible information and 
commitments will lead to long term agreements in otherwise fractious bargaining 
processes between disputing parties (Martin 2000: 37). 
 Additionally, democracies have the capacity to make credible security guarantees 
when implementing the terms of a peace resolution.  A key aspect of a credible 
peacekeeping commitment is the third party’s capability to sanction noncompliance by 
the combatants in the implementation of a peace accord (Walter 2002; Toft 2010).  When 
the third party offering a security guarantee toward the implementation of a peace 
agreement has the capacity to bring extraordinary capability to the fore, it escalates the 
costs of defection from the agreement for the combatants.  Democratic governments can 
bring significant resources to a conflict due to their capacity to raise rents from their 
constituencies and enhanced audience costs shown to deter aggressive behavior by 
adversaries (Lake 1992).  Democratic governments implementing a peace accord have the 
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capacity to bring substantial resources to a post conflict zone and, therefore, can deter 
noncompliance to the terms of a peace agreement.   
H5a:  There will be a greater likelihood for peace during a peacekeeping 
mission when the lead country (country contributing the most 
peacekeepers) is a more democratic nation. 
 
H5b:  There will be a greater likelihood for enduring peace in a post conflict 
zone when the lead country is a more democratic nation after a 
peacekeeping mission. 
 
A peacekeeping operation upholding a clear agreement for peace provides an 
informational tool for the peacekeepers.  Ceasefire and peace agreements provide 
transparent and tangible indications of the requirements and intentions of the 
belligerents at the cessation of conflict.  If belligerents sign a ceasefire or peace 
agreement prior to a peacekeeping mission, they not only signal to each other what 
bargains they are implementing, but they clarify to the peacekeepers what obligations 
each of the belligerents must uphold to sustain a lasting peace.  Though a ceasefire or 
peace treaty does not force compliance among any of the parties involved, it clarifies the 
intentions and obligations of each.   
Accidents and unauthorized incidents can be another significant source of conflict 
renewal.  Written agreements can serve as blueprints for acceptable and unacceptable 
behavior among disputing factions (Fortna 2004).  While the existence of a peace or 
ceasefire treaty does not preclude the belligerents from returning to violent conflict once 
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the peacekeeping mission arrives, it presents the peacekeepers with specific terms that 
stipulate compliance or noncompliance. 
H6a:  There will be a greater likelihood for peace during the peacekeeping 
mission when the belligerents enter into a ceasefire/peace agreement prior 
to the arrival of the peacekeeping mission. 
 
H6b:  There will be a greater likelihood for lasting peace when the 
belligerents enter into a ceasefire/peace agreement prior to the arrival of 
the peacekeeping mission. 
 
Written agreements prior to the arrival of the peacekeeping mission signal the 
importance of transparency, but not necessarily based on actions by the peacekeeping 
mission, itself.  A ceasefire agreement provides a framework for the peacekeepers to 
monitor.  However, a peacekeeping mission that fosters transparency and cooperation 
should be evident in the actions that take place during the mission.  If peacemaking is a 
process, then that process must continue throughout the peacekeeping operation.  
Consequently, peacekeepers that continue dialogue and negotiation throughout the 
mission will reduce uncertainty and fear among the factions, alleviate fear of political 
abuse, and provide a political basis for future communication and negotiation. 
Active communication and credible signaling behavior among the belligerents help 
alleviate widespread fear and distrust generated from years of war.  Misconceptions and 
the motivation to misrepresent lead to suspicious dialogue, but an effective intermediary 
can alleviate this distrust.  First, an intermediary can allow dialogue that might not 
otherwise exist.  Left to their own devices, belligerents would not accept many gestures 
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for constructive dialogue.  Over time, warring factions that meet under a banner of 
dialogue, rather than hostility, can overcome their distrust.  Second, the acceptance of 
peacekeepers serves as a signal itself.  Violating a peace after communicating intent to 
negotiate not only presents reputational costs to your opposition, but also to the 
intermediary.  Cooperation through an intermediary offers an initial signal by the 
opposing sides that they desire a peaceful resolution (Fortna 2008: 95). 
 Active communication through a peacekeeping mission also reduces the possibility 
of political abuse in a future governmental structure.  Among the unique challenges 
presented by civil wars is the need for assurance of political rights in any new 
government.  Government forces are reluctant to grant political rights to rebel groups and 
rebel groups are reluctant to disarm without them.  Continuous and open dialogue by a 
trusted intermediaries help facilitate this process.  Commitment problems persist in civil 
conflicts because neither side wishes to make the first gesture which could be construed 
as bargaining weakness.  Peacekeepers can insure incremental compliance by both sides 
during the transitional phases of governance.  They can monitor elections and legal 
proceedings to insure governmental compliance and oversee disarmament by the rebel 
factions.  Active involvement of peacekeepers insures that credible information is being 
relayed in a post conflict environment.  
 When discourse among belligerents has been defined by violent conflict, it is hard 
to build a political system based on communication, negotiation, and compromise.  
Effective intermediaries must contribute to overcoming this obstacle by demonstrating 
peaceful political discourse.  Similar to the argument for the protection of political 
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commitments, intermediaries that facilitate dialogue and negotiation among the 
disputants display a model of healthy political discourse in a functioning state.  Political 
violence should be a tactic of last resort, but in a dysfunctional state where opposing 
factions do not trust one another and refuse to recognize the legitimacy of each other, it 
is more likely to be the primary method of political expression.  An intermediary 
displaying the diplomatic skill to facilitate successful negotiation and compromise among 
the belligerents should serve as a model for appropriate governmental discourse. 
Determining how active and constructive dialogue takes place during a 
peacekeeping operation can be elusive.  However, if peacekeepers are able to get the 
belligerents to commit to a peace treaty during the peacekeeping mission, it may serve as 
an indication that they are actively facilitating credible information transfer among the 
disputants and are shaping a continuing political dialogue.  Signing a ceasefire agreement 
prior to the arrival of the peacekeepers indicates a dialogue primarily among the 
belligerents, but peace agreements signed during a peacekeeping mission indicates a 
dialogue facilitated and improved by the intermediary. 
H7a:  There will be a reduced likelihood for recurrences of violence during a 
peacekeeping mission when the belligerents sign a peace treaty while the 
peacekeepers are present.   
 
H7b:  There will be a reduced likelihood for recurrences of violence after a 
peacekeeping mission when the belligerents sign a peace treaty during the 
peacekeeping mission.    
The metrics estimating transparency and signaling credibility associated with the 
peacekeeping mission are rough approximations.  Further elaboration about how these 
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metrics are specified in the data will be discussed in chapter 3.  However, the theoretical 
focus remains the importance of information.  If war is a bargaining process, the 
credibility and process of information transfer between the disputing parties holds 
significance in negotiating a plausible settlement.    
Legitimizing a Peace Resolution 
 
While realists measure power through tangible measures like economic strength 
and military power, Nye (2004) asserts that the power to persuade is often more effective 
than the power to coerce.  When a third party intervenes into a conflict only achieving 
their goals through the threat of punishment, they are only coercing reluctant actors.  
However, when a third party intervenes and has the credibility necessary to convince each 
of the actors to implement a lasting peace rather than resume violence, this exercise in 
persuasion has greater resonance since the actors are cooperating out of their own free 
will rather than out of threat.  Furthermore, the use of threat as a means for coercion 
increases hostility between the intervening country and the host state actors.  Coercive 
intervention can be used to mobilize internal support against the third party intermediary.  
Consequently, the perceived legitimacy and respected authority of the third party must be 
recognized by the warring factions for lasting peace to be effective.  “As has often been 
said, in international affairs, perceptions matter because, so often, perceptions are 
mistaken for reality” (McNamara and Blight 2001: 141).   
 The final advantage that third parties possess when constraining renewals of 
violence in countries steeped in civil conflict can be characterized as “shaming” the 
disputants into accepting a compromise.  While international norms of conduct are not 
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always clearly spelled out, resolving disputes through war is generally not accepted as a 
legitimate method.  Consequently, a third party will often intervene in a conflict appealing 
to humanitarian concerns exacerbated by the violence of war.  Combatants that fail to 
comply with such appeals risk suffering reputational costs which may hurt them, even in 
spite of a military victory.  The international community, as a whole, carries a greater 
capability to persuade rather than coerce, often referred to as “soft power” (Nye 2004).  A 
third party peace broker must utilize this idea if it is able to successfully propose tenable 
solutions to the combatants.  Individual states often provide significant resources for 
coercing parties to come to agreement, but multinational organizations overcome this 
resource deficit with enhanced legitimacy and perceived lack of prejudice (Dobbins et al. 
2005).  
 Legitimacy can prove to be important simply by acknowledging disputants’ 
grievances.  Among civil war disputants, rebel factions suffer from a lack of political 
recognition within their country.  International recognition by a third party intervening in 
the conflict provides status to the rebel faction(s) and leadership, granting a political 
platform not previously allowed under the government.  An intermediary giving a rebel 
faction recognition that the government refuses opens political discourse as an alternative 
to fighting.  Also, an intermediary can provide the government with a source of legitimacy 
as well.  The government may be reluctant to negotiate with a rebel group on its own 
because doing so, itself, is an act of recognition and makes them appear weak within their 
own constituency.  However, acting through a recognized arbiter opens dialogue and 
negotiation without the internal appearance of weakness.  This fragile political platform 
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can only be traversed by a third party that is clearly recognized by both the government 
and the rebel factions as legitimate and neutral body (Regan 2000: 112).  
A third party can, first, be credited as a legitimate and neutral military arbiter 
when it carries the backing of a greater proportion of the international community.  When 
more states commit themselves to a cause, they are making a strong political signal of 
support.  The universality of a third party cause can be represented by the membership of 
the peacekeeping force or the authority under which the peacekeepers are acting.  
Collective interventions may suffer greater risks of free riding and incongruent objectives, 
but international condemnation and domestic political opposition can be minimized when 
greater international consensus in peacekeeping is sought (Olson 1965; Coleman 2007).   
Peacekeeping missions are most likely to get a strong backing by a wider 
population of nations when the costs of intervention are well distributed and the benefits 
of intervention serve the greater collective (Regan 2000: 107).  When more states commit 
to intervene, they assert their collective will to uphold international peacekeeping 
objectives.  Therefore, when more countries are represented in a peacekeeping mission, it 
is assumed that there is greater international consensus behind the action of the 
peacekeeping mission and the outcome the mission is supporting.  Universal involvement 
in the mission also means that more states are providing valuable input and confidence in 
the operation.  Global contributions of resources and personnel should be evident among 
the citizenry within the country and greater input from a wider variety of sources provide 
better historical, political, and societal context for the mission organizers.  “Multinational 
organizations do not necessarily depend on consensus for action, but peace operations 
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are viewed as more legitimate when the coalition is larger as opposed to duties carried 
out primarily by a single state” (Diehl 2008: 80).  Greater international consensus and 
contribution should help make a peacekeeping mission successful in the immediate and 
long term.   
H8a: There will be a greater likelihood for peace during the mission, if more 
countries contribute troops to a peacekeeping mission because it will be 
viewed as internationally legitimate.    
 
H8b: There will be a greater likelihood for peace after the peacekeepers 
depart, if more countries contribute troops to a peacekeeping mission 
because it will be viewed as internationally legitimate.    
 
Another factor contributing to the legitimacy of a peacekeeping mission is the 
authorization of a mission by the UN. While the UN is the leader in global peacekeeping 
operations, it does not have a monopoly on such interventions.  At times individual states, 
regional organizations, and integrated security structures engage in operations outside of 
their borders, also with varying degrees of success.  These varying types of interventions 
by outside actors differ in their composition.  Dobbins et al. (2005) document this 
juxtaposition by highlighting some of the regularities in such initiatives by both the US and 
the UN in post conflict zones.  The UN has regularly contributed fewer numbers of 
peacekeepers since they depend on voluntary contributions for the missions and the US 
often relies on overwhelming force to dissuade recurrences of violence.  One would 
expect bigger to be better in terms of effectiveness, but that is not always the case.  Both 
the UN and the US interventions stabilizing conflict zones have been met with varying 
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successes.  However, any intervening state must establish itself as an honest negotiator of 
a conflict and a mission led by an organization or state serving the interests of a regional 
power player will most definitely have less legitimacy than a UN mission (Diehl 2008). 
Despite the differences between US and UN styles in nation-building, the UN 
generally has better success rates because of its ability to compensate for its hard power 
deficit with the soft power attributes of international legitimacy and local impartiality 
(Dobbins et al. 2005: 243-245).  The UN’s success rate is particularly notable since the UN 
is more likely to engage peacekeeping missions under the most difficult circumstances 
(Dobbins et al. 2005; Fortna 2008; Wallensteen and Heldt 2008).  Furthermore, Coleman 
(2007) argues that in the contemporary international system international organizations 
serve as authorities for peace enforcement operations when international peace and 
humanitarian conventions are breached.  Though they authorize peace enforcement 
measures on a case by case basis, these organizations and the UN under Chapter VII in 
particular “remain central to establishing the international legitimacy of an intervention” 
(Coleman 2007: 46).   
International legitimacy can be captured, in part, by distinguishing whether or not 
the mission has been sanctioned or authorized by the UN.  Since the UN’s goals and 
objectives are generally perceived as neutral in their orientation, belligerents in a post 
conflict zone should feel less threatened by a force that has the backing and authorization 
of the UN and less compelled to resist these forces.  In the absence of a UN resolution 
that can be vetoed by any one of five permanent members of the Security Council, other 
regional organizations or individual states may be able to implement a peacekeeping 
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mission with greater effectiveness.  While smaller local organizations (usually regional 
IGOs) might earn greater support among the belligerents due to common economic, 
historical, ethnic or tribal roots, they might also be regarded as a threat to sovereignty 
and ignite nationalistic sentiment.  UN backing carries strong legitimizing significance 
without appearing to subjugate the state to foreign rule.  The universal membership of 
the UN and institutional structures make UN consensus difficult but not impossible to 
achieve.  Because of the difficulty of authorizing forceful UN resolution deploying 
peacekeepers, it can be expected that those peacekeeping missions that are sanctioned 
by the UN carry a significant degree of international authority and consensus.  
H9a:  There will be a reduced likelihood for violence during the 
peacekeeping mission if the mission is authorized by the UN.  
 
H9b:  There will be a reduced likelihood for violence after the departure of 
the peacekeepers if the peacekeeping mission is authorized by the UN.  
 
 A peacekeeping mission that is a result of greater international consensus and has 
the perception of legitimacy is less likely to be viewed as a militaristic threat to the 
conflict state.  Determining the legitimacy associated with a peacekeeping mission is 
calculated by establishing the degree of international support for the mission.  More 
states participating in the peacekeeping operation is one way of determining international 
support. Peer pressure is more effective when there are more peers advocating a cause.  
Furthermore, a UN mandate for a peacekeeping operation signals international support.  
The UN has the strongest degree of moral authority in the world, makes its decisions 
based on international consensus, and is less likely to invoke nationalistic sentiment 
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among the peacekept.  Military intervention is a serious imposition on states’ sovereignty 
and a third party must establish good cause and appeal to recognized international norms 
of conduct to legitimate its imposition. 
Summary of the Argument 
 
 The literature research on third party intervention through peacekeeping has been 
limited in its analysis due to the relatively small number of peacekeeping missions.  Some 
notable exceptions include Walter (2002) and Fortna (2008).  Walter’s analysis, however, 
only measures whether or not a third party security guarantee was issued during the 
peace negotiation process.  This does not take into account the degree of commitment of 
the third party or the nature of the third party making the security guarantee.  Fortna’s 
analysis expands upon this earlier research by specifically examining peacekeeping 
operations and their ensuing results, but does not sufficiently analyze the composition of 
the peacekeeping force outside of the mandate for the mission.  Prior work on 
peacekeeping makes significant contributions to theory on peacekeeping as an effective 
means for conflict resolution, but additional research on the causal mechanisms behind 
successful peacekeeping can further determine how peacekeepers affect the stability of 
peace.   
 Though belligerents left to their own devices may be able to invoke a lasting 
peace, fear and mistrust lead to information and commitment problems when 
implementing a permanent cessation of hostilities in civil conflict.  Since belligerents are 
less likely to trust commitments they make with one another, they are unable to 
effectively share credible information, have incentive to cheat on agreements or 
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concessions they make, have an incentive attack the opposition, suffer from possibilities 
of escalations in hostilities resulting from accidents, and may not be able to effective 
allocate distributional political and economic resources.  These difficulties amount to a 
security dilemma that make bargaining and negotiation difficult among the belligerents in 
civil conflict.   
 I argue that introduction of a third party benefits the process of conflict resolution 
in a civil conflict through three primary methods.  A third party increases the costs for 
defecting from a resolution.  If a peacekeeping mission provides a robust force to the 
region, recurrences of violence should be less likely.  Third party peacekeeping missions 
may provide informational advantages to the belligerents involved in the civil dispute.  
War is theorized to consist of a bargaining process that does not necessarily stop when 
the fighting ceases.  Third party peacekeepers may provide more transparent means for 
monitoring and verification that each of the parties involved are maintaining their 
commitments to peace.  A peacekeeping mission may also provide legitimacy to a 
resolution.  States and non state actors may seek recognition from the international 
community as legitimate actors that are promoting the general welfare of the people 
inhabiting their country.  As civil conflict has grown to be seen as an international and not 
just a domestic problem, belligerents may be more likely to comply with peacekeeping 
missions supported by the international community due to prospective reputational costs.    
 Figure 2.3 illustrates and summarizes the theoretical arguments made regarding 
the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions.  The most successful peacekeeping missions 
should involve states that provide the strength and sanctioning capacity to increase the 
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costs of resuming conflict so that recurrences of war are not a well suited option for either 
of the belligerents.  The peacekeeping mission should have the support of the greater 
international community in order to legitimize a violation of state sovereignty.  Lastly, the 
peacekeepers should be composed of nations and/or institutions that provide clear and 
credible transfer of information among the belligerents.  Democratic third parties best 
accomplish this task by transmitting information that supported by domestic institutional 
structures and audiences.  Peacekeeping missions that fulfill these criteria help alleviate 
the information and commitment problems associated with implementing peace in civil 
wars and will, therefore, reduce the prospect of violence during and after peacekeepers’ 
deployment. 
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Figure 2.3: Increasing the Likelihood for Successful Peacekeeping 
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Chapter 3: Methods and Data for Testing Peacekeeping Success 
Key Distinctions in the Analysis 
 
 In order to narrow the scope of inquiry, it is important to define the parameters of 
components within the analysis.  Three terms that can be used in a rather broad context 
include peacekeeping, civil conflict, and international governmental organizations.  What 
constitutes a peacekeeping action? When does a dispute become a civil war? When do 
interstate interactions constitute an organization?  How these terms are defined in the 
analysis determine the boundaries of the study.  One must address how such terms are 
addressed in the literature and how the current study addresses them in the data.   
Is it Peacekeeping or Mediation? 
 
 “Peacekeeping” can be defined both broadly and narrowly.  Commonly, it is used 
to describe any international effort to “promote the termination of armed conflict or the 
resolution of longstanding disputes” (Diehl 1993: 4).  When referring to peacekeeping 
throughout this research project, the term shall be defined as an enforcement operation 
as well as a confidence-building measure in post conflict areas alleviating suspicion among 
belligerents in a civil conflict (Werner 1999: 914).  Rather than only serving as a force to 
stop violence, peacekeepers serve the role of monitoring compliance by the belligerents 
to increase trust and confidence between them.  This role in post conflict areas is 
particularly important since “fear is high and trust is low among antagonists, parties may 
fail to carry out their commitments in the belief that the adversary will take advantage of 
them (Stedman and Rotchild 1996: 20).   
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This definition emphasizes that peacekeepers play an important informational role 
as opposed to only a coercive role in conflict resolution.  Diehl (1993: 5-14) stresses this 
point by noting that the defining attributes to a peacekeeping operation involve 
nonenforcement, limited military capability, and neutrality.  These characteristics imply 
that peacekeepers are less important as a coercive tool, than they are as an intermediary 
for establishing trust and cooperation.  Peacekeepers must act multilaterally because they 
cannot rely on overwhelming force to insure compliance among belligerents.  Despite 
their best efforts at remaining neutral, peacekeepers are still outsiders and might be 
regarded as a threat to sovereignty.    
 To elaborate upon the prior assertions regarding the purpose and role of 
peacekeepers, an operational definition as the subject of this research is consistent with 
the conditions set by Heldt and Wallensteen (2005).  Peacekeepers must fulfill several 
characteristics to fit within my analysis.  First, a peacekeeping contingent must come from 
a third party.  That third party could represent a single state, multiple states or an 
intergovernmental organization, but must be a legal international body.    Second, a 
peacekeeping contingent must provide an operational component within the post conflict 
zone.  This is a departure from the mediation literature because mediation may involve 
nothing more than negotiation from afar.  Peacekeeping involves a heavier cost burden on 
the intermediary by committing personnel.  This commitment does not have to be military 
in nature, but it must contain a human oversight component.  Third, a peacekeeping 
mission is sent to a conflict that is currently, if temporarily, involved in a cessation of 
active hostilities.  If a third party involves itself while hostilities are active, it may be 
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perceived as favoring one side rather than preserving a ceasefire.  This condition provides 
that the third party is neutral, but not necessarily impartial.  Simply stated, a 
peacekeeping contingent involves the active commitment of personnel from a third party 
once there has been a cessation in conflict to insure that the belligerents remain at peace 
and continue the process of conflict de-escalation. This operational definition is consistent 
with definitions in the literature and permits further examination of the effectiveness of 
peacekeeping operations.   
Civil Conflict and Intervention 
 
 Data on wars in the last half century show that civil wars outnumber interstate 
wars (Heldt and Wallensteen 2005: 20).   The numbers of civil conflicts peaked in the 
1990’s and the end of the Cold War prompted more international interventions to subdue 
violence.  When considering peacekeeping operations, there are approximately three 
times as many peacekeeping operations deployed to intrastate conflicts as there are to 
interstate conflicts (Heldt and Wallensteen 2005: 16-20).  Furthermore, the breakdown of 
state oversight and institutions make rampant human rights abuses more prevalent in civil 
wars.  States have greater concern with their reputation and international norms than 
nonstate actors.  This makes the international responses to civil wars important.   
 Civil conflict identifies a war that exists within the territorial boundaries of a state, 
rather than between two or many states.  This is not meant to suggest that outside states 
are not affected by conflict within another country.  Cultural and ancestral ties often 
affect domestic politics in foreign countries, refugees fleeing bloodshed often spill over 
borders into neighboring states, and trade and investment are disrupted.  Despite the 
 58 
localized nature of civil conflict, the international community may seek to reduce 
hostilities and curtail violence.  In addition to the scope of civil conflict, the scale can also 
be deceptive.  Traditionally, scholars define interstate wars using a threshold of one 
thousand battle-related deaths to signify a war (Singer and Small 1972).  However, civil 
wars can be just as brutal, though often resulting in fewer hostilities.  Consequently, 
identification for civil wars often contain lower death-related thresholds (Harbom, 
Melander, and Wallensteen 2008).  This lower number of fatalities does not necessarily 
make them less brutal.  Several components of civil conflicts make them especially 
difficult to resolve. 
 Civil conflicts involve both national and sub-national actors.  The national actor is 
usually indicated as the government and the sub-national actor is usually designated as 
one or more rebel groups.  On the surface this difference may not seem any more 
significant that two interstate rivals, however, it makes a difference in conflict resolution.  
First, the government will be unlikely or unwilling to even recognize the rebel group out of 
fear for legitimizing their cause while weakening the authority of the government.  This 
makes negotiation especially difficult.  A second problem relates to de-escalation.  In 
order for conflict to end, some kind of tenable solution must be accepted and a 
government must be formed.  To do this, both sides must demobilize to some degree.  
However, neither side is likely to do so without formidable guarantees that they will not 
be taken advantage of once they have demobilized.  Furthermore, rebel groups can often 
be very fractious and in the wake of a settlement might not be able to control fringe 
elements of their supporters.   
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 Civil conflict is a result of a state’s failure to regulate and govern itself 
appropriately.  Consequently, there are significant costs resulting from this failure.  Failed 
states leave an extraordinarily hostile situation for civilians who are often caught within 
the fray of civil conflict, leading to human rights abuses, war crimes, and even genocide.  
The void left by ineffective government, also, promotes a surge in the illicit economy.  
Illegal transport and manufacturing of commodities ranging from diamonds to drugs fuel 
rebel armies and flood foreign black markets.  These illicit activities can prove to be very 
profitable for rebel groups, who may seek to extend conflict for the mere purpose of 
enriching themselves (Collier and Hoeffler 2004).  The inability for a state to effectively 
police itself produces economic disaster and prospective human rights abuses affecting 
others in the international community. 
 Civil conflicts may inherently affect other states, but international conventions 
have traditionally been framed to prevent outside intervention into civil wars in the name 
of sovereignty.  Despite significant incentive to intervene and attempt to stop civil 
conflict, states are often reluctant to take action.  Intervention into a conflict within the 
confines of a state violates one of the central norms of international relations.  The 1648 
Peace of Westphalia formalized the convention of the sovereignty of the territorially 
defined state and the principle of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of recognized 
states.  This concept of state sovereignty over domestic affairs has been one of the 
longstanding and accepted conventions of international affairs, but the destructive nature 
of civil conflict required reexamination of this norm in recent decades (Evans 2008).  The 
post World War II reality of genocide alerted the international community to the 
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catastrophes associated with nonintervention in cases of genocide and humanitarian 
disasters.  Consequently, the United Nations has more closely associated intervention into 
domestic affairs of states undergoing civil discourse with its international mandate to 
uphold international peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Coleman 
2007: 41-46)  International involvement in the domestic affairs of states, formerly taboo, 
has become more acceptable particularly since the 1990’s to alleviate the devastating 
effects of civil wars.    
International Governmental Organization vs. States 
 
  The conception of the “international community” can take many forms whether it 
is individual citizens, leaders, individual states, nongovernmental organizations, 
multinational corporations, or collections of states through international governmental 
organizations (IGOs).  The units of analysis that are singled out in this research project 
consist of states and collections of states through organizational bodies.  While there is 
room for argument about how international organizations are perceived, they will largely 
be identified by their state composition.  Even though IGO’s are identified primarily by 
their state membership in this project, they can take on a larger identity than any one 
particular state.   
 The primary distinction that this research examines is the organization and 
influential strength of international organizations and states.  IGOs have a difficult 
organizational threshold to overcome when engaging in collective action.  IGOs, as 
collections of states, may have competing interests among their membership, making 
agreement and cooperation difficult.  When IGOs involve themselves in political decisions, 
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they must develop consensus among their members and rely on mutual contributions 
from the various states that make up the organization.  The structural differences 
between these two entities amount to states being able to act quickly, decisively, and 
perhaps with greater success.  However, international consensus carries with it 
advantages as well.  Foreign policy actions that have international consensus carry with it 
greater legitimacy or judgments of acceptability based on understood rules of the game 
(Coleman 2007: 31).  Despite a difficulty to generate consensus on foreign policy actions, 
an IGO may better influence states to accept norms of conduct.   
 Recognizing an IGO as a collection of states through a more formal organization 
provides a simpler conception of the term, but also excludes organizations that could also 
fit within the definition.  Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or extra-state actors 
could have a significant influence in post conflict zones, but are excluded from the 
definition.  Organizations like the Red Cross or Doctors without Borders significantly 
improve the conditions in post conflict areas and alleviate the human costs of war torn 
countries, making peace a more tenable solution.  Nongovernmental individuals, such as 
religious leaders, may be able to play an active role in peace settlements and 
negotiations, helping alleviate hostilities among belligerents.  While these actors may 
influence peaceful outcomes, their role is more difficult to quantify for empirical analysis.  
Although I do not empirically measure their role, NGO contributions are investigated in 
case study on Sierra Leone. 
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Choosing a Dataset 
  
 The Third Party Interventions in Intrastate Dispute Project (TPI) dataset best suits 
the research needs to empirically measure effects that peacekeeping forces have in civil 
conflicts.  The discussion of the data begins with a specification of the dataset and then 
provides reasoning why it suits the purposes of the research at hand.  Other peacekeeping 
datasets have significant benefits, but do serve all of the intended purposes for this 
research.   
 The dataset used is the Third Party Interventions in Intrastate Disputes Project 
dataset developed by Mullenbach and Dixon (2007).3  This dataset provides a variety of 
suitable variables and a significant quantity of observations allowing for research on the 
composition of peacekeeping missions.  The overall empirical record for peacekeeping 
missions is rather small, making large-n studies problematic.  However, the TPI Intrastate 
Dispute Project data resolve many data problems by reformulating traditional methods of 
distinguishing observations, thus expanding the number of observations of peacekeeping 
missions.  These data employ a broader definition of peacekeeping.  An outside state or 
organization must commit personnel to the state undergoing conflict for multiple 
purposes ranging from enforcement to monitoring.  The personnel must also be sent 
within 12 months to the country experiencing a cessation of conflict (Mullenbach 2005).  
Each peacekeeping data point is determined by blending various observational methods 
and standards for third party intervention in civil conflicts.  The two primary methods 
used to increase the number of data points involve including all third party peacekeeping 
                                                 
3
 This dataset can be found at the following web URL http://faculty.uca.edu/~markm/tpi_homepage.htm 
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operations (not just UN peacekeeping missions) and revising the traditional methods of 
observing civil conflict and conflict recurrence.   
 Alternative datasets do not provide sufficient information for this analysis.  The 
Doyle and Sambanis (2006) dataset includes 124 civil wars, specified by the Correlates of 
War standards classifying civil conflicts, only 27 of which identify outside intervention by a 
UN peacekeeping force.  The problems with these data are that it only deals with UN 
sanctioned peacekeeping missions.  If different types of peacekeeping mandates and 
interventions are going to be compared, there have to be additional types of 
peacekeeping interventions.  Extracting what aspects of the intervention made peace 
more likely is the central purpose of the current research.  Using a dataset that includes 
intervention in civil wars by unitary state actors and regional intergovernmental 
organizations not only expands the number of data points in the analysis, but also 
provides greater information on the effect that different compositions of peacekeeping 
forces have on the likelihood for peace.   
Fortna (2008) expands upon Doyle and Sambanis’ data to analyze the success of 
peacekeeping operations.  However, Fortna also examines only UN intervention versus 
nonintervention.   Her updated data provide 36 total instances of peacekeeping in these 
civil wars, making a large-n study problematic.  Fortna’s study also examines intervention 
versus nonintervention in civil wars.  This accommodates her research for a large-n study, 
but makes these data insufficient to study the observations associated with intervention.  
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 Another popular dataset for analyzing civil war dispute resolution is the 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset.4  These data apply a lower threshold for violent 
occurrences of civil war using a threshold of 25 battle-related deaths as an indication for 
civil conflict, specify government and opposition disputants, and document civil wars from 
1945 through 2005.  Such temporal and definitional variations on civil war outbreaks 
provide a much larger number of instances of civil war (approximately 1900).  This 
expansion of the data makes it very useful for empirical analyses.  However, for the 
purposes of the current study on third party interventions, some of the omissions in the 
data are problematic.   
 The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset identifies whether or not there was a third 
party associated with the conflict, which side the intervening party preferred (third party 
bias), how many states supported each of the disputants, and country codes for the 
supporter.  However, the dataset does not specify the nature of this relationship or the 
mandate under which intervening countries provided their support.  While these data 
provide a great amount of information about which parties enjoyed greater support from 
outside actors, it does not specify how that support manifested itself or much about the 
third party actor itself.  Further research could clarify the nature of these relationships 
between disputants and third parties helping alleviate this ambiguity.  These data include 
many more observations, but for the purposes of the current research project, more 
detailed data with a richer description of the peacekeeping mission are preferred and 
importantly identify the primary nations involved in the intervention.  The 25 battle-death 
                                                 
4
 The dataset and corresponding codebooks can be found at the web URL 
http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO 
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threshold for civil conflict, additionally, may not necessarily capture civil wars, but rather 
short outbursts of violence in unstable countries.   
 As mentioned, the dataset that accommodates the purposes of the present 
research in civil wars is the TPI Intrastate Disputes Project.  The TPI data provides 
empirical data on various third party interventions into intrastate disputes from 1946 to 
2006 totaling approximately 149 observations of third party interventions into civil 
conflicts.  The data not only provide information detailing the kinds of third party 
interventions, but also specifies additional variables relevant to the states contributing 
most of the peacekeeping forces to the region.  Detailing where the peacekeepers come 
from and the kinds of international mandates supporting the mission provides insight into 
the strength, neutrality, and international impetus behind the peacekeeping mission 
providing suitable information for study.  Peacekeeping observations used in the TPI 
Dataset are listed in Appendix A.   
The TPI dataset has two primary advantages over the other datasets analyzing 
peacekeeping missions. First, the TPI data expands the number of observations by both 
including all peacekeeping interventions in civil conflicts rather than just UN sanctioned 
missions.  Including individual state interventions and regional organization interventions 
into civil conflicts increases the number of observations in the data and permits us to see 
success based on who initiates the intervention.  Second, the TPI dataset redefines when 
civil conflicts recur.  Instead of using a fatality metric to determine recurrences of war, the 
TPI dataset use a time metric that records each civil conflict as an observation if violence 
recurs for 10 consecutive days after the civil conflict reaches a stalemate (Mullenbach 
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2005).  These two data alterations expand the number of observable peacekeeping 
operations and provide a suitable dataset for empirical study. 
Although the dataset has been used less frequently than Doyle and 
Sambanis/Fortna or UCDP/PRIO, the TPI Intrastate Dispute Project dataset includes a 
significant amount of testable variables, particularly specifics on the composition of the 
peacekeeping forces involved in the conflict.  For instance, among the most relevant 
variables for the present study is the specification of the “lead nation” in a third party 
intervention.  Because troop contributions and compositions change so frequently, it is 
difficult to quantify where all of the peacekeepers are coming from, so the data specify 
which country contributes the most troops to any particular mission which is subject to 
less frequent change.  This variable can be valuable to determine how the third party will 
be perceived and received by the combatants and local populations.  Further specification 
of this “lead state” could clarify how a peacekeeping mission may be effective through 
commitment, transparency, and legitimacy.  Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2004: 35-36) 
assert that peacekeeping operations routinely involve “pivotal states” motivated by roles 
that they may play as great powers, regional hegemons, concerned neighbors, or former 
colonial rulers.  Identification of the lead state helps specify the historical, political, or 
geographical relationship that the peacekeepers may serve.   
Additionally, the TPI dataset provides information about the organizational origins 
of the peacekeeping mission.  The data delineate whether the peacekeeping mission is 
sent under the auspices of the UN, a regional IGO, or an individual state.  International 
organizations have the capacity to operate with greater legitimacy than individual states, 
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have permanent bureaucratic structures that can manage and audit field operations, and 
provide greater accountability and operate within procedural norms (Bellamy, Williams, 
and Griffin 2004: 41).  These characteristics provide credibility of the peacekeeping 
mission to local leaders and civilians, prospectively alleviating commitment problems 
among the belligerents.  Including such specifications about the peacekeeping contingent 
can provide insight into how the peacekeepers will operate and be perceived by the 
belligerents involved in the cessation of conflict. 
Describing the Data 
 
To fully understand the dataset as it relates to peacekeeping, some detailed 
descriptions of the data are necessary.  As is common with most data on third party 
intervention in intrastate disputes, there is variation in the temporal distribution of the 
peacekeeping missions.  Figure 3.1 illustrates the distribution of peacekeeping operations 
by all actors in the TPI dataset from 1946-2006.  The distribution of peacekeeping data 
clearly indicates that a majority of the peacekeeping missions are concentrated in the 
1990’s.  These data are consistent with prior research findings on peacekeeping 
operations in both interstate and civil conflicts (Fortna 2003; Heldt and Wallensteen 
2005).  The data reflect increases in peacekeeping missions during the post Cold War era.  
Though the number of missions dramatically increased, only a few embarked on a wider 
scope of complex peacekeeping.  Most remained smaller missions aimed at conflict 
resolution and post conflict reconstruction (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2004: 76).   
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Figure 3.1: Temporal Distribution of Peacekeeping Missions-TPI Data 
 
   Several explanations account for the increase in peacekeeping missions during 
the post Cold War era.  These explanations center on the UN Security Council becoming a 
more proactive institution, the P5 members agreeing on foreign policy actions, and more 
states becoming willing and able participants in peacekeeping operations (Bellamy, 
Williams, and Griffin 2004: 78).  The decline of the Soviet Union and rejection of 
communism in Eastern Europe, enabled the Security Council to pursue more liberal 
objectives promoting international cooperation and peace, permitting “a world where the 
United Nations, freed from the Cold War stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of 
its founders” (Bush 1991).  Additionally, increases in globalization and advances in 
information technology encouraged more western nations to address issues of human 
rights and suffering across the globe.  Greater public awareness of human suffering, fewer 
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UN constraints due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and an ambitious plan for a 
liberal UN agenda promoted an upsurge in peacekeeping operations by the UN, other 
IGOs, and individual states alike (see Walter 2002; Heldt and Wallensteen 2005; 
Mullenbach 2005; Svensson 2007; Fortna 2008). 
The disparity in distribution of peacekeeping operations over time should not 
cause major problems within the analysis, but rather it will strengthen the argument that 
effective information sharing and third party neutrality increase the viability of a 
peacekeeping mission.  First, during the Cold War, the UN faced limitations because of the 
need for P5 unanimity.  During the Cold War unanimity was difficult to obtain so UN 
peacekeeping missions were limited in numbers and scope.  Fewer independent states 
and Regional Organizations intervened as peacekeepers during the Cold War for similar 
reasons (Heldt and Wallensteen 2005: 24-27).  Many civil conflicts during this time may 
have had Cold War implications that could have provoked wider wars.  While there were 
fewer peacekeeping missions, outside involvement in civil wars may have manifested 
through covert operations by the US and Soviet Union.  The heavy concentration of cases 
during the post Cold War era are understood to be a result of a more proactive 
international agenda focused on a liberal peace through political reconciliation (Bellamy, 
Williams, and Griffin 2004: 76-81), rather than an increase in greater international 
disorder from a lack of superpower management (Waltz 1993).  When peacekeepers 
serve as facilitators of political reconciliation, the credibility and neutrality of the third 
party in the eyes of the belligerents promote greater understanding and trust among 
those expected to maintain peaceful relations. 
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Figure 3.2 illustrates the proportion of dispute types within the TPI Intrastate 
Dispute Project data.  When examining the types of disputes that compose the data, 70% 
account for civil or political strife among various factions within the observed country.  
The remaining 30% involve independence and secessionist movements within the 
country.  It is within civil conflicts affected by political strife that reconciliation is most 
important and credible signaling and information transfer is most important.  The factions 
have little trust for one another and must form a single, unified government.  
Consequently, a third party acting as a trusted intermediary and guarantor of security will 
be important.  Furthermore, secessionist movements seeking recognition from 
international bodies should be more receptive to outside influence since their acceptance 
is based on adhering to accepted international practices of state conduct and are 
susceptible to reputational costs.  Secessionist movements may involve separation of 
belligerents by geographical boundaries and peacekeeping missions involving strong 
intermediaries could make a difference in getting the belligerents to commit to peace.   
Independence movements most likely to favor “all or nothing” outcomes 
constitute the smallest number of observations within the data (4.3%).  Peacekeeping 
missions are likely to be difficult in such instances, no matter how effective the 
intermediary might be at relaying information since each of the belligerents will be less 
likely to negotiate anything less than total victory.  Rebel groups may care little about 
reputational costs associated with recurrences of civil war because rebel groups will more 
likely seek war as an end (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004).   
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Figure 3.2: Reasons for Civil War-TPI Data  
 
 One final concern about the data is that there may be a geographic bias in the 
peacekeeping missions deployed from 1946-2006.  If any particular region of the world is 
represented disproportionately in the data, the analysis may be systematically biased in 
its conclusions.  Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of peacekeeping missions in the TPI 
Intrastate Dispute Project data by geographic region.  While there are a greater number of 
missions deployed to sub-Saharan Africa (approximately one third of the total), each of 
the other regions of the globe are represented in the data and no one particular region is 
substantially overrepresented.  The fewest number of observations are in the Western 
Hemisphere (10%) and the Middle East/North Africa Regions (11%).  This may be 
reflective of fewer civil conflicts in the regions, as well as indicative of the fewer states 
within these regions. The regions including Europe and the Former Soviet Union and the 
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Asia/Pacific Region each constitute approximately 23% of the peacekeeping mission 
observations.  Though there are more peacekeeping missions in sub Saharan-Africa, there 
is not necessarily a geographic bias in the data.   
Figure 3.3: Where Peacekeepers Go-TPI Data 
 
 The TPI Intrastate Dispute Project data serve the intended purposes for the 
research, providing the best dataset using variables that are practical for the current 
analysis.  It expands the number of peacekeeping observations and specifies necessary 
components about the peacekeeping mission that should prove valuable in the present 
research.  While some time periods and geographic regions appear more often in the 
data, they do not significantly bias the results of the analysis which remains consistent 
with other examinations of peacekeeping.   
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Unit of Analysis: Identifying a Peacekeeping Mission 
 
 Each of the observations within the TPI Intrastate Dispute Project data represent 
an identified peacekeeping mission by an outside organization or state in a civil conflict.  
Each observation consists of a state experiencing a cessation in conflict.  Even though 
conflict has ceased, each of the belligerents distrusts one another, undermining their 
commitment to peace.  This distrust makes recurrences of conflict likely since each of the 
belligerents should defect from the stalemate as soon as it thinks it can gain a strategic 
advantage (Filson and Werner 2002).   
 The TPI Intrastate Dispute Data consider a civil conflict to consist of government 
security personnel involved in active hostilities with one or more armed opposition groups 
challenging the sovereignty of the government.  These conflicts must occur within the 
recognizable boundaries of a single state and the civil conflict must have been an active 
military engagement for no fewer than 10 consecutive days.  Consistent with the 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset, this unit of analysis uses a low threshold of violence 
to capture lower scale civil conflicts and uprisings. However, these data omit singular acts 
of violence which might be included in the UCDP/PRIO data.   
If a civil conflict has taken place, it is not necessarily included in the data.  
Observations in the data only include instances when peacekeepers have been deployed 
to the observed civil conflict.  While other studies have examined if third parties make a 
difference in the peace process (see Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Fortna 2003, 2008; 
Regan 2002; Walter 2002), this analysis examines the effectiveness of different 
intermediaries.  There are several conditions that characterize the peacekeeping mission 
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so that it is not confused with military occupation or third party mediation.  To be 
included in the data, the belligerents must have reached a relatively stable cessation of 
conflict.  This insures that the peacekeepers are less likely to be viewed as a military 
occupation force seeking to alter the status quo within the conflict.  The third parties 
introduced to the country must involve peacekeepers in the form of security and 
monitoring personnel so that these forces are not confused with diplomatic envoys meant 
to negotiate peace in an ongoing conflict.  Ultimately, the observed peacekeeping 
missions in the data serve one or more of the following purposes: maintaining law and 
order, monitoring or verifying a ceasefire agreement, monitoring or verifying 
disarmament or demobilization, protecting/delivering humanitarian assistance, providing 
security to government or civilian facilities, and/or maintaining buffer zones between 
combatants.     
Dependent Variables: Determining When Conflict Recurs 
 
 One of the more difficult tasks associated with the peacekeeping literature is 
determining when civil wars recur and when peace has been successfully implemented.  
The simplest definition for an existence of peace is a lack of war, but there must also be 
some capacity for political authority imposed by the state (Vasquez 1993: 264-265).  
Political authority is particularly important in civil conflicts because factions of rebellious 
belligerents must in some way be appeased to the point to seek political means to meet 
their objectives, rather than militaristic means.  Once peacekeepers have been sent to an 
area of relative calm, new outbreaks of violence mark a failed peace.   
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The TPI Intrastate Dispute Project data define recurrences of violence in internal 
state disputes as “periods of military hostilities between government security personnel 
and members of one or more armed opposition groups within a state lasting 10 or more 
days, regardless of the number of fatalities” (Mullenbach 2005: 539-540).  The data 
include 149 observations of outside interventions in civil conflicts.   These observations 
account for recurrences of conflict both while the peacekeepers were present in the 
conflict and whether there was a recurrence of conflict one year after the peacekeepers 
left.5  The variation in these two dependent variables allow for us to distinguish between 
mission resulting an artificial cessation of conflict and missions which actually help foster 
a working political structure that endures even after the peacekeepers are gone.   
 There are two primary dependent variables.  The first dependent variable 
“Violence during PKO” measures whether or not military hostilities resumed while the 
peacekeepers were present.  This variable measures the effectiveness of the immediate 
enforcement capability of the peacekeepers.  Though peacekeepers are often numerically 
small and operate under strict rules of engagement, they make resumption of violence 
costlier for the belligerents.  If consistent fighting between the belligerents resumes for at 
least 10 continuous days, the observation is coded as 1 and the peacekeeping mission is 
considered a failure according to the data.  If there was no observed resumption of 
violence while the peacekeeping mission was present, the observation is coded 0 and the 
mission is considered successful because violence did not resume in the civil war.   
                                                 
5
 Variables in the data also distinguish observations in which peacekeepers have not yet left the post conflict 
area or have not yet been gone for a year.  I use this data by incorporating and omitting these observations in 
separate analyses. 
 76 
 The second dependent variable “Violence after PKO: original data” provides an 
indication of peacekeeping effectiveness over time.  This variable captures the lasting 
effects of a peacekeeping mission, rather than the immediate modification of the status 
quo by a third party intermediary.  While the first dependent variable indicates a 
resumption of military hostilities while the peacekeepers were present, the “Violence 
after PKO: original data” variable indicates a resumption of military hostilities within one 
year after the peacekeeping mission leaves the post conflict zone.  The same standard for 
resumptions of military hostility is applied to determine the success and failure of the 
peacekeeping mission in this variable.  When there is 10 days of continuous fighting 
between the belligerents in the year after the peacekeepers leave, the civil war is 
considered to have resumed.  Resumptions of military hostilities are coded 1.  When 
peacekeeping missions aid a government’s ability to commit to agreements with 
aggrieved domestic parties, their impact should not merely focus on ceasing conflict, but 
also alleviating conditions that promote future conflict.   
 There must be adequate variation in the dependent variable outcomes within the 
dataset.6  The first dependent variable “Violence during PKO” includes 59% of the 
observations with no resumptions of violence and 41% of the observations with 
resumptions of violence.  The “Violence during PKO” variable shows substantive variation 
in of successes and failures of peacekeeping operations while they are in progress.  
 The second dependent variable “Violence after PKO: original data,” assessing the 
viability of peace after the peacekeepers have left, shows less variation.  When the data 
                                                 
6
 Variation within the dependent variable is also captured in the Reduction of Error (ROE) statistic used as 
one of the quality control measures for the empirical model.   
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are summarized, 58% of the observations show no recurrences of violence, 23% of the 
observations show recurrences of violence and 19% of the observations do not fall into 
either category because the peacekeeping mission is listed as “ongoing” in the data.   
There are two ways the ongoing data will be addressed in the analysis.  First, the 
analysis omits the 31 observations that are considered ongoing.  This results in 71% of the 
peacekeeping missions with no resumption of violence and 29% resulting in recurrences 
of violence.  A second solution to improve long term analysis of peacekeeping missions 
involves recoding the outcomes listed as ongoing.  This is done by identifying ongoing 
peacekeeping missions that illustrate a measure of success.   
Updating the ongoing peacekeeping missions results in a third dependent variable 
“Violence after PKO: updated data.”  If the mission in question results in a 2 year period 
without a recurrence of violence in spite of the ongoing presence of a peacekeeping 
mission, it is coded as 0 indicating a successful peacekeeping effort.  If the observation 
with an ongoing peacekeeping mission experienced a recurrence of violence, despite the 
presence of a peacekeeping contingent from December 2006 to December 2008, it is 
coded with a 1.7  The revised data results in 69% of the total observed missions ending 
peacefully and 31% of the observed missions resulting in a resumption of violence.  All of 
the dependent variables will be tested in the empirical model.   
 The three dependent variables are listed below for reference and a brief 
description is provided for each: 
                                                 
7
 The countries/regions that experienced recurrences of conflict in the 2 year period in question include 
Ossetia/Abkazia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sri Lanka, Cote d’Ivoire, Central African Republic, 
Afghanistan, and the Philippines.  The same definition for recurrences of violence in the TPI Intrastate 
Dispute Project data is used to make these estimations.  The determinations derived from researching online 
databases of international media outlets and are specified in Appendix B. 
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Violence during PKO:  Was there a resumption of military hostilities while the 
peacekeeping mission was present? (1=yes) 
Violence after PKO: original data:  Was there a resumption of military hostilities within 1 
year after the peacekeeping mission left? (1=yes) 
Violence after PKO: updated data:  Was there a resumption of military hostilities within 1 
year after the peacekeeping mission left and within the last 2 years if the peacekeeping 
mission is ongoing? (1=yes) 
Explanatory Variables: Characteristics of Peacekeeping Missions 
 
 Peacekeeping theory suggests that a lasting peace relates to the strength of the 
peacekeeping mission, the transparency and effective signaling capability of the 
peacekeeping mission, and the legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission. Peacekeeping 
strength is measured by the number of peacekeepers sent to the region, the nature of the 
intervening state, and the location of the intervening state.  Transparency in a 
peacekeeping mission is measured by the existence of treaties signed prior and during the 
operation and the domestic political institutions of the inventing state.  Legitimacy behind 
a peacekeeping mission is measured by the number of states involved in the mission and 
the sanctioning of the mission by the UN.  While the explanatory variables do not 
completely capture the theoretical concepts, they provide specific and testable 
approximations.  Finally, some control variables will enumerate possible alternative 
factors influencing peace in a post conflict area.   
Measuring the Strength of the Peacekeeping Mission 
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 The first component of the peacekeeping mission that affects the viability of peace 
is the collective strength associated with the peacekeeping mission.  As a means for 
coercion, strength can be measured in various ways.  Peacekeeping is often militarily 
weak, military forces usually vary in numerical size, and adhere to strict rules of 
engagement.  Measurements of strength in the empirical model estimate the military 
capability of the peacekeepers by accounting for the size of the intervening force and the 
power of the states intervening in the conflict.  Measurements also account for the 
resolve of intervening states, which can help overcome a deficit in capability.  The 
explanatory variables that serve as indicators of strength include the numerical size of the 
peacekeeping force, the great power or colonial power status of the intermediary, the 
proximity of the intervening states, and the signaling strength of the intermediary.   
Numerically larger peacekeeping forces can strengthen the coercive capability 
posed by peacekeepers.  While the size of most peacekeeping missions varies from month 
to month, the TPI Intrastate Dispute Project data provide numerical approximations of the 
total peacekeeping personnel (including support staff) sent to the region.  The data 
account for the wide variation in sizes from smaller observer missions to larger peace 
enforcement missions.  The numerical size (boots on the ground) of peacekeeping 
missions within the data ranges from 2 to 65,000 peacekeepers.8     
 Additional variables related to strength are based on the estimation of power 
associated with the primary intervening state.  The TPI Intrastate Dispute Project dataset 
include variables indicating the state contributing the most troops to the peacekeeping 
                                                 
8
 Numerical estimates of the size of the peacekeeping force is included within the TPI Intrastate Dispute 
Dataset and indicate the number of third party peacekeepers deployed to the civil conflict. 
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mission.  However, it does not account for any individual characteristics of this lead state.  
Since troop contribution is voluntary, the state contributing the most troops to a 
peacekeeping mission has a distinct desire to see a permanent end to the fighting.  The 
lead state is making a costly commitment to implement a peaceful resolution and is 
presumed to be highly motivated to that end.   
The lead state data were individually coded to account for the strength in 
capability of the lead nation.   The variables indicating the strength of the lead nation 
include major power status, colonial relationships, and contiguity.  For the dichotomous 
variable accounting for the military strength of the intervener, a state is considered 
independently strong if it is a permanent member of the UN Security Council.  Those five 
countries are among the strongest in terms of military capability during the post World 
War II era.  Additionally, a dichotomous variable for a colonial relationship is provided.  
The lead country in a peacekeeping mission is coded for a prior colonial presence in the 
country undergoing civil conflict.  Former colonial rulers should have greater historical, 
cultural, and economic ties to the conflict country, motivating it to permanently end 
violence.  Variables are coded for lead nation contiguity in a peacekeeping mission to the 
country undergoing civil conflict.   A country located near a conflict ridden country will be 
more willing and able to commit more resources to an unstable neighbor.  These 
observations are coded for contiguity based on land borders or water contiguity 
consistent with the Correlates of War direct contiguity standard (Stinnett et al. 2002).9  
                                                 
9
 See www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2 Data/DirectContiguity/DCV3desc.htm, I use the 400 mile water 
standard with two notable exceptions of Australia’s involvement in the Solomon Islands and East Timor.  I 
code these as contiguous because few, if any, other fall within 400 miles of these island nations.  The coding 
exception affects 3 observations in the data. 
 81 
Each of these variables provides a nominal indication of the capacity for the lead country 
to engage in the mission and the potential strength in their resolve for the mission. 
The final variable indicating the strength of the intervener relates to mediation.  
Involvement of a major power in the mediation process amounts to a cheap, but clear 
signal of intent by a militarily strong state.  A major power is, again, defined as a 
permanent member of the Security Council.  These data are included in the original TPI 
and do not require that a state actually contribute troops to the peacekeeping mission.  It 
only requires that a major power become directly involved in the mediation process.10  
Though this is a weak signal of strength, it still may present an indication of future 
involvement by a militarily strong country.   
 The independent variables indicating strength of involvement by third parties are 
listed below, simplified in their explanation, and reflecting the abbreviations presented in 
the data tables.   
Number of PKs:  The approximate number of peacekeepers involved in the mission. 
Colonial Power: Was the country contributing the largest contingent of peacekeepers to 
the mission a former colonial occupant in the post conflict region? (1=yes) 
Major Power:  Was the country contributing the largest contingent of peacekeepers to 
the mission one of the permanent 5 members of the UN Security Council? (1=yes) 
Contiguity: Was the country contributing the largest contingent of peacekeepers to the 
region a contiguous state? (1=yes) 
                                                 
10
 The variable does not account for states that may become diplomatically involved in a dispute through a 
surrogate country or organization.   
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Major Power Mediation:  Was a major power nation (P5 security council member) 
involved in the mediation process prior to the cessation of conflict? (1=yes) 
Measuring Informational Components of the Peacekeeping Mission 
 
 Clarity in signaling and information transfer among the belligerents is trickier to 
estimate, but the written agreements and the domestic political institutions of the 
intermediary can help approximate such measurements.  I use two specific methods of 
measurement.  First, is the lead state involved in the peacekeeping mission a democracy?  
Democratic governments are often cited as better arbiters due to their ability to 
effectively convey information because of the transparent nature of their political 
institutions (Schultz 1999).  Secondly, what treaties have the belligerents entered into 
either at the cessation of the conflict or while the peacekeeping mission is taking place?  
Written agreements constitute a transparent signal of the stated intentions of the 
belligerents to conform to a peace or ceasefire agreement (Fortna 2004).  Data within the 
TPI Intrastate Dispute Project Dataset provide explanatory variables approximating the 
impact of these informational components on cessations of conflict.  Quality of signaling 
and information transfer by third party intermediaries is measured by the democracy 
score of the peacekeeping mission and the existences of written agreements prior and 
during the peacekeeping mission.  
Identifying democratic nations within a peacekeeping operation is important.  
Again, democracy associated with a peacekeeping mission is approximated by the state 
leading the mission.  The most common measurements for democratic institutions involve 
Polity IV and Freedom House distinguishing existence of both political and civil democratic 
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principles.  Freedom House scores do not cover the necessary pre-1975 time frame, so 
Polity IV scores ranging from 0-10 (10 being the most democratic and 0 being the least) 
are sufficient for capturing democracy of the lead nation of the peacekeeping mission.  
Rather than identifying a threshold for democracy, the Polity IV measurement provides an 
ordinal distinction for degree of democracy.  Peacekeeping missions lead by nations that 
have a more democratic orientation should be transparent in their institutional 
composition and foster greater clarity among the parties seeking discourse.   
Two additional explanatory variables identify informational clarity by identifying 
ceasefire agreements among the belligerents.  Having a written ceasefire agreement 
clarifies the desire for peace by the warring factions and specifically enumerates the 
terms of upholding a resolution.  Clarity in written peace agreements promote more 
peaceful outcomes after war (Fortna 2004).  Written agreements are identified in the data 
in two variables.  First, the TPI dataset identify if a written ceasefire agreement was signed 
prior to the arrival of the peacekeeping mission.  This clarifies the scope of the mission by 
identifying agreements for the peacekeepers to uphold.  Second, the data identify a 
variable determining if a peace agreement was signed in the presence of the 
peacekeeping mission.  The analysis assumes that a peacekeeping mission had some role 
in facilitating and providing security guarantees if the treaty was signed during the 
mission.  This provides the most robust measurement of peacekeeping involvement in a 
peace negotiation.    
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The explanatory variables measuring the transparency associated with a 
peacekeeping mission are listed below and reflect the abbreviations presented in the data 
tables.   
Lead State Democracy:  What was the democracy score (polity IV) of the country 
contributing the most troops to the peacekeeping mission?  (0-10; 0 least democratic-10 
most democratic) 
Cease:  Was a formal cease fire agreement signed between the belligerents at the 
cessation of conflict? (1=yes) 
Treaty:  Was a formal peace treaty signed between the belligerents while the 
peacekeeping mission took place? (1=yes) 
Measuring the Legitimacy Associated with the Peacekeeping Mission 
 
 A particularly difficult variable to approximate deals with the legitimacy afforded 
to a peacekeeping mission.  A measurement of legitimacy should take into account the 
international consensus behind a peacekeeping initiative.  International consensus takes 
the form of granting authorization into to a peacekeeping action.  This is accomplished by 
accounting for UN authorization for a peacekeeping mission and identifying the number of 
countries contributing peacekeepers to the mission.   
 UN authorization is not a perfect measurement for international legitimacy, but it 
is perhaps the best metric for international support for mission.  A UN resolution for a 
peacekeeping operation requires a majority vote among the Security Council and no 
objection among the P5.  Achieving such consensus requires significant collaboration and 
political will.  Consequently, action taken by the Security Council requires significant 
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international resolve.  The TPI dataset provides descriptive explanation for UN sanctioned 
peacekeeping operations, but the actual coding was done specifically for the purposes of 
this research and results in a dichotomous explanatory variable for UN authority behind 
the peacekeeping mission.  All missions sanctioned by the UN fall into this category, 
including missions with personnel contributed from regional organizations.  A 
peacekeeping mission supported by the UN is assumed to have greater backing from the 
international community than missions without UN backing. 
 In addition to the UN sanctioning a peacekeeping mission, political will behind a 
peacekeeping mission can be measured by the number of states willing to make costly 
signals of resolve.  This is measured in the analysis by the number of states committing 
troops to the mission.  While states can have multiple motivations for committing troops 
to a peacekeeping operation, this measurement estimates that it is a costly signal of 
international resolve for a peaceful outcome.  One or few countries involved in a 
peacekeeping mission are likely to be viewed as an occupation, stoking nationalistic 
sentiment among local nationals.  Alternatively, breaking a peace when more countries 
have troops in the area would not endear the belligerents to a larger number of states in 
the international community.  The TPI Intrastate Dispute Data provide the approximate 
number of nations involved in the peacekeeping mission and though many nations choose 
to send small contingents of monitors and troops, their actions signal support for the 
mission, thereby, legitimizing the peacekeeping mission.   
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The explanatory variables approximating a measurement of legitimacy provided to 
a peacekeeping mission are listed below and reflect the abbreviations presented in the 
data tables.   
UN Mandate:  Was the peacekeeping mission sponsored or authorized by the UN? (1=yes) 
Number of States:  What was the approximate number of states involved in the 
peacekeeping mission? 
Control Variables 
 
 Additional control variables help account for alternative factors influencing 
peaceful or violent outcomes in the data.  First, population may alter the likelihood for 
peace in post conflict zones.  Larger populations are difficult to control and belligerents 
may be able to shirk in their commitments to peace by hiding in a larger crowd.  Second, 
one side achieving total victory in the conflict may account for a lack of recurrence in 
violence.  Peace has been shown to persist when the victorious side has the capacity to 
dictate the terms of the post conflict peace (Toft 2010).  Third, the duration of the 
peacekeeping mission may account for a peaceful or violent outcome in the conflict.  
Successful peacekeeping may simply be a reflection of how long the mission lasts.  
Without incorporating control variables, the statistical model may omit possibly relevant 
variables. 
 The population of the country is coded as a continuous variable based on the size 
of the country within which the peacekeeping mission is taken place.  The population 
variable is recorded by the country’s population size in millions at the beginning date of 
the peacekeeping mission.  The largest country in the dataset was Indonesia (220.6 mil.) 
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and the smallest country in the dataset consisting of Tonga (.1 mil.).  Population data are 
not included in the original TPI Intrastate Dispute dataset and was added using data 
acquired from the World Bank Data and Statistics website.11   It is reasonable to predict 
that larger populations will be more difficult to control by relatively small contingents of 
peacekeepers, who usually operate under strict rules of engagement.  Also, larger 
populations are usually reflective of geographically larger states, which may account for 
an inefficiency of peacekeepers covering all of the parts of the territory undergoing 
conflict.  Bigger populations within a country could lead to more instances of 
peacekeepers being ineffective to quell popular uprisings.   
 Achieving military victory by one of the belligerents can also influence the 
likelihood for peace, once conflict has subsided.  It can be expected that if one side 
achieved a military victory at the conclusion of the civil conflict, they have been able to 
successfully implement their preferred policies by force.  While this may be the case, it is 
far from a certainty in civil conflicts.  In spite of a military defeat, combatants in civil 
conflict could effectively wage a guerilla campaign or wait until more favorable conditions 
emerge.  Consequently, while the winning side in a civil conflict can impose their will to a 
greater degree, they cannot ignore the political grievances that initiated the conflict in the 
first place.  As a control variable, military victory is coded as a dichotomous measurement 
in the data.  If the peacekeeping force was introduced in the wake of a military victory by 
one of the belligerents, the variable is coded 1 and if the peacekeeping mission is 
deployed in the midst of a stalemate, the variable is coded 0.  However, peacekeeping 
                                                 
11
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/0,,menuPK:476823~pagePK:64165236~piPK:
64165141~theSitePK:469372,00.html 
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missions are rarely deployed in cases of military victory. Only 5% of the observations 
involve a military victory.  
 The duration of the peacekeeping mission is coded as a continuous variable 
estimating the total number of months that the peacekeeping mission took place.  The 
success of a peacekeeping mission may not be a result of who intervenes but rather, how 
long they are willing to remain there to insure that peace persists.  Controlling for the 
duration of the peacekeeping mission provides that the success of a peacekeeping mission 
is not a function of how long the peacekeepers are willing to stay in a post conflict zone.  
The duration of the peacekeeping missions are accounted for in the TPI Intrastate Dispute 
dataset with the average peacekeeping mission lasting 35 months.  
Population:  What is the population (in millions) of the country in which the peacekeeping 
mission is taking place? 
Victory:  Did either of the belligerents achieve a military victory in the civil conflict, prior 
to the peacekeeping mission? (1=yes) 
Duration:  What was the approximate duration of the peacekeeping mission? (Months) 
Methodology  
 
 STATA statistical software is used to analyze the data and the nature of the 
dependent variables make logistical regression models the appropriate method for 
analysis.  Since the dichotomous dependent variables record the outcomes in the data, 
the output of a linear regression line is not accurate.  Consequently, Clarify is used in 
conjunction with STATA to estimate the predicted probabilities of  the logistical regression 
and further specify the impact of the explanatory variables on the outcome variables 
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(King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003).  Simply put, the 
initial estimation of the regression line is a straight line represented by the coefficient as 
an indicator of the slope.  However, the regression line, in actuality, is curvilinear and 
Clarify uses Monte Carlo estimations to simulate the change of the regression line at 
varying points on the curve.  The result of this process is represented by a probability 
estimate indicated in supplemental tables accompanying each regression table. 
The data are presented in multiple combinations of logistical regression models to 
fully address the statistical relationships among the variables.  Each logistical regression 
table presents the results of a different dependent variable (exception: Table combination 
3.1-3.2 & 3.3-3.4 use the same dependent variable but alter the explanatory variable 
listed below in parenthesis).   
The results of the empirical tests are briefly summarized in the next section.  Each 
regression analysis will include a description of the dependent variable being tested, a 
complete logistical regression table and a table displaying the predicted probabilities for 
significant variables.  A more detailed description of the findings will further explain the 
empirical results in the following chapters 4-6.   
Summary of the Analysis 
 
The logistical regressions models are described below and followed by the 
corresponding regression tables: 
Tables 3.1-3.2: Recurrence of Violence during Peacekeeping Operation (Major Power)  
Table 3.1 displays the likelihood for recurrences of conflict while peacekeepers are 
present.  Model 1 tests the variables related to the strength of the intermediary and 
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includes the variable for major power leadership.  Model 2 tests the variables related to 
the transparency associated with the intermediary.  Model 3 tests the variables related to 
the legitimacy of the intermediary.  The Full Model tests all of the variables of interest 
together to determine the collective impacts of each of the variables and includes the 
variable for major power leadership.  Table 3.2 displays the predicted probabilities for 
significant variables in Table 3.1.  The predicted probabilities in Table 3.2 show the 
probabilistic effects of the variables on peacekeeping success during a peacekeeping 
operation.   
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Table 3.1: Resumptions of Violence during a Peacekeeping Mission (Major Power) 
 
Likelihood for the Resumption of Military Hostilities during a Peacekeeping Deployment 
 Model 1 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) 
Model 2 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) 
Model 3 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) 
Full Model 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) 
Intercept 
 
Number of PKs 
 
Major Power 
 
Major Power 
Mediation 
 
Contiguity 
 
Lead State 
Democracy 
 
Cease 
 
Treaty 
 
UN Mandate 
 
Number of 
States 
 
Duration 
 
Population 
 
Victory 
 
 
Pseudo-r2 
χ2 
N 
ROE 
Log-Likelihood 
   -.168(.291) 
 
.00001(.00002) 
 
-1.17(.525)** 
 
2.62(.808)*** 
 
 
-1.08(.466)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.002(.004) 
 
.002(.005) 
 
-1.27(1.13) 
 
 
.14 
25.76 
141 
.18 
-81.849 
1.21(.554)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.144(.056)** 
 
 
-.341(.433) 
 
-1.32(.448)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.005(.004) 
 
.001(.006) 
 
-1.96(1.13)* 
 
 
.15 
29.73 
146 
.27 
-83.228 
-.199(.280) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.784(.462)* 
 
 
-.04(.016)** 
 
.004(.004) 
 
.003(.006) 
 
-1.16(1.12) 
 
 
.06 
12.18 
149 
.002 
-95.082 
1.70(.644)*** 
 
.00004(.00003) 
 
-.954(.628) 
 
2.742(.886)*** 
 
 
-1.20(.585)** 
 
-.146(.071)** 
 
 
-1.03(.528)** 
 
-1.11(.529)** 
 
1.13(.640)* 
 
 
-.042(.020)** 
 
.00002(.006) 
 
.041(.007)** 
 
-1.66(1.271) 
 
 
.29 
51.82 
133 
.41 
-63.916 
Notes: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Table 3.2: Predicted Probabilities for Significant Variables:  
During a Peacekeeping Mission 
 
Significant Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Full Model 
Major Power -.24    
Major Power Mediation .44   .39 
Contiguity -.23   -.26 
Democratic Lead State  -.31  -.30 
Ceasefire    -.23 
Treaty  -.28  -.24 
UN Mandate   .18 .23 
Number of States   -.35 -.48 
Victory  -.35   
Population    .42 
 
Tables 3.3-3.4: Recurrence of Violence during Peacekeeping Operation (Colonial Power) 
 Table 3.3 also displays the likelihood for recurrences of conflict during a 
peacekeeping mission, but substitutes the major power leadership variable for a colonial 
power leadership variable.  Since there is significant overlap between major powers and 
former colonial rulers, these variables are tested in separate models.  Model 1 tests 
variables related to the strength of the intermediary substituting the colonial leadership 
variable.  Since the colonial leadership variable is not used in Model 2 and Model 3, these 
models are identical to Model 2 and Model 3 in Table 3.1.  The Full Model tests all of the 
variables of interest and includes the colonial leadership variable.  Table 3.4 displays the 
predicted probabilities for significant variables in Table 3.3.  Table 3.4 shows the predicted 
change in recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping mission when the colonial 
leadership variable is substituted.  
 
 
Table 3.3: Resumptions of Violence during a Peacekeeping Mission (Colonial) 
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Substituting Colonial Power for Major Power 
Likelihood for the Resumption of Military Hostilities during a Peacekeeping Deployment 
 Model 1 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) 
Model 2 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) 
Model 3 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) 
Full Model 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) 
Intercept 
 
Number of PKs 
 
Colonial Power 
 
Major Power 
Mediation 
 
Contiguity 
 
Lead State 
Democracy 
 
Cease 
 
Treaty 
 
UN Mandate 
 
Number of 
States 
 
Duration 
 
Population 
 
Victory 
 
 
Pseudo-r2 
χ2 
N 
ROE 
Log-Likelihood 
   -.278(.288) 
 
.000001(.00002) 
 
-1.93(.877)** 
 
3.28(1.04)*** 
 
 
-1.01(.463)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.002(.004) 
 
.006(.006) 
 
-1.44(1.12) 
 
 
.14 
26.84 
141 
.18 
-81.312 
1.21(.554)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.144(.056)** 
 
-.341(.433) 
 
-1.32(.448)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.005(.004) 
 
.001(.006) 
 
-1.96(1.13)* 
 
 
.15 
29.73 
146 
.28 
-83.228 
-.199(.280) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.784(.462)* 
 
 
-.04(.016)** 
 
.004(.004) 
 
.003(.006) 
 
-1.16(1.12) 
 
 
.06 
12.18 
149 
.002 
-95.082 
1.63(.641)** 
 
.00003(.00002) 
 
-1.441(.918) 
 
3.088(.976)*** 
 
 
-1.07(.565)* 
 
 
-.170(.066)** 
 
-.982(.524)* 
 
-.959(.528)* 
 
1.30(.635)** 
 
 
-.044(.021)** 
 
.00095(.0057) 
 
.015(.008)** 
 
-1.69(1.257) 
 
 
.29 
52.36 
133 
.46 
-63.644 
Notes: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
 
Table 3.4: Predicted Probabilities for Significant Variables:  
 94 
During a Peacekeeping Mission (Included Colonial) 
 
Significant Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Full Model 
Colonial Power -.30    
Major Power Mediation .50   .45 
Contiguity -.21   -.23 
Democratic Lead State  -.31  -.36 
Ceasefire    -.21 
Treaty  -.28  -.20 
UN Mandate   .18 .28 
Number of States   -.35 -.47 
Victory  -.35   
Population    .48 
 
Tables 3.5-3.6: Recurrence of Violence after Peacekeeper Departure (Original TPI Data) 
 Table 3.5 displays the results of the logistical regression models testing 
recurrences of violence within 1 year after the departure of peacekeepers using the 
original Dixon and Mullenbach data.  Testing the variables using the original dataset 
presents a baseline for peacekeeping success with the original TPI data.  However, these 
data contain numerous observations in which the peacekeeping missions are ongoing.  
Similar to the previous tables, Model 1 tests the independent variables related to the 
strength of the intermediary, Model 2 tests the independent variables related to the 
transparency of the intermediary, and Model 3 tests the independent variables related to 
the legitimacy of the intermediary.  The Full Model cumulatively tests all of the 
independent variables for peacekeeping success.  Table 3.6 displays the predicted 
probabilities for significant variables in Table 3.5.  Tables 3.5 and 3.6 test the likelihood for 
recurrences of violence based on the intermediary using the original Dixon and 
Mullenbach data. 
Table 3.5: Recurrences of Violence after a Peacekeeping Mission 
(Using Original TPI Data) 
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Likelihood for the Resumption of Military Hostilities within 1 Year after the Withdrawal of 
a Peacekeeping Mission (D&M Dependent Variable) 
 Model 1 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) 
Model 2 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) 
Model 3 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) 
Full Model 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) 
Intercept 
 
Number of PKs 
 
Colonial Power 
 
Major Power 
Mediation 
 
Contiguity 
 
Lead State 
Democracy 
 
Cease 
 
Treaty 
 
UN Mandate 
 
Number of 
States 
 
Duration 
 
Population 
 
Victory 
 
Pseudo-r2 
χ2 
N 
ROE 
Log-Likelihood 
   -.636(.282)** 
 
.00001(.00002) 
 
-.635(.618) 
 
.803(.642) 
 
 
-.480(.413) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.006(.005) 
 
.009(.006) 
 
.758(.791) 
 
.06 
12.12 
141 
.13 
-90.647 
.610(.552) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.096(.055)* 
 
-.068(.441) 
 
-1.87(.480)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.010(.005)** 
 
.009(.006) 
 
-.360(.820) 
 
.18 
35.31 
146 
.28 
-82.432 
-.624(.283)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.783(.457)* 
 
 
.014(.014) 
 
.004(.004) 
 
.012(.008)* 
 
-.194(.349) 
 
.05 
10.39 
149 
.13 
-96.303 
.881(.635) 
 
.00002(.00002) 
 
-.045(.810) 
 
.242(.750) 
 
 
-.643(.524) 
 
 
-.101(.064) 
 
-.406(.517) 
 
-2.41(.590)*** 
 
-1.13(.630)* 
 
 
-.033(.021) 
 
.012(.006)* 
 
.020(.011)* 
 
-.828(1.00) 
 
.26 
48.31 
133 
.42 
-67.188 
Notes: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
Table 3.6: Predicted Probabilities for Significant Variables 
Likelihood for a Resumption of Violence after Peacekeepers have Left (1 year) 
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Using Original TPI Data 
 
Significant Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Full Model 
Colonial Power     
Major Power Mediation     
Contiguity     
Democratic Lead State  -.21   
Ceasefire     
Treaty  -.38  -.48 
UN Mandate   -.15 -.22 
Number of States     
Victory     
Duration  .48  .22 
Population   .42 .21 
 
Tables 3.7-3.8: Recurrence of Violence after Peacekeeper Departure (Revised TPI Data) 
 To fully account for ongoing peacekeeping missions, Table 3.7 displays the results 
of the logistical regression models testing the updated dependent variable on long term 
peacekeeping success.  The updated dependent variable uses an alternate definition of 
peacekeeping success to account for peacekeeping missions that remain ongoing.  The 
new dependent variable classifies ongoing peacekeeping missions that remain ongoing 
and have not experienced violence for 2 years from 2006 as successful peacekeeping 
missions.  Models 1-3 independently test the strength, transparency, and legitimacy of an 
intermediary on long term peacekeeping success.  The Full Model in Table 3.7 tests all of 
the variables of interest using the updated dependent variable.  Table 3.8 displays the 
predicted probabilities of statistically significant variables from the models in Table 3.7.  
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 display the likelihood for recurrences of violence after a peacekeeping 
mission using the updated dependent variable.   
Table 3.7: Recurrences of Violence after a Peacekeeping Mission 
Updated TPI Data (Accounting for Ongoing Missions) 
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Likelihood for the Resumption of Military Hostilities within 1 Year after the Withdrawal of 
a Peacekeeping Mission 
 Model 1 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) 
Model 2 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) 
Model 3 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) 
Full Model 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) 
Intercept 
 
Number of PKs 
 
Colonial Power 
 
Major Power 
Mediation 
 
Contiguity 
 
Lead State 
Democracy 
 
Cease 
 
Treaty 
 
UN Mandate 
 
Number of 
States 
 
Duration 
 
Population 
 
Victory 
 
Pseudo-r2 
χ2 
N 
ROE 
Log-Likelihood 
   -.509(.307)* 
 
.00002(.00002) 
 
-.222(.460) 
 
.917(.626) 
 
 
-1.02(.478)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.009(.006) 
 
.005(.005) 
 
.110(.815) 
 
.06 
10.84 
141 
.02 
-83.622 
.813(.552) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.147(.056)*** 
 
.305(.459) 
 
-1.95(.551)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.006(.005) 
 
.004(.006) 
 
.251(.823) 
 
.18 
33.69 
146 
.17 
-75.617 
-.448(.287) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.553(.471) 
 
 
-.0008(.015) 
 
-.005(.005) 
 
.007(.006) 
 
-.223(.375) 
 
.03 
5.65 
149 
.00 
-91.549 
1.25(.629)** 
 
.00003(.00002) 
 
.095(.610) 
 
.327(.732) 
 
 
-1.37(.603)** 
 
 
-.145(.071)** 
 
.051(.525) 
 
-2.17(.635)*** 
 
-.646(.674) 
 
 
.0013(.0205) 
 
-.005(.005) 
 
.013(.008)* 
 
-.621(.990) 
 
.26 
43.99 
133 
.31 
-63.117 
Notes: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
Table 3.8: Predicted Probabilities for Significant Variables 
Likelihood for a Resumption of Violence after Peacekeepers have Left (1 year) 
Updated TPI Data 
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Significant Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Full Model 
Major Power     
Major Power Mediation     
Contiguity -.19   -.31 
Democratic Lead State  -.34  -.29 
Ceasefire     
Treaty  -.31  -.42 
UN Mandate     
Number of States     
Victory     
Population    .37 
Tables 3.9-3.10: Recurrence of Violence after Peacekeeping Mission (Omitting Ongoing)  
 To be sure that the ongoing peacekeeping missions are consistent with the rest of 
the data, Table 3.9 tests long term peacekeeping success omitting ongoing missions from 
the analysis.  If the results of Table 3.10 show substantially different results from the 
previous models on long term peacekeeping success, it indicates that the statistical results 
are being driven by ongoing peacekeeping missions in the data.  In Table 3.9, Models 1-3 
display the independent effects of strength, transparency, and legitimacy in the 
intermediary and the Full Model displays the cumulative effects of the independent 
variables of interest on recurrences of violence within 1 year after the departure of 
peacekeepers.  Table 3.10 displays the predicted probabilities for statistically significant 
variables in Table 3.9.  To insure that ongoing peacekeeping missions are not altering the 
results of the logistical regression models, Tables 3.9 and 3.10 show the likelihood for 
recurrences of violence while omitting ongoing peacekeeping operations. 
 
 
Table 3.9: Recurrences of Violence after a Peacekeeping Mission 
(Omitting Ongoing Missions)  
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Likelihood for the Resumption of Military Hostilities within 1 Year after the Withdrawal of 
a Peacekeeping Mission 
 Model 1 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) 
Model 2 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) 
Model 3 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) 
Full Model 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
(Robust SE) 
Intercept 
 
Number of PKs 
 
Colonial Power 
 
Major Power 
Mediation 
 
Contiguity 
 
Lead State 
Democracy 
 
Cease 
 
Treaty 
 
UN Mandate 
 
Number of 
States 
 
Duration 
 
Population 
 
Victory 
 
Pseudo-r2 
χ2 
N 
ROE 
Log-Likelihood 
   -.509(.307)* 
 
.00002(.00002) 
 
-1.37(.885) 
 
1.17(.765) 
 
 
-1.44(.615)** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.022(.011)** 
 
.006(.006) 
 
.450(1.04) 
 
.11 
15.08 
113 
.03 
-61.573 
.850(.663) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.119(.062)* 
 
.019(.511) 
 
-2.56(.801)*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.011(.012) 
 
-.004(.007) 
 
.033(.997) 
 
.22 
32.39 
118 
.14 
-56.391 
-.342(.333) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-.257(.524) 
 
 
-.017(.021) 
 
-.011(.009) 
 
.005(.008) 
 
-.265(.441) 
 
.04 
5.89 
123 
.03 
-72.276 
1.41(.744)* 
 
.00005(.00003)* 
 
-.334(1.02) 
 
.650(.868) 
 
 
-1.81(.803)** 
 
 
-.123(.078) 
 
-.488(.609) 
 
-2.58(.751)*** 
 
-.121(.751) 
 
 
-.015(.029) 
 
-.018(.016) 
 
.016(.011) 
 
-.507(1.15) 
 
.32 
42.42 
107 
.36 
-44.895 
Notes: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
Table 3.10: Predicted Probabilities for Significant Variables 
Likelihood for a Resumption of Violence after Peacekeepers have Left (1 year) 
Using TPI Data (Omitting Ongoing Missions) 
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Significant Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Full Model 
Number of Peacekeepers    .18 
Major Power Mediation     
Contiguity -.20   -.35 
Democratic Lead State  -.27   
Ceasefire     
Treaty  -.39  -.49 
UN Mandate     
Number of States     
Duration -.36    
Population     
Victory     
 
Findings 
The findings are reported through three descriptive mediums.  First, the results of 
the empirical tests for each of the variables of interest are described based on their 
statistical relationships to the dependent variables.  The logistical regression models 
determine if the independent variables have a statistically significant impact on the 
dependent variables and predicted probabilities measure that impact.  Predicted 
probabilities are generated using CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003).  Second, 
the statistical results are interpreted in the context of theory on peacekeeping.  If the 
statistical results are consistent with theory on peacekeeping, that relationship will be 
explained.  If the statistical results are inconsistent with theory on peacekeeping, possible 
explanations for the inconsistency will be examined.     
The results of the empirical tests show mixed findings regarding the success of 
peacekeeping operations both during and after a peacekeeping mission.  Variables 
associated with the strength and legitimacy associated with the intervener show mixed 
evidence that the explanatory variables promote a lasting peace in civil wars.  However, 
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the variables associated with transparency and signaling credibility in an intermediary 
provide the best evidence of permanently reconciling the warring factions in civil conflict.  
Though the explanatory variables are approximations of the larger theoretical arguments, 
they present a clearer picture of how peacekeeping promotes resolutions in civil conflicts.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright     2013     Barrett J. Osborn  
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Chapter 4: Evaluating the Strength of the Intervening Third Party 
 
 Stronger intermediaries should reduce the likelihood for recurrences of violence in 
civil conflicts.  Theory suggests that a third party peacekeeping force with strong “will and 
skill” to subdue violence in a civil conflict will be more successful.  Strong intermediaries in 
a civil conflict escalate the costs among the belligerents for defecting from a cessation in 
conflict.  However, once the intermediary is removed, if a bargaining imbalance remains, 
conflict will recur.  Consequently, peacekeepers relying on strength to subdue the 
belligerents should be successful while peacekeepers are present, but not after they 
leave.    
 Five explanatory variables test the strength of the intervening peacekeeping 
mission.  The measurements accounting for the strength of the intermediary include the 
number of peacekeepers involved in the mission, the leadership of the peacekeeping 
mission by major powers, former colonial rulers, or contiguous nations.  Furthermore, if a 
major power is involved in the mediation process, it may present a signal to the 
belligerents that escalation of involvement is a possibility.   Troop commitment presents a 
visible signal of engagement. Large numbers of peacekeepers makes conflict escalation 
for the belligerents a potentially costly decision.  Major powers, former colonial states, 
and contiguous states have greater military capabilities at their disposal, making 
recurrences of violence a costlier pursuit for the belligerents.  These states have a 
significant motive in maintaining peace.  In addition, the involvement of a major power in 
the mediation process presents a tangible but “cheap” signal to the belligerents that more 
coercive involvement of a strong third party is a possibility.  These explanatory variables 
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describe characteristics of a strong intervening peacekeeping force and illustrate the 
influence of strength on peaceful outcomes while the force is on the ground and after the 
force exits the region.   
Number of Peacekeepers: More Boots on the Ground 
 
Table: 4.1: Impact of the Number of Peacekeepers on Recurrences of War 
Variable 
 
During PKO 
After a PKO 
(Original Data) 
After a PKO 
(Updated Data) 
After a PKO 
(Omitting Ongoing) 
Number of 
Peacekeepers 
(Model 1) 
.00001 
 
.00001 
 
.00002 
 
.00002 
 
Number of 
Peacekeepers 
(Full Model) 
.00003 
 
.00002 
 
.00003 
 
.00005* 
(Pr=.18) 
 
The first explanatory variable related to the strength of the intervening 
peacekeeping force examines the impact that the size of the peacekeeping force has on 
recurrences of violence.  Peacekeeping forces are composed of troops contributed by 
individual states.  While the size of the force is often related to the tasks the force intends 
to accomplish, states determine the overall size of the mission since troop contributions 
are based on what states are willing to contribute.  The voluntary nature of the forces 
usually makes the overall numbers suboptimal for the duties of the force (Diehl 2008: 87).   
It is expected that when more peacekeepers deploy to a post conflict zone, the 
international community is presenting a tangible signal of resolve toward ending the civil 
conflict.  In addition to stronger capabilities for coercive force, having more troops on the 
ground provides a substantial monitoring capability.  Since the size of the peacekeeping 
force deployed to the region represents both a tangible commitment of capability and an 
 104 
intangible commitment of resolve by the international community to ending the civil 
conflict, larger peacekeeping operations should make recurrences of conflict less likely.   
What the Models Indicate 
 The empirical tests show more peacekeepers do not necessarily reduce 
recurrences of violence in civil wars.  The statistical tests cannot conclusively determine 
that larger peacekeeping missions generate a reduced probability of recurrences of 
violence in civil conflict states.  This finding remains true both before and after the 
peacekeepers leave the host country.  Consequently, Hypothesis 1 (H1a and H1b) cannot be 
accepted.  The data do not suggest that a larger peacekeeping force will insure a 
reduction of military hostilities while present, nor do the data suggest that larger 
peacekeeping contingents reduce conflict over the long term after the peacekeepers 
leave.    
The lack of statistical evidence linking numerically larger peacekeeping missions to 
reductions in recurrences of violence during the mission can be found in Table 3.1 and 
Table 3.3.  Table 3.1 and Table 3.3 analyze the likelihood for recurrences of conflict while 
a peacekeeping mission is present within a country, the only difference being that Table 
3.1 includes a major power as the primary contributor to the peacekeeping mission and 
Table 3.3 includes a former colonial ruler as the primary contributor of personnel to a 
peacekeeping mission.12  Model 1, the reduced model for strength, in Table 3.1 and Table 
                                                 
12
 Initially, the variables accounting for “Major Powers” and “Colonial Powers” were included in the same 
logistical regression analyses, but were highly correlated with one another (Thank you to Dan Morey for this 
observation).  Consequently, the analyses are done separately and displayed in Table 1 and Table 3 to show 
that there are no significant differences in the outcomes of the tests, but when both variables are the model 
there are issues of collinearity.  In the following logistical regression analyses only the “Colonial Power” 
variable is used in order to simplify the models and eliminate redundancy.   
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3.3 each show a coefficient of .00001 that is not statistically significant (p>.10).  The Full 
Models in Table 3.1 and Table 3.3, further, do not indicate that the troops numbers 
deployed to the area significantly impact recurrences of violence.   Table 3.1 shows a 
positive coefficient of .00004 and Table 3.3 shows a positive coefficient of .00003.  Neither 
variable is statistically significant (p>.10).  The models do not indicate that larger 
peacekeeping missions in the context of troop strength make violence more or less likely 
with any statistical certainty during a peacekeeping mission.   
 Furthermore, the size of the peacekeeping force does not have a statistically 
significant impact on recurrence of violence after the peacekeepers depart.  Tables 3.5-
3.10 illustrate the results of the logistical regression showing no statistically significant 
impact between the size of the peacekeeping force and recurrences of violence within 1 
year after the departure of peacekeepers.   The logistical regression models displayed in 
Table 3.5 use the original dependent variable in the Dixon and Mullenbach dataset and 
indicate that there is no statistical relationship between the size of the peacekeeping 
force and the likelihood for recurrences of violence after the departure of the 
peacekeepers.  In Model 1 of Table 3.5, there is a positive relationship (.00001) between 
peacekeeping numbers and recurrences of violence, but it is not statistically significant 
(p>.10).  Furthermore, the Full Model in Table 3.5 also shows a positive coefficient 
(.00002) that is not statistically significant (p>.10).  The Dixon and Mullenbach data do not 
indicate that there is a statistically significant relationship between troop strength and 
recurrences of violence in civil conflict within 1 year after the departure of peacekeepers.  
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However, analysis of the updated dependent variable accounting for ongoing 
peacekeeping missions may show different results. 
Table 3.7 displays the logistical regression results when the explanatory variables 
are tested against the updated dependent variable that incorporates ongoing 
peacekeeping missions.  The results in Table 3.7 indicate that the size of the peacekeeping 
force still does not significantly affect the likelihood recurrences of violence within 1 year 
of the departure of the peacekeepers using the updated data.  Both Model 1 and the Full 
Model show positive coefficients of .00002 and .00003, respectively, and are not 
statistically significant (p>.10).  The logistical regression model using the updated 
dependent variable remains consistent with the previous models, showing that troop 
number does not significantly alter the likelihood for recurrences of violence after the 
departure of the peacekeepers.   
To insure that ongoing missions are not distorting the data related to long term 
peacekeeping success, Table 3.9 displays the results of the logistical regression model 
when observations with ongoing missions are removed from the data.  When ongoing 
peacekeeping missions are omitted from the data, the size of the peacekeeping mission 
does have a statistically significant impact on recurrences of violence within one year of 
the departure of the peacekeeping mission, but only in the Full Model.  Consistent with 
previous models, Table 3.9 Model 1 indicates a positive coefficient of .00002 but is not 
statistically significant (p>.10).  However, the Full Model displays a positive coefficient of 
.00005 and is statistically significant.  In this logistical regression model, larger numbers 
peacekeepers produce an increased likelihood for recurrences of violence within one year 
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of the departure of the peacekeepers.   The corresponding predicted probability in Table 
10 estimates that larger peacekeeping forces increase the likelihood for recurrences of 
violence by 18%.  The Full Model in the logistical regression omitting the observations 
with ongoing peacekeeping missions displays the only indication that the size of the 
peacekeeping force is statistically significant in recurrences of violence within one year 
after the peacekeepers leave.   
Interpretation 
 The results of the logistical regression analysis on troop commitment and 
peacekeeping success suggest that bigger does not necessarily mean better when it 
comes to peacekeeping.  The number of peacekeepers committed to a peace operation is, 
perhaps, the most basic metric imaginable for estimating the strength of a military 
operation.  Yet, the data do not suggest that sending more troops lead to reductions in 
recurrences of violence.  In each of the regression models, there is no connection to 
reductions in violence during a peacekeeping mission.  For the most part, the results were 
not statistically significant.  However, one model indicated that larger troop commitments 
lead to higher probabilities of recurrences of violence within 1 year of the departure of 
peacekeepers.   
 Why might increased troop levels lead to increases in violence after the 
peacekeepers leave? Peacekeepers and belligerents may be engaging in a waiting game.  
Greater numbers of peacekeepers may be sent to the most hostile disputes and 
belligerents may be waiting for the peacekeepers to leave before they reassert 
themselves violently.  This idea is weakly supported in the data because there is only a 
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recurrence of conflict when ongoing missions are omitted from the analysis.  Only in the 
Full Model omitting ongoing missions do large peacekeeping numbers lead to increases in 
recurrences of violence.  Peacekeepers may be reluctant to leave situations they deem 
hostile.  This finding may provide evidence supporting Werner and Yuen (2005), who 
argue that significant outside commitment to civil conflict disrupts the structural balance 
of a dispute.  Consequently, disputants are more likely to become hostile when the 
impediment to the civil war is removed.   
Overall, it was expected that more troops would yield a reduced likelihood for 
violence while they are present yet the logistical regression models do not show that 
troop numbers produce statistically significant results.  As a result, Hypothesis 1 (H1a and 
H1b) cannot be accepted based on the statistical findings.  More peacekeepers may 
alleviate humanitarian disasters in civil conflicts, but more peacekeepers do not reduce 
the likelihood for recurrences of violence in civil conflicts.  
Major Powers & Colonial Powers: Strength in Capability and Connection 
 
 
Table: 4.2: Impact of Colonial and Major Powers on Recurrences of War 
Variable During PKO 
After a PKO 
(Original Data) 
After a PKO 
(Updated Data) 
After a PKO 
(Omitting Ongoing) 
Colonial/Major 
Powers 
(Model 1) 
-1.93**/-1.17** 
(Pr=-.30/-.24) 
-.635 
 
-.222 
 
-1.37 
 
Colonial/Major 
Powers 
(Full Model) 
-1.441/-.954 
 
-.045 
 
.095 
 
-.334 
 
 
  States may involve themselves in a civil conflict because of historical colonial ties.  
States may also believe that a strong international stature makes them responsible for the 
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promotion of peaceful outcomes in civil war.  By examining the effects of a major global 
power or a former colonial ruler on post conflict peace, the analysis adds another 
dimension of intervention strength.  If the strength of an intermediary is an important 
factor when imposing peace, states with a preponderance of power and states with a 
prior colonial history should be better equipped to persevere in their mission to secure 
peace.  The analysis of the data shows that the involvement of a former colonial state or 
major power does not consistently reduce the likelihood for the recurrences of violence in 
a civil conflict.  
Involvement of a major power or former colonial ruler is determined by the 
majority of the peacekeeping contingent.  If most of the peacekeepers come from either a 
former colonial ruler or a P5 member of the UN Security Council, the mission is considered 
to be led by a nation with a considerable motive and capacity to restore order.  A 
permanent member of the Security Council likely carries a strong military capability and a 
former colonial ruler should be resolute in its mission to secure peace.  Since colonial 
powers might also be permanent members of the Security Council, these variables are 
tested separately, illustrating their similar effects in the model.13  The effects of the 
involvement of a major power and a colonial power similarly demonstrate their effects on 
peaceful outcomes in post civil conflict peacekeeping missions.  However, neither variable 
consistently correlates to reductions in recurrences of violence. 
What the Models Indicate 
                                                 
13
 When these variables are included in the same model, colinearity obscures the overall effects of the 
statistical analysis.  Consequently, Tables 1 and 3 illustrate the effects of these variables separately and 
subsequent analyses show only the colonial power variable in the analyses.  Logistical regression results 
showed identical effects with the major power variable. 
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 The effect of major power and colonial involvement during a peacekeeping 
mission is illustrated in Table 3.1, 3.3 and summarized in Table 4.2.  Table 3.1, Model 1 
shows that when a major power leads a peacekeeping operation, there is a statistically 
significant reduction in violence (p<.05) as indicated by the negative coefficient (-1.17).  
The predicted probabilities estimated using Clarify and shown in Table 3.2, Model 1, 
determine the predicted reduction in violence to be about 24%.  However, when this 
variable appears in the Full Model in Table 3.1, the major power variable is no longer 
statistically significant (p>.10).  Including all of the explanatory variables of interest reduce 
the statistical effect of major powers reducing recurrences of violence during a 
peacekeeping mission.   
Intervention into civil wars by former colonial rulers exhibit similar results.  Table 
3.3 substitutes a colonial power for the major power variable.  Table 3.3, Model 1 shows 
that the involvement of a former colonial ruler in a peacekeeping mission reduces 
recurrences of violence, indicated by a negative coefficient (-1.93) and is statistically 
significant (p<.05). Table 3.4, Model 1 illustrates the predicted change in reducing 
recurrences of violence at 30%.  However, this relationship (p>.10) also disappears in the 
Full Model of Table 3.3 on peacekeeping success.  Like the involvement of major powers 
in a peacekeeping operation, former colonial powers leading a peacekeeping mission only 
statistically reduces recurrences of violence if the other variables of interest are not 
included in the logistical regression model.   
 Former colonial rulers and major powers who intervene in a civil war likely have 
the capability and desire to intervene again, should violence break out after their 
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departure.  This possibility should keep belligerents from returning to war.  Table 3.5, 
Table 3.7, and Table 3.9 display the results of the logistical regression models 
distinguishing the impact of peacekeeping led by a former colonial ruler on recurrences of 
conflict within 1 year of the departure of the peacekeepers.14  However, the logistical 
regression models show that colonial powers leading a peacekeeping mission do not have 
a statistically significant impact on recurrences of violence after peacekeepers leave.  
Tables 3.5, 3.7 and 3.9 all show that involvement of colonial powers does not impact 
recurrences of violence. 
Interpretation 
When strength in a peacekeeping mission is approximated by the lead state 
contributing troops to the mission, there is limited evidence that peace will persist while 
the peacekeepers are present.  However, after the peacekeepers leave the region, it is 
less likely that violence will recur.  Peacekeeping missions led by major powers or former 
colonial rulers only support Hypothesis 2 (H2a and H2b) in some cases.  Major power and 
former colonial ruler involvement shows some impact on peace during the mission, as 
indicated in Table 3.1 (Model 1) and Table 3.3 (Model 1), but results are  less conclusive 
when all of the explanatory variables are included in the Full Models and in the logistical 
regression models determining recurrences of violence after peacekeepers leave.  
Recurrences of conflict cannot be considered more or less likely after a third party has 
exited a post conflict zone.  These findings similarly support Fortna’s (2008: 118) statistical 
                                                 
14
 To avoid redundancy, the remaining logistical regression models examining recurrences of violence after 
the departure of the peacekeepers only use the colonial power variable.  Separately, logistical regression 
models using the “major power” variable produced similar results to those displayed in Tables 3.5, 3.7, and 
3.9 using the colonial variable. 
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evidence using alternate data showing “no consistent relationship between wars in 
former colonies of the P5 and the stability of peace.”  Consequently, the increased role 
that smaller states have shown toward peacekeeping in recent years  (Neack 2005) may 
not necessarily lead to more intractable civil wars.   
Contiguity: The Importance of Proximity  
 
Table: 4.3: Impact of Peacekeeping Missions Led by Contiguous Countries on Recurrences of War 
Variable 
 
During PKO 
After a PKO 
(Original Data) 
After a PKO 
(Updated Data) 
After a PKO 
(Omitting Ongoing) 
Contiguity 
(Model 1) 
-1.01** 
(Pr=-.21) 
-.480 
 
-1.02** 
(Pr=-.19) 
-1.44** 
(Pr=-.20) 
Contiguity 
 (Full Model) 
-1.07* 
(Pr=-.23) 
-.643 
  
-1.37** 
(Pr=-.31) 
-1.81** 
(Pr=-.35) 
 
The final explanatory variable related to the strength of the intervening third party 
involves the peacekeeper’s geographical proximity to the conflict area.  When the state 
leading the peacekeeping mission is contiguous to the state undergoing conflict, greater 
resources can be employed and contiguous states have stronger motives to quell violence.  
Neighboring states carry the burdens of refugees and illicit cross border activities when 
contiguous states undergo civil conflict.  Not only does proximity give contiguous states 
the capacity for involvement, but also the motivation for preserving a peaceful resolution.  
The data show that involvement of contiguous countries has distinct advantages in 
pacifying a state undergoing internal conflict. 
What the Models Indicate 
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When a contiguous state leads a peacekeeping mission, the data suggests that the 
recurrences of conflict are less likely during a peacekeeping mission and after the 
peacekeepers leave.  Multiple models show that when a majority of peacekeepers come 
from a state that is contiguous to the conflict state, there is a significant likelihood that 
violence will not recur during and after the peacekeeping mission.  The cumulative 
findings are summarized in Table 4.3. 
Table 3.1 and Table 3.3 display the results of logistical regression models testing 
recurrences of violence during the peacekeeping mission.  Table 1 Model 1 shows that 
leadership of a peacekeeping mission by a contiguous state has a negative and significant 
effect on recurrences of violence (-1.08; p<.05).  The Full Model illustrates a similarly 
negative effect on recurrences of violence that is also significant (-1.20; p<.05).  When the 
colonial power variable is substituted for the major power variable in the logistical 
regression, the effect of contiguous peacekeepers is consistent with the results in Table 
3.3.  These results provide support that peacekeepers from neighboring countries reduce 
the recurrence of violence during a peacekeeping mission.  The predicted probabilities 
listed Table 3.2 and Table 3.4 show the estimated reduction in war recurrence when 
contiguous states lead a peacekeeping mission.  The estimated reduction in recurrence of 
violence is between 23% and 30% in the models.   
When missions are led by peacekeepers from countries that are contiguous to the 
conflict state, there is additional evidence that violence will be less likely to recur after the 
peacekeepers leave.  Table 3.5 illustrates the results of the logistical regression models 
testing the effects of contiguous peacekeepers on the recurrence of violence within 1 year 
 114 
after the peacekeepers leave using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data.  Table 3.7 and 
Table 3.9 display results of the models indicating that contiguity reduces the likelihood for 
recurrences of violence within 1 year after the departure of the peacekeepers.  Table 3.7 
shows that when peacekeepers come from contiguous countries there is a negative and 
significant impact (p<.05) on recurrences of violence using the updated dependent 
variable.  Both Model 1 and the Full Model produce negative coefficients (-1.02 and -1.37, 
respectively) that are statistically significant (p<.10).  Table 3.8 indicates that 
peacekeeping missions led by contiguous countries reduce the likelihood of the 
recurrence of violence by 19% (Model 1) and 31% (Full Model).  When the updated 
dependent variable is incorporated into the data, intervention by contiguous countries 
shows a reduction of the recurrence of violence after peacekeepers leave.    
In the logistical regression models using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data 
omitting observations with ongoing missions, Table 3.9, peacekeepers from contiguous 
countries have a statistically significant and negative impact on recurrences of violence 
within 1 year after the departure. Table 3.9, Model 1 shows a negative coefficient (-1.44) 
and the Full Model also displays a negative coefficient (-1.81), with both results 
statistically significant (p<.05).  The predicted probabilities in Table 10 show that 
peacekeeping missions led by contiguous countries reduce the likelihood for violence 
within 1 year of the departure of the peacekeepers by 20% (Model 1) and 35% (Full 
Model).  The results show that peacekeepers from contiguous countries promote long 
term peace.   
Interpretation 
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The results of the logistical regression analyses suggest that when peacekeeping 
missions are led by states that neighbor the conflict state, violence is less likely to recur in 
the civil war.  In the models examining recurrences of conflict while peacekeepers are 
present, the contiguity variable is statistically significant with the expected negative 
relationship.  The models accounting for recurrences of violence within 1 year after the 
peacekeepers depart also show that peacekeepers from contiguous countries reduce 
violence, but only in the models using the updated data.  The results of the regressions 
using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data do not produce statistically significant 
results.  However, when accounting for ongoing peacekeeping missions, the models show 
a reduction in the likelihood for recurrences of violence.   
Theory predicts that the involvement of a contiguous state in a peacekeeping 
mission represented a proxy for strength and resolve in an intermediary, dissuading 
belligerents from resuming violence in post civil conflict environments.  These findings 
support Hypothesis 3 (H3a and H3b), postulating that peacekeepers from contiguous 
countries decrease the likelihood for resumptions of violence in civil conflicts.  The results 
across the models using the updated dependent variables suggest that there is a negative 
impact on recurrences of violence among belligerents when contiguous states take 
leadership roles in peacekeeping missions during (H3a) and after (H3b) the presence of 
peacekeepers.   
Despite the assumption that peacekeepers from contiguous countries bring more 
resources to bear and can limit the sanctuary for combatants in a civil war, there may be 
other factors at play.  Neighboring countries may have a deeper history in the conflict 
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prior to their involvement as peacekeepers or contiguous states may provide cultural 
appeals to belligerents and citizenry in a conflict state.   Cultural explanations suggest that 
the strength in contiguous peacekeepers comes from their ability to persuade rather than 
coerce.  Identifying the specific cultural role that makes neighboring countries better 
peacekeepers may be better suited for a qualitative research design and could be further 
examined in future research by looking at the effectiveness of peacekeeping and ethnic 
ties.  
Major Power Mediation: Talk is Cheap and Potentially Harmful 
 
Table: 4.4: Impact of Mediation by a Major Power on Recurrences of War 
Variable 
 
During PKO 
After a PKO 
(Original Data) 
After a PKO 
(Updated Data) 
After a PKO 
(Omitting Ongoing) 
Maj Power 
Mediation 
(Model 1) 
3.28*** 
(Pr=.50) 
.803 
 
.917 
 
1.17 
 
Maj Power 
Mediation 
 (Full Model) 
3.088*** 
(Pr=.45) 
.242 
  
.327 
 
.650 
 
 
Theory suggests that when a major power involves itself in the mediation of a civil 
dispute, the third party presents a signal toward the belligerents that it seeks a resolution 
to the conflict and could consider a costlier escalation by intervening with more 
peacekeepers.  Hypothesis 4 postulates that major power mediation should reduce 
violence both during (H4a) and after (H4b) a peacekeeping mission.  Major powers possess 
the capability for intervention and the involvement of a major power in the mediation 
process signals their desire for resolving the conflict.  Despite this contention, the data 
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show that when a major power attempts to mediate a civil conflict, that conflict is more 
likely to recur during the peacekeeping mission.   
What the Models Indicate 
When major powers get involved in the mediation of a civil war, the data show 
that the recurrence of violence is more likely while peacekeepers are present.  The data 
presented in Table 3.1, 3.3 and summarized in Table 4.4 show the impact of major power 
mediation on recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping operation.  While a 
peacekeeping mission is on the ground, major power mediation makes the resumption of 
military hostilities more likely in both logistical regression models found in Table 3.1 and 
Table 3.3.   
In Table 3.1 Model 1, major power mediation has a positive coefficient (2.62) and 
is statistically significant (p<.01).  The Full Model in Table 1 also shows a positive 
coefficient (2.742) and is statistically significant (p<.01).  Statistical significance in both 
models supports the finding that major power mediation increases the likelihood for 
recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping mission.  The predicted effects of major 
power mediation on recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping mission are shown in 
Table 3.2: 44% in Model 1 and 39% in the Full Model.  This indicates that major power 
involvement in mediation while a peacekeeping mission is present makes the resumption 
of violence in civil conflict more likely.    
The logistical regression models in Table 3.3 replacing major power leadership for 
the leadership of a former colonial state show similar results.  The results for major power 
mediation during a peacekeeping operation are similar to the previous model.  Table 3.3 
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Model 1 shows a positive coefficient for major power mediation (3.28) that is statistically 
significant (p<.01).  The Full Model in Table 3.3 confirms the positive relationship between 
major power mediation and recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping mission 
indicated by a positive coefficient (3.088) that is statistically significant (p<.01).  Table 3.4 
illustrates the predicted probabilities from this logistical regression models showing that 
major power mediation increases the likelihood for violence by 50% in Model 1 and 45% 
in the Full Model.  
Despite the strong statistical relationship between recurrences of violence and 
mediation by a major power during a peacekeeping operation, this relationship 
disappears in the models examining recurrences of violence within 1 year of the 
departure of peacekeepers.   The models illustrated by Table 3.5, Table 3.7, and Table 3.9 
show that there is no statistically significant relationship between major power mediation 
and the likelihood for peace after peacekeepers leave the region.  The results of the 
logistical regression models using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data are shown in 
Table 3.5.  Model 1 indicates a positive coefficient (.803), but it is not statistically 
significant (p>.10).  The Full Model in Table 3.5 also displays a positive coefficient (.242) 
and is not statistically significant (p>.10).  The logistical regression results using the 
updated dependent variable accounting for ongoing missions is displayed in Table 3.7.  
Model 1 and the Full Model both show a positive coefficients (.917 & .327, respectively) 
for the effects of major power mediation, but neither value is statistically significant.  
Similar results are shown in Table 3.9, displaying the logistical regression results of 
recurrences of violence when ongoing peacekeeping missions are omitted from the data.  
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Model 1 shows a positive coefficient (1.17), as does the Full Model (.650), but neither 
coefficient is statistically significant (p<.10).  Because these values were not statistically 
significant, no further analysis is relevant for their predicted probabilities.   
Interpretation 
Hypothesis 4 (H4a and H4b), which predicts that major power mediation would 
curtail violence, is not validated.  This hypothesis is unsupported by the data and 
contradicted by the results.  The conclusion that can be drawn from the data is that 
involvement of a major power in mediating a civil war increases the likelihood for violence 
while peacekeepers are present.  However, the logistical regression models do not show 
that major power mediation affects recurrences of violence within 1 year of the departure 
of the peacekeepers.  This is a peculiar finding, but may suggest that the “cheap signals” 
associated with signaling intent through mediation, even in the presence of a major 
international power, may not convince the belligerents that an intermediary is serious 
about physically intervening in the conflict.   
However, an alternative story may relate to major power mediation and omitted 
variable bias.  The involvement of a major power mediator during a peacekeeping mission 
may increase recurrences of violence if the major power is favoring either the government 
or the rebel groups during the negotiations.  The Mullenbach and Dixon data do not 
specify whether or not the mediator represents a government or rebel bias by the major 
power mediator, but Svensson (2007) suggests that biased mediators affect prospects for 
peaceful resolutions in civil conflicts because the favored combatant makes more 
demands when negotiating a settlement.  Consequently, the positive coefficients, 
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indicating a resumption of violence, may result from the security guarantees by 
peacekeepers and an expectation that outside support favors the rebel or government 
factions, which Svensson shows to exacerbate commitment problems in civil conflicts.  
Additional research examining this question may clear up the possibility of biased 
mediation as an omitted variable. 
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Chapter 5: Evaluating an Intermediary’s Signaling Capability 
 
 Successful peacekeeping in civil wars requires that a third party be effective at 
serving as a conduit for credible information between the conflicting factions.  Variables 
measuring an intervening third party’s capacity for credible transmission of information 
between the belligerents include the involvement of democracies in the peacekeeping 
mission, the existence of a ceasefire agreement between the belligerents prior to the 
peacekeeping operation, and the development of a permanent peace treaty during the 
peacekeeping mission.  Theory suggests that these explanatory variables should reduce 
recurrences of violence during and after a peacekeeping mission.  The data suggest that 
variables related signaling credibility and information transparency have a substantial 
impact on reductions in recurrences of violence in civil conflicts.  Promoting credible and 
transparent information by an intermediary promotes peaceful outcomes in civil conflicts. 
Democratic Lead State: Transparency and Trust in Domestic Institutions 
 
Table: 5.1: Impact of Peacekeeping Missions Led by Democratic Countries on Recurrences of War 
Variable 
 
During PKO 
After a PKO 
(Original Data) 
After a PKO 
(Updated Data) 
After a PKO 
(Omitting Ongoing) 
Democracy of 
Lead Country 
(Model 2) 
-.144** 
(Pr=-.31) 
-.096* 
(Pr=-.21) 
-.147*** 
(Pr=-.34) 
-.119* 
(Pr=-.27) 
Democracy of 
Lead Country 
 (Full Model) 
-.170** 
(Pr=-.36) 
-.101 
 
-.145** 
(Pr=-.29) 
-.123 
 
 
 Democratic states should be more effective at relaying credible signals due to 
open and transparent institutional government structures, more definitive signaling 
methods, and stronger commitments of resources in their foreign policies. These factors 
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clarify foreign policy decision making and reduce commitment problems between 
belligerents (Mitchell, Kadera, and Crescenzi 2008).  The data, summarized in Table 5.1, 
support this theoretical contention by demonstrating that states with democratic 
institutions lead to better peacekeeping outcomes in civil conflicts. 
Since democracies are measured through Polity IV scores, the Democracy 
measurement takes into account the degree of democracy, rather than a nominal 
distinction that the lead state exceeds a threshold to be considered a democracy.15  States 
with higher Polity IV values contain transparent political institutions with separations of 
political powers and greater civil liberties allowing for open public discourse.  Since Polity 
IV values are determined by the openness of the political structures, the Polity IV metric 
provides a more direct measurement of the institutions associated with democracy.  
Greater institutional transparency should present effective signaling capabilities and 
promote credible commitments in foreign policy.   Previous research further shows that 
democratic institutions decrease dispute durations in interstate wars (Bennett and Stam 
1996; Russett and Oneal 2001).  However, when applied to civil conflicts, intervention by 
democratic states have a less successful track record when implementing democratic 
institutions in post conflict states (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006). 
The data support the theory that democratic institutions promote successful 
peacekeeping outcomes.  The data show that there is a significant and negative 
relationship between democracy score of the lead nation and recurrences of violence in 
                                                 
15
 Most of the explanatory variables are dichotomous variables with predicted probabilities determining 
likelihood estimates of the explanatory variables changing from their minimum values to maximum values 
(0-1).  However, the use of Polity IV scores containing a 0-10 scale determine predicted probability changes 
in value of the explanatory variable holding values constant at their mean. 
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the conflict state.  The more transparent the state and societal institutions of the 
leadership in the peacekeeping mission, the less likely that violence will recur during and 
after the peacekeeping mission.   
What the Models Indicate 
 The logistical regression models suggest that states with democratic institutions 
leading peacekeeping missions reduce recurrences of violence in civil conflicts.  Table 3.1 
and Table 3.3 show that higher democracy scores significantly reduce the likelihood for 
recurrences of violence during the mission.  Tables 3.1 and 3.3 indicate that the impact of 
democracy score is a consistent indication of reductions in violence during a peacekeeping 
mission.  The impact of democracy is determined by the predicted probabilities found in 
Table 3.2 and Table 3.4.  The predicted impact of democratic peacekeepers is a 31% 
reduction in the likelihood for recurrences in violence in Model 2 and a 30% reduction in 
the Full Model.  The reduction in likelihood for violence is based on predicted change in 
the y coordinate as the x coordinate moves from its minimum to maximum value.16  There 
is a 36% reduction in violence in the Full Model of Table 4 identifying the impact of 
democracy during a peacekeeping mission when colonial lead state is substituted for a 
major power lead state.  The statistical results provide sound evidence that democratic 
peacekeepers reduce the likelihood for recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping 
mission. 
 In the statistical models examining the impact of democracy after the 
peacekeepers depart, there is additional evidence suggesting that democratic 
                                                 
16
 Since the variable is ordinal, values are held at their mean when estimating this predicted probability using 
CLARIFY.   
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peacekeepers reduce recurrences of violence in civil conflicts.  Table 3.5 shows the results 
of the logistical regression model using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data.  In Model 
2, increased democracy score reduces the likelihood for recurrences of violence and the 
coefficient (-.096) is statistically significant (p<.10).  The predicted probability for this 
impact on recurrences of violence, listed in Table 3.6 Model 2, shows a decline of 21% 
when democratic states intervene.  Despite a statistically significant result in Model 2, the 
Full Model of the logistical regression does not show statistically significant results for 
democracy.  In the original Dixon and Mullenbach data, there is more limited statistical 
evidence showing that democratic peacekeepers promote peace after the departure of 
the peacekeepers.   
 The results are robust across models using the updated dependent variable.  The 
results of the logistical regression using the updated dependent variable are listed in Table 
3.7 and show that democratic peacekeepers reduce the likelihood for violence after the 
departure of peacekeepers.  Table 3.7 (Model 2) shows a negative coefficient (-.147) for 
democratic peacekeepers and is statistically significant (p<.01).   The negative relationship 
is further supported by the Full Model in Table 3.7, showing a negative coefficient (-.145) 
that is statistically significant (p<.05).  The predicted probabilities, found in Table 3.6, 
display the expected impact of democracy on recurrences of violence within 1 year of the 
departure of the peacekeepers using the updated dependent variable.  The predicted 
probabilities show a 29% (Full Model) and a 34% (Model 2) decline in the likelihood for a 
resumption of violence.  The logistical regression model updating the dependent variable, 
accounting for ongoing peacekeeping missions, shows that peacekeepers with higher 
 125 
democracy scores reduce the likelihood for recurrences of violence after the departure of 
a peacekeeping force.   
  The regression models in Table 3.9, omitting ongoing peacekeeping missions, 
display results comparable to the original Dixon and Mullenbach data.  In Model 2 of 
Table 3.9, democracy is shown to have a negative effect (-.119) on recurrences of violence 
and is statistically significant (p<.10).  The predicted probability, listed in Table 3.10 
(Model 2), estimates the impact of democracy to be a 27% reduction in the likelihood for 
recurrences of violence.  The significance of this relationship disappears in the Full Model 
using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data and in the models omitting observations 
with ongoing peacekeeping operations.  While there is evidence that peacekeeping 
missions led by more democratic nations influence peace after the departure of the 
peacekeepers, this result is only statistically consistent in the models when ongoing 
missions are taken account in the logistical regression models.     
Interpretation 
The analyses support the theory that democratic peacekeepers are more effective 
at maintaining peace.  Most of the models indicate that higher democracy scores of the 
lead peacekeeping nation reduces the likelihood for recurrence of violence in civil 
conflicts.  Democratic peacekeepers significantly reduce the likelihood for a recurrence of 
violence during the peacekeeping mission with the results in each of the models 
displaying statistically significant coefficients in the expected negative direction.  The 
statistical results also show that democratic peacekeepers reduce the likelihood for 
recurrences of violence after peacekeepers leave, although these statistical results have 
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the strongest impact using the updated dependent variable.  Using the updated 
dependent variable, accounting for ongoing peacekeeping missions, the results show that 
peacekeeping missions led by democratic nations produce the best results for 
peacekeeping, even after the departure of the peacekeepers.   
The results support Hypothesis 5 (H5a and H5b).  When peacekeepers come from 
democratic countries, civil wars are more likely to end peacefully and remain peaceful.  
While the original Dixon and Mullenbach data sporadically show the impact of democratic 
peacekeepers, the updated dependent variable consistently shows reductions in the 
likelihood for recurrences of violence.  The negative impact that democratic peacekeepers 
have on resumptions of violence is illustrated by Figure 5.1.  The x-axis indicates the 
democracy score of the nation leading the peacekeeping mission (0=least democratic, 
10=most democratic) and the y-axis indicates the predicted probability for a recurrence of 
violence in the civil conflict.  Figure 5.1 shows that when peacekeeping missions are led by 
democratic countries, there is a reduced likelihood for violence during and after the 
peacekeeping mission.17  Given these findings, one can conclude that greater democratic 
institutions help peacekeepers implement a lasting settlement in civil wars.  Institutional 
transparency is the theoretical explanation supporting the results of the logistical 
regression models.   
The empirical models suggest that democratic institutions produce the expected 
outcomes in peacekeeping missions; however, the results prompt further questions.  
                                                 
17
 Figure 5.1 shows the predicted decline in likelihood for recurrences of violence in the Full Models of the 
logistical regression models.  The predicted change in violence during the peacekeeping operation uses the 
model with the “colonial” variable (Table 3.3) and the predicted change in violence after peacekeepers depart 
uses the updated dependent variable, accounting for ongoing peacekeeping missions.     
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Further investigation can clarify the value of democracy in peacekeeping.  Perhaps, 
democracies have institutional advantages that allow for better collaboration with other 
nations or democracies are recognized as better enforcers of international law.  Some 
clues might come from the results in the models updating the ongoing missions.  When 
ongoing missions are recoded using the updated dependent variable, peacekeeping 
missions lead by democracies promote significant reductions in violence.  However, using 
the original Dixon and Mullenbach data, these results do not meet the threshold for 
significance in the Full Models on recurrences of violence.  Democracies may contain 
institutional advantages that promote continuing a peacekeeping mission until it is 
appropriately ready to conclude.  Discussion in democratic institutions and open public 
debate about the merits of withdrawal may force leaders to insure that withdrawal of a 
peacekeeping operation is done at a time when long term success is most likely.  Since the 
duration of the peacekeeping operation is a control variable, democracies do not appear 
to be waiting out a resolution, but rather withdrawing from the mission at a time when 
recurrences of violence are unlikely or forcing domestic political actors to assume 
responsibility for security in the post conflict state. 18   
                                                 
18
 From my personal experiences in Afghanistan, I can say that political transparency in NATO countries sent 
strong signals to Afghan political officials about withdrawal of NATO forces in 2011-2012.  This forced 
Afghan political officials to prepare for withdrawal of forces by organizing their domestic coalitions and 
placating the local Afghan public who legitimized their authority.    
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Figure 5.1 
 
 
Ceasefire Agreement: Getting it in Writing before the Mission Starts 
 
Table: 5.2: Impact of Ceasefire Agreements before a Peacekeeping Mission on Recurrences of War 
Variable 
 
During PKO 
After a PKO 
(Original Data) 
After a PKO 
(Updated Data) 
After a PKO 
(Omitting Ongoing) 
Ceasefire 
(Model 2) 
-.341 
(Pr=-.21) 
-.068 
 
.305 
 
.019 
 
Ceasefire 
 (Full Model) 
-.982* 
(Pr=-.21) 
-.406 
  
.051 
 
-.488 
 
 
The ceasefire variable approximates cooperation and negotiation prior to the 
arrival of the peacekeeping mission.  The existence of a ceasefire provides better clarity in 
the negotiated terms of conduct between the belligerents.  This variable says less about 
the impact of the peacekeepers and more about the importance of information, 
communication, and the intent among the disputants.  On one hand, a written ceasefire 
lays out the terms associated with an agreement and clarifies the expectations within a 
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cessation of conflict.  On the other hand, it also may be a tactic to buy time to allow for 
one or more of the belligerents to rearm and remobilize forces.  Despite these alternative 
conditions, a ceasefire agreement can be a valuable tool for peacekeepers.  Having a 
ceasefire agreement provides the peacekeeping force with a directive to uphold as well as 
an expectation of behavior between those involved in the conflict.  Consequently, having 
a ceasefire agreement prior to the imposition of the peacekeeping force should make 
achieving peace more a more realistic prospect.   
What the Models Indicate 
 Theory suggests that a ceasefire agreement should reduce the likelihood for 
recurrences of violence; however, the data do not support the theory.  The results are 
summarized in Table 5.2.  When considering the impact of a ceasefire agreement on 
resumptions of violence while the peacekeeping mission is present, the results of the 
logistical regressions are mixed.  A ceasefire agreement among the belligerents reduces 
the likelihood for recurrences of violence during the peacekeeping mission, but the 
statistical evidence does not link a ceasefire agreement to recurrences of violence after 
the peacekeepers leave.   
 Table 3.1 and Table 3.3 display the results of the logistical regression models on 
recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping mission.  In Table 3.1 Model 2, the 
logistical regression model shows the existence of a ceasefire agreement produces a 
negative coefficient (-.341) toward recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping 
mission, but this relationship is not statistically significant.  However, this relationship is 
statistically significant (p<.05) in the Full Model of Table 3.1, with the existence of a 
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ceasefire agreement showing a negative coefficient (-1.03).  The predicted probability for 
this value, shown in the Full Model in Table 3.2, estimates that a ceasefire agreement 
reduces the likelihood for recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping mission by 23%.  
This result is consistent in the Full Model substituting the colonial variable for the major 
power variable in Table 3.3.  The Full Model in Table 3.3 shows that a ceasefire agreement 
is negatively related to recurrences of violence (-.982) and is statistically significant 
(p<.10).  The predicted probability for this effect is shown in the Full Model of Table 3.4 
and indicates that a ceasefire agreement reduces recurrences of violence during a 
peacekeeping mission at a similar rate of 21%.  Ceasefires between the belligerents before 
the arrival of the peacekeepers improve the conditions for peacekeepers by reducing the 
likelihood for recurrences of violence.     
 Despite a negative and statistically significant relationship on reductions in 
violence during a peacekeeping mission, ceasefire agreements do not appear to have the 
same effect after the peacekeepers leave the conflict country.  Remaining models in 
Tables 3.5-3.10 show that the existence of a ceasefire agreement does not statistically 
impact recurrences of violence.  Ceasefire agreements negotiated between the 
belligerents appear to provide a framework for a peacekeeping mission to maintain 
peace, but do not improve the capacity for the belligerents to cooperate after a 
peacekeeping mission departs.   
Interpretation 
 Ceasefire agreements appear to statistically reduce the likelihood for recurrences 
of conflict, but only during a peacekeeping mission.  When the belligerents enter into a 
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ceasefire agreement and peacekeepers arrive, the data show that there is a reduced 
likelihood for recurrences of violence.  However, this statistical relationship dissolves 
upon the departure of the peacekeeping force in each of the models testing recurrences 
of violence after the departure of the peacekeepers.  Why the discrepancy? 
 Several contentions can be made about the value of a ceasefire agreement.  There 
is a possibility that a ceasefire agreement can be used as bait for a peacekeeping 
contingent by the belligerents.  Belligerents may sign a ceasefire hoping that it might coax 
a peacekeeping mission to the area, allowing for time and protection while they 
remobilize and improve their bargaining position.  This would imply that belligerents enter 
into a ceasefire without any intention of honoring it.  However, the results do not show 
that violence is more likely after the departure of the peacekeeping force; only that 
prolonged peace is no longer statistically significant.  This finding adds credibility to 
Werner and Yuen (2005), who argue that third party interventions only promote a pause 
in civil conflicts. 
 Hypothesis 6 cannot be accepted in its entirety.  Hypothesis 6 contends that 
ceasefire agreements will reduce the likelihood for violence while peacekeepers are 
present and within a 1 year of their departure.  During a peacekeeping operation, the data 
show that ceasefires statistically reduce the likelihood for violence, supporting H6a.  
However, the data show no statistical impact of ceasefires after the peacekeepers leave 
the region which does not support H6b.  
The results prompt additional questions about how ceasefires work to alleviate 
violence.  They may operate as an informational component to enumerate the intentions 
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of the warring factions or ceasefires may exacerbate future conflict by giving time for the 
factions to remobilize.  However, peacekeeping missions must do more than prevent 
violence.  Effective peacekeeping missions must actively engage the disputants in dialogue 
and implement a program of Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR).  The 
variable on treaty negotiation attempts to capture some of this relationship among 
peacekeepers and the belligerents.  Rather than examining a variable that identifies a 
negotiation that took place prior to the arrival of the intermediary, the treaty negotiation 
variable captures successful negotiations that occur during the peacekeeping mission.   
Treaty Negotiation: Actively Working out a Resolution 
 
Table 5.3: Impact of Negotiating a Treaty during a Peacekeeping Mission on Recurrences of War 
Variable 
 
During PKO 
After a PKO 
(Original Data) 
After a PKO 
(Updated Data) 
After a PKO 
(Omitting Ongoing) 
Treaty 
(Model 2) 
-1.32*** 
(Pr=-.28) 
-1.87*** 
(Pr=-.38) 
-1.95*** 
(Pr=-.31) 
-2.56*** 
(Pr=-.39) 
Treaty 
 (Full Model) 
-.959* 
(Pr=-.20) 
-2.41*** 
 (Pr=-.48) 
-2.17*** 
(Pr=-.42) 
-2.58*** 
(Pr=-.49) 
 
Ceasefire agreements prior to the arrival of peacekeepers can be instruments 
promoting clarity of intention among the belligerents and reduce violence.  However, the 
effectiveness of the peacekeeping mission itself is an important component of evaluating 
an intermediary as an arbiter of conflict resolution.  A peacekeeping mission must actively 
engage the belligerents in a peaceful discourse and negotiate a more permanent peace 
treaty as well as implement it.  Consequently, a proxy for a mission’s capacity for 
negotiation, communication, and information relay can be shown by a successful treaty 
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negotiation during the peacekeeping mission.  The Dixon and Mullenbach data include 
this variable as a dichotomous variable identifying the successful negotiation of a treaty 
during the peacekeeping operation.  The results of the logistical regression show that a 
treaty negotiation is strong predictor for reductions of violence in post conflict areas.  
Since the existence of a ceasefire agreement prior to the arrival of a peacekeeping mission 
has little impact on peacekeeping success, this variable tests peacekeeping outcomes of a 
treaty when it is negotiated in the presence of a peacekeeping force. 
What the Models Indicate 
 The logistical regression models show that when a peace treaty is signed during a 
peacekeeping mission, there is a reduced likelihood for recurrences of violence during the 
peacekeeping mission.  Table 3.1 shows that a treaty signed during a peacekeeping 
operation has a negative impact on recurrences of violence (-1.32; -1.11) and is 
statistically significant (p<.05) and Table 3.2 shows a 24-28% reduction in the likelihood 
for a recurrences of violence.  The negative and significant impact remains in the model 
with the colonial power variable substituted in the model (p<.10).  Together, the models 
offer support that when peacekeepers actively promote the negotiation of a treaty among 
the belligerents, there is a significant reduction in the likelihood for recurrences of 
conflict.   
  The results of the logistical regressions further show that treaty negotiation has an 
impact on reducing the likelihood for violence after peacekeepers depart.  The results of 
the regression models are displayed in Tables 3.5-3.10.  Table 3.5 shows the effect of 
treaty negotiation on recurrences of violence after the departure of peacekeepers using 
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the original Dixon and Mullenbach data.  Table 3.5 shows a negative relationship (-1.87; -
2.41; p<.01) with treaty negotiation reducing the likelihood for violence after the 
peacekeeping mission by 38%-48%.  The data suggest that when a peace treaty is 
negotiated while peacekeepers are present, there is a significant likelihood for peace after 
the peacekeepers leave. 
 Using the updated dependent variable, Table 3.7 shows that treaties signed during 
the peacekeeping mission have a negative (-1.95; -2.17; p<.01) impact on recurrences of 
violence after peacekeepers depart and Table 3.8 shows this impact to be a 31%-42% 
reduction in the likelihood for a recurrence of violence.  Using the updated dependent 
variable, treaties negotiated in the presence of a peacekeeping force display a negative 
impact on recurrences of violence after the departure of a peacekeeping mission. 
 The results in the models that omit observations with ongoing peacekeeping 
missions further support the contention that signing a treaty during a peacekeeping 
mission reduces the likelihood for recurrences of violence after the departure of 
peacekeepers.  Table 3.9 displays the regression results when ongoing peacekeeping 
missions are omitted from the analysis.  Signing a treaty during a peacekeeping mission 
has a negative (-2.56; -2.58; p<.01) and significant (p<.01) impact on recurrences of 
conflict after the departure of peacekeepers, reducing the likelihood for recurrences of 
violence by 39%-49%.  This finding further supports the previous models showing that 
when peacekeepers are instrumental in negotiating a peace treaty, civil wars are less 
likely to recur.   
Interpretation 
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 The results of the logistical regression clearly indicate that when treaties are 
signed during a peacekeeping operation, there is a reduced likelihood that violence will 
recur while peacekeepers are present and after they are gone.  The assertion behind this 
finding is that a peacekeeping force facilitates credible information among the 
belligerents during the mission which persists afterward.  While the findings do not 
necessarily specify that the peacekeeping mission serves as the integral cog, the 
negotiation of a treaty during a peacekeeping mission has a greater impact on the 
prospects for peace than if the belligerents construct a ceasefire on their own.19  Further 
research could specifically examine how treaty negotiations differ in the presence of a 
third party versus when they occur independently.   
What does this mean for peacekeeping?  Treaties are more successful in securing a 
peace when they are signed in the presence of peacekeepers.  Having a neutral 
intermediary makes for a better channel when transferring information than when the 
belligerents independently negotiate an agreement.  The findings of the regression 
models support Hypothesis 7 (H7a and H7b).  When a ceasefire exists prior to the arrival of 
a peacekeeping force, there is little evidence that violence will cease permanently, but 
when treaties are negotiated in the presence of peacekeepers, there is a reduced 
likelihood that violence will recur.  These findings support the conclusion that 
                                                 
19
 The Third Party Intervention data by Dixon and Mullenbach also include a variable indicating the existence 
of a permanent peace treaty before the imposition of a peacekeeping mission.  Separately, an analysis was 
done examining the impact of the existence of a permanent peace treaty prior to the imposition of a 
peacekeeping mission, yielding similar results when using the “ceasefire” variable.  For the sake of 
parsimony, only the “ceasefire” variable was used since it accounts for peace treaties in addition to ceasefire 
agreements.   
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peacekeepers who maintain a dialogue and bargaining process in the context of treaty 
negotiation reduce recurrences of violence during and after a peacekeeping mission.   
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Chapter 6: Evaluating the Importance of Legitimacy  
 
 The two explanatory variables used to determine international legitimacy include a 
UN sanctioned operation and the number of states contributing personnel to the mission.  
The existence of a UN mandate and a large number of states involved in the mission 
approximate a more committed international community to a peacekeeping mission.  The 
empirical models indicate that peacekeeping missions estimated to be more legitimate 
based on their support by international bodies do not lead to reductions in the likelihood 
for recurrences of violence.  While theory suggests that collective international pressure 
legitimizing a peacekeeping mission should deter belligerents from resuming violence, the 
findings demonstrate some mixed results and do not show legitimacy of a peacekeeping 
mission to be a significant factor for peacekeeping success.   
UN Mandate: Providing an International Blessing 
 
Table 6.1: Impact of a UN Mandate on Recurrences of War 
Variable 
 
During PKO 
After a PKO 
(Original Data) 
After a PKO 
(Updated Data) 
After a PKO 
(Omitting Ongoing) 
UN Mandate 
(Model 3) 
.784* 
(Pr=.18) 
-.783* 
(Pr=-.15) 
-.553 
 
-.257 
 
UN Mandate 
 (Full Model) 
1.30** 
(Pr=.28) 
-1.13* 
 (Pr=-.22) 
-.646 
 
-.121 
 
 
 A UN mandated peacekeeping mission should provide legitimacy to the mission 
and improve the prospects of peace both during and after the deployment of 
peacekeeping troops.  As a large intergovernmental organization with few nationalistic 
goals and the global leader in peacekeeping operations, the UN can enter the fray of a 
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tenuous peace and alleviate local concerns of territorial occupation and colonial rule.  The 
near universality of membership in the UN makes it an appropriate representative of the 
international community.  Additionally, the humanitarian goals behind UN missions 
promote international goodwill toward the institution.  The regression models display 
some statistically significant results, but are mixed in their outcomes both before and 
after the peacekeepers leave the area.  Overall, the results show that a UN led mission 
leads to a greater likelihood for recurrences of violence while peacekeepers are present.  
This unexpected finding requires further investigation.  However, the results also show 
that UN authorization for peacekeeping missions lead to a reduced likelihood of violence 
1 year after peacekeepers depart, although there is some discrepancy across models.  The 
results are summarized in Table 6.1. 
What the Models Indicate 
 The logistical regression models analyzing recurrences of violence during a 
peacekeeping mission show that UN mandated missions are more likely to result in 
resumptions of violence.  Table 3.1 shows that a UN mandate is positively related 
(.784/1.13/1.30; p<.10, p<.05) to recurrences of violence while peacekeepers are present 
by 18%-28% (Tables 3.2 and 3.4).  These findings are peculiar since UN mandated missions 
were expected to reduce recurrences of violence as stated in Hypothesis 8 (H8a). 
 Though the models show that UN missions are more likely to see violence during a 
peacekeeping mission, there is non-robust evidence that UN missions reduce the 
likelihood for violence after the departure of the peacekeeping mission (H8b).  The models 
in Table 3.5, using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data, shows peacekeeping missions 
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with a UN mandate are less likely to experience a recurrence of violence within 1 year 
after the departure of the peacekeepers by 15% to 22% (-.783/-.033; p<.10).  Using the 
original Dixon and Mullenbach data, peacekeeping missions with UN mandates are less 
likely to experience violence in the year after the departure of the peacekeepers, but the 
updated dependent variable is the preferred measurement.   
 The findings using the updated dependent variable, accounting for ongoing 
missions does not match original Dixon and Mullenbach data on UN mandated missions.  
The updated variable indicates that UN missions do not reduce recurrences of violence 
after the departure of peacekeepers.  Furthermore, the regression models omitting 
ongoing missions report similar results.  When ongoing peacekeeping missions are 
removed from the data, the regression models displayed in Table 3.9 show negative 
coefficients that are not significant.  When accounting for ongoing missions, the results of 
the logistical regression analysis are unsupportive of the effect of a UN mandate after the 
departure of peacekeepers.  Consequently, the data cannot conclusively state that UN 
mandated missions reduce the likelihood for recurrences of conflict within 1 year of the 
departure of the peacekeepers.   
Interpretation 
 Most of the logistical regression models produce results that are not statistically 
significant, although the models using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data show that 
UN mandated missions reduce violence after a peacekeeping mission.  These findings 
using a UN mandate to account for a greater degree of legitimacy associated with a 
peacekeeping mission offers some insight into the effect of a UN sanctioned mission on 
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the prospects for lasting peace.  While UN mandated missions more often result in 
violence while the peacekeepers are present, this relationship may be a result of the UN 
taking part in more hostile peacekeeping missions with a lower probability of success.   
In the longer term perspective, UN mandated missions show little evidence to 
support the theory.  Using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data, UN mandated missions 
appear to be more effective in promoting peace after the peacekeepers leave the area.  
However, when the ongoing missions are taken into account by either excluding them 
from the analysis or altering the coding rules examining ongoing missions, UN mandated 
missions do not lead to reductions in violence over the long term.  Consequently, H8b 
cannot be accepted.   
International Involvement: Bandwagon Legitimacy 
 
Table 6.2: Impact of More States Participating in Peacekeeping Mission on Recurrences of War 
Variable 
 
During PKO 
After a PKO 
(Original Data) 
After a PKO 
(Updated Data) 
After a PKO 
(Omitting Ongoing) 
Number of States 
(Model 3) 
-.04** 
(Pr=-.35) 
.014 
 
-.0008 
 
-.017 
 
Number of States 
 (Full Model) 
-.044** 
(Pr=-.47) 
-.033 
  
.0013 
 
-.015 
 
 
 Another indication that a peacekeeping mission has legitimacy involves the 
number of states willing to commit personnel to the mission.  States can have varying 
rationale to commit peacekeepers to a post conflict area.  Some states may be seeking a 
cost effective method to train their soldiers by minimizing the amount of harm to which 
they are subjected.  Other states may have self interested motives related to securing 
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borders or vital trade relationships.  However, considering motives in the aggregate, it 
would be unlikely that a leader would be willing to pay a political price for an unpopular 
commitment of peacekeeping personnel.   Generally, one would expect that when more 
countries send troops to a conflict area, they do so out of a sense of obligation and 
political desire toward resolving the conflict.  The regression results show that more 
countries contributing to an operation only lead to reductions of violence while 
peacekeepers are present.  The likelihood for recurrences of violence after peacekeepers 
leave is less clear because none of the models show coefficients that are statistically 
significant.  The results are summarized in Table 6.2. 
What the Models Indicate 
 The empirical models show that increased state involvement reduces the 
likelihood that violence will recur during a peacekeeping mission.  Table 3.1 and Table 3.3 
present the results of the logistical regression models examining the impact of increased 
state involvement in a peacekeeping mission on recurrences of violence during 
peacekeeping operations.    Table 3.1 shows negative coefficients (-.04/-.042; p<.05) that 
are statistically significant and Table 3.2 estimates a 35% to 48% reduced likelihood for 
recurrences of violence while peacekeepers are present. 20  The Full Model in Table 3.3, 
replacing the major power variable with the colonial lead state variable, further, supports 
the argument on added state involvement.  Table 3.3 shows that state involvement in a 
peacekeeping mission has a negative (-.044) and significant (p<.05) impact on recurrences 
of violence during a peacekeeping mission by 47% (Table 3.4).  
                                                 
20
 This estimation in predicted probabilities is used keeping the variable “Number of States” held constant at 
its mean value.  Consequently, the reduction in likelihood for violence (35-48%) describes movement from 
the mean value to the maximum value of the variable.   
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The regression models examining long term effects of peacekeeping do not show 
that increased state involvement has an effect on recurrences of violence in any of the 
empirical analyses.  Table 3.5 using the original dependent variable shows that state 
involvement does not have an effect on recurrences of conflict in any of the models.  
Additionally, the regression models using the updated dependent variable accounting for 
ongoing peacekeeping missions display similar results and show no significant 
relationships in the data (Table 3.7).  Furthermore, when omitting ongoing missions from 
data, the results of the logistical regression models still do not indicate significant results 
(Table 3.9).   
Interpretation 
 The results of the regression models show that state involvement reduces the 
likelihood of recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping mission, but does not have an 
impact on recurrences of violence after the departure of peacekeepers.  The finding that 
more states sending troops to a peacekeeping mission reduces the likelihood for 
recurrences of violence indicates that greater international attention and recognition 
dissuades warring factions from accepting the reputational costs of breaking a ceasefire.  
While this finding supports the notion that greater international legitimacy toward a 
peacekeeping mission adds influences the mission’s capacity to deter violence, this 
argument is only valid while peacekeepers are present.  The impact of greater legitimacy, 
as approximated through state participation, is only evident while the peacekeeping 
mission is taking place and Hypothesis 9 can only partially be accepted.  Therefore, H9a is 
validated while H9b cannot be accepted.   
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 This mixed finding may be a result may lend greater support to the notion that the 
international legitimacy surrounding a peacekeeping operation motivates peace among 
the warring factions.  Since the international community is more likely to be focused on a 
peacekeeping mission while troops are on the ground, the belligerents are most likely to 
face international pressure to maintain a ceasefire.  A breach of the peace is probably 
most likely when the international community is not paying sufficient attention to the 
post conflict state and least likely when more countries around the world have a stake in 
the fight.   One would expect the international community to focus more attention on a 
conflict during the deployment of international personnel.    
Figure 6.1 
 
 The case that a more legitimate international peacekeeping effort plays a 
significant role in post conflict peace cannot completely be accepted and requires further 
exploration.  Peacekeeping missions sanctioned by the UN are more likely to see violence 
during their missions.  Greater international involvement in a peacekeeping mission 
(indicated by state participation) promotes less violence during the mission, but not after 
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peacekeepers leave.  Why there is such disparity between these variables while 
peacekeepers are present and after they leave attests to a more complicated relationship 
between UN and state involvement?  Further investigation could clarify the nature of 
these relationships.   
Control Variables: What Else Might Influence Peace? 
 
 Control variables added to the model insure that possible alternative explanations 
for recurrences of violence are taken into account within the regression models.  If any 
alternative explanations prove to weigh heavily on the results of the models, the 
explanatory capacity of the variables of theoretical interest will be reduced.  The primary 
control variables that provide alternative explanations for durable peace in peacekeeping 
missions deal with the duration of the peacekeeping mission, the population size of the 
country undergoing conflict, and the existence of a conclusive military victory by one side 
in the civil conflict.  None of the control variables consistently show a significant impact on 
the dependent variables related to recurrences of violence in post civil conflict areas.   
Inclusion of the control variables adds credibility to the significance of the explanatory 
variables that show impacts on recurrences of violence.   
Duration: Waiting Out a Resolution 
 
 The duration control variable measures the length of time (in months) that the 
peacekeeping mission was present in the conflict.  It is reasonable to expect that 
peacekeeping missions with longer duration may simply be waiting out the peace process 
in spite of any active engagement with the local populations.  Over time, a peaceful status 
quo may emerge and the animosity of the militant factions within the country will 
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dissipate.   Alternatively, lengthy peacekeeping missions might also put peacekeepers in 
harm’s way for added opportunities for acts of violence against them.  The duration of the 
peacekeeping mission is intended to mute a possible selection effect of the peacekeeping 
mission.  Peacekeeping missions may just be sticking around until they think that peace is 
likely to persist.  Despite an expectation that longer peacekeeping missions should reduce 
the onset of renewed violence, the regression models suggest that there is little evidence 
of any relationship between the duration of a peacekeeping mission and the likelihood for 
recurrences of violence.   
What the Models Indicate 
The regression models do not indicate that the duration of a peacekeeping mission 
has significant effects on recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping operation.  In 
Tables 3.1 and 3.3, each of the logistical regression models display coefficients that are 
not statistically significant.  The logistical regression models examining the effect of 
duration of a peacekeeping mission on recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping 
mission do not indicate any relationships that are statistically significant.  
In the models focusing on recurrences of violence within one year after the 
peacekeeping mission leaves the post conflict country, evidence indicating that the 
duration of the peacekeeping mission impacts the prospects for peace is more mixed.  
Taken in its entirety, the analysis indicates that little statistical relationship exists between 
duration of a peacekeeping mission and the likelihood for recurrences of violence.  
However, Table 3.5 displays positive coefficients (.010, .012; p<.05, p<.10) indicating that 
longer missions increase the likelihood for recurrences of violence within 1 year after the 
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peacekeepers leave by 48% in Model 2 and 22% in the Full Model.  This relationship is 
illustrated in Figure 6.2.   
 In the regression models accounting for ongoing peacekeeping missions, the 
statistical relationship between the duration of a peacekeeping mission and the likelihood 
for recurrences of violence within 1 year of the departure of peacekeepers is no longer 
evident.  Table 3.7, which includes the updated dependent variable accounting for 
ongoing missions, does not display coefficients in any of the models that are significant.  
Table 3.9 shows a negative coefficient (-.022) that is statistically significant (p<.05); 
however, when additional variables are introduced into the model, this relationship 
disappears.  Collectively analyzed, the logistical regression models accounting for ongoing 
missions show that the duration of a mission is not statistically related to recurrences of 
violence within 1 year after peacekeepers depart.   
Interpretation 
The results in the logistical regression models indicate that the duration of the 
mission is not substantially influencing the recurrences of violence in the data.  
Interestingly, there is little relationship between the duration of a peacekeeping mission 
and the resumption of military hostilities while the peacekeeping mission is present within 
the country.  One would expect that the longer a peacekeeping mission maintains its 
presence within a tenuous cessation of conflict, the more opportunities there would be to 
experience resumptions in violence.  Positive coefficients in the logistical regression 
models indicating increased likelihood for recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping 
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operation show that duration may offer these opportunities; however, these coefficients 
are not consistent in the models to draw extensive conclusions.   
Using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data, the regression models show that 
longer peacekeeping operations lead to increases in violence within the year after the 
departure of peacekeepers.  There are several explanations that may account for this 
finding.  If a peacekeeping mission is staying in a country for a longer period of time, it 
might be an indication that there is a major problem in the negotiation processes 
between the belligerents.  The lengthy duration of peacekeeping missions may be an 
indication in the data that little progress is being made in conflict resolution.  
Furthermore, the data may indicate that peacekeeping missions with an extended 
duration produce a dependency on an intermediary for order.  Once the intermediary is 
removed, resumptions of conflict are more likely.   
The regression models using the modified data, displayed in Table 3.7 and Table 
3.9, show that increases in the likelihood for resumptions of violence based on the 
duration of the mission are no longer significant.  These subsequent findings indicate that 
when ongoing missions are taken into account, the duration of the peacekeeping missions 
do not impact recurrences of conflict. 
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Figure 6.2 
 
Population: More People, More Problems? 
 
 Peacekeeping success may also be influenced by the population size of the 
country.21  Post conflict states with larger populations will likely be more difficult to 
control, given the relatively small contingents of peacekeepers that are sent to states 
undergoing conflict.  Larger populations can also serve as an approximation for greater 
ethnic fractionalization with the country undergoing conflict.  Both of these factors 
related to the population size of the country lead one to believe that more populous 
countries will be more likely to endure protracted civil conflicts (Collier, Hoeffler, and 
Soderbom 2004).  The data show that the size of the country makes recurrences of 
violence more likely.   
What the Models Indicate 
                                                 
21
 The original Dixon and Mullenbach data set does not include a population size variable, which was added 
using the World Bank population estimates for the year in which the peacekeeping mission began in the 
conflict state.  
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 Larger populations in the conflict state appear to make recurrences of conflict 
more likely, but only in the Full Models of the regressions.  Table 3.1 and 3.3 mostly 
display results that are not significant.  However, the Full Model in Table 3.1 shows that 
population increases (.041; p<.05) recurrences of conflict during a peacekeeping mission 
by 42%.22  This finding is further supported by the Full Model in Table 3.3 which also 
shows that population has a positive (.015; p<.05) impact on recurrences of conflict during 
a peacekeeping mission (48% increase).  The finding that population size influences 
recurrences of conflict is further supported in the models examining violence after the 
departure of peacekeepers.  Using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data, Table 3.5 
shows a positive relationship between population size and recurrences of violence within 
1 year after the departure of peacekeepers, but only in select models.  Using the updated 
dependent variable accounting for ongoing peacekeeping missions only shows that 
population size has a positive relationship (.013) on recurrences of conflict in the Full 
Model (Table 3.7).  When ongoing peacekeeping missions are omitted from the data, the 
results of the logistical regression models are no longer significant.  
Interpretation 
 In each of the logistical regression models on recurrences of violence during a 
peacekeeping mission, the Full Models show that large populations are more likely to 
endure recurrences of violence.  These findings suggest that during a peacekeeping 
operation larger populations are more difficult to monitor and prevent from returning to 
civil conflict.  Upon the departure of peacekeepers, population size also accounts for 
                                                 
22
 Population data is kept constant at its mean when calculating predicted probabilities.   
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recurrences of violence according to 2 of the 3 Full Models.  Figure 6.3 summarizes the 
statistical effect of population size on recurrences of conflict.   
 The statistical relationship between population size and recurrences of civil 
conflict suggests that peacekeeping missions should recognize that populous states are 
more difficult to monitor.  The population size of the country undergoing civil conflict is 
not one of the explanatory variables of interest, but the regression models show that 
population size influences recurrences of conflict.  The importance of population size 
indicates that further research should take the size of a country’s population into account 
when analyzing the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. 
Figure 6.3 
 
Victory: To the Victor Go the Spoils? 
 
 It is reasonable to predict that the prospects for peace are directly related to the 
outcome of the civil war.  If one side achieves an overwhelming victory, the bargaining 
capability of the defeated side is essentially nonexistent.  As a result, the victorious side 
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has the capacity to dictate and impose the terms of the settlement toward the defeated 
side.  Despite military victory, there remains a possibility of violence.  Military victory does 
not necessarily erase the social and political discontent of the defeated side, nor does it 
insure carte blanche dictation of the post conflict settlement for the victorious side.  
Though a military victory does not guarantee post conflict peace, it should make the 
bargaining terms of the settlement easier to negotiate since the defeated side loses 
significant capacities to negotiate its preferences.  In theory, military victory should make 
peace a more likely outcome; however, the findings do not support this argument.   
What the Models Indicate 
 The regression models do not show much support that victory by one side reduces 
the likelihood that violence will recur.  During a peacekeeping mission, the control 
variable for military victory is only significant in Model 2 of Tables 3.1 and 3.3.  Table 3.1 
and Table 3.3 show that victory by one side reduces recurrences of conflict during a 
peacekeeping mission (-1.96; p<.10) by 35% but not when all of the explanatory variables 
are taken into account.  The regression models testing peacekeeping success within 1 year 
after the departures of peacekeepers show that military victory by one side does not have 
any significant effect on recurrences of violence.  Using the original Dixon and Mullenbach 
data, Table 3.5 shows that military victory is not statistically significant.  Using the 
updated dependent variable accounting for ongoing missions, the models show mixed 
results; however, none of the coefficients related to military victory in Table 3.7 or Table 
3.9 are significant.   
Interpretation 
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 The results of the regression models show little evidence that military victory has 
an impact on resumptions of violence in civil conflicts.  In the regression models 
examining recurrences of conflict during peacekeeping missions, military victory is a 
significant factor in only one model.23  This is hardly a strong endorsement for the 
contention that military victory has a consistent relationship in effecting outcomes in civil 
conflicts.  During a peacekeeping mission, there is evidence that military victory is 
negatively related to recurrences of conflict, but rarely is this effect statistically significant.  
Furthermore, none of the empirical analyses examining outcomes after the peacekeepers 
leave the country show any statistical relationship between military victory and 
recurrences of violence.   Consequently, the analysis shows limited, support that military 
victory has a lasting peaceful impact in civil conflict.   
While the finding that military victory has little impact on recurrences of violence 
does not present any considerable problems to the theoretical contentions, it serves as an 
important control in the analysis insuring model accounts for alternative explanations in 
reductions of conflict.  Toft (2010) contends that decisive military victory by one side 
produces the best possibility for ending a civil conflict.  However, Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004: 257) note that military victories in civil wars are rare occurrences and military 
victories in civil wars with the imposition of an intermediary are rarer still.  If one side 
achieves military victory over the other, they have little need for an intermediary, since 
they have crippled the opposition beyond its capacity to retaliate.  Military victory may be 
an important factor in reducing violence, but rarely will a peacekeeping force be 
                                                 
23
 Model 2 in Table 3.1 and Model 2 in Table 3.3 display coefficients from the same logistical regression 
model. 
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requested when one side is victorious in civil war.  The data in this analysis showing that 
military victory is rarely significant could be driven by the rarity of intervention after a 
military victory in a civil war.   
Quality Control Statistics 
 
 It is worth examining some of the quality control measurements used to quantify 
the veracity of the results in the logistical regressions.  Multiple models, variables, and 
statistical tests insured that the reported results of the analyses were valid in their 
findings.  Additionally, quality control statistics point to potential problems that exist in 
the models.  Using a dataset with relatively few observations leads to less than ideal 
statistical verifications, however, considering the size of the dataset, the abundance of 
models, and the robustness of the results, the quality control statistics show that the 
regression results are relatively valid.   
 Because the relatively small number of observations in the dataset, some 
accommodations and leniency in the quality control statistics must be reconciled.  General 
rules pertaining to logistical regression and sizes of datasets stipulate that logistical 
regression models break down when the number of observations reduces below 100 
(Long 1997: 54).  Consequently, significant efforts were made to maintain a threshold of 
at least 100 observations in each of the models.  The model with the fewest observations 
had an N of 107.  Since the number of observations was still relatively low, some 
concessions had to be made on the alpha levels for statistical significance.  The alpha level 
for statistical significance was reduced to .10, which is not uncommon and still most 
variables of interest were able to maintain more robust thresholds of confidence 
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intervals.  Although, many of the models have p-values below .10, a priory research 
requires that the initial metric for significance be maintained despite more robust findings 
after the analysis was conducted. 
 Because of the smaller numbers of observations in the dataset, several summary 
statistics are not as robust as one would desire.  Log-likelihood statistics throughout the 
varying models are not as low as they typically would be in most logistical regression 
models and the Pseudo-r2 statistics are particularly low in several of the models.  This is 
not entirely unexpected in empirical models related to international relations and models 
that include relatively few observations.  The Full Models in each of the tables improve 
upon many of these robustness indicators and the models with variables related to 
legitimacy produce less robust statistical indicators.  Among the most important statistical 
indicators in a logistical regression analysis is the reduction of error statistics (ROE), 
indicating the statistical improvement upon chance.  The Full Models produce results that 
have the largest improvement upon random chance and the models analyzing variables 
related to legitimacy produce the weakest improvements.   
Taken together, the summary statistics show that the empirical results produced 
by the logistical regression analyses support the models.  Less robust quality control 
statistics can be seen in the models emphasizing explanatory variables related to 
legitimacy, but these variables show limited statistical significance when compared to 
other explanatory variables in the analysis.  The quality control statistics are most robust 
in the models with significant explanatory variables. 
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Conclusions on Successful Peacekeeping from the Empirical Data 
 
 The findings in the logistical regression models support many of the predictions in 
the theoretical model.  The explanatory variables measured in the analysis focus on a 
third party’s strength, the third party’s capacity to effectively transfer information, and 
legitimacy associated with the peacekeeping mission.  Additionally, the effectiveness of 
the third party is analyzed both during and after the deployment of peacekeepers.  
Consequently, the analysis of third party intervention in civil conflicts provides a clearer 
picture of how third party intervention in civil wars are most likely to produce peaceful 
outcomes in the short term and long term.  The conclusions provide insight into 
developing third party peacekeeping missions that can more effectively prevent 
recurrences of violence which have been shown to plague failed states undergoing civil 
conflict (Collier 2007: 27).   
According to the empirical analyses, the explanatory variables estimating the 
strength of the intervener matter most while the peacekeeping mission is on that ground.  
The numbers of peacekeepers sent to the post conflict area do not have a strong effect on 
recurrences of violence and major powers mediating a conflict, actually, make violence 
more likely to recur.  Despite these findings, involvement of major powers and former 
colonial states leading the peacekeeping mission reduces recurrences of violence when 
other explanatory variables are not taken into account in the scaled down models.  
Contiguity of an intervening third party showed the strongest results in reducing the 
likelihood for recurrences violence.  Though contiguous state involvement could be 
considered a greater imposition of sovereignty by the local populations, the analysis 
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shows that contiguous states contributing troops have a better record in maintaining 
peace in post civil conflict states.  This finding adds credibility to future peacekeeping 
operations involving cooperation among the neighboring countries of the conflict state.    
The models show that peacekeeping success both during and after a peacekeeping 
mission is strongly influenced by the capacity for the intervening third party to effectively 
and credibly transmit information among the belligerents.  Among all of the components 
included in the empirical models, one can conclude that third parties that are best able to 
relay credible information among the belligerents make the best peacekeeping 
contingents.  The variables that produce significant results involve the third parties 
deemed to be the most credible and transparent intermediaries.  Peacekeepers from 
democratic countries and peacekeepers that successfully negotiate permanent treaties 
during the mission best prevent recurrences of violence over the short and long term.  
The argument of this dissertation contends that peacekeeping missions with transparent 
and credible signaling mechanisms are capable of establishing long term solutions to 
states undergoing civil conflict.   
The influence of legitimacy on the success of the peacekeeping mission is mixed in 
the empirical results.  While the existence of a UN Mandate for the peacekeeping mission 
might contribute to reduced violence over the long term, UN sanctioned missions are 
more likely to result in resumptions of violence while the peacekeepers are present.  This 
result may be influenced by previous research findings that UN Missions often deploy to 
the most difficult conflicts (Fortna 2008).  Resulting violence may be a product of the 
difficulties surrounding the UN missions, rather than the impact of the peacekeepers.  
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Mixed results can also be seen in the effect that more states have on successful 
peacekeeping outcomes.  When more states contribute personnel to the mission, violence 
is less likely to result while the peacekeepers are present, but no relationship can be seen 
in the longer term after peacekeepers leave.  Though legitimacy in a peacekeeping 
operation cannot conclusively be determined to promote peaceful outcomes in post civil 
conflict situations, further research might identify how a peacekeeping mission with 
greater international support might affect the attitudes of local populations and promote 
international awareness of humanitarian crises that are often related to civil wars.  Such 
aspects of a peacekeeping operation may peripherally affect the short term and long term 
success of a mission.   
The empirical study sought to answer one larger question in particular: does it 
matter who intervenes in a post civil conflict scenario?  These findings, taken together, 
expand upon previous work to show that whether or not a third party intervenes is not 
the only thing that is important, but in addition, who intervenes?  Research on third party 
interventions in civil conflict has focused on three theoretical explanations when aiding 
belligerents to overcome commitment problems.  By analyzing different types of 
intervening third party peacekeeping operations, the empirical findings stress that 
credible signaling capabilities make the most effective intervention force, while stronger 
intervention forces promote peace in the short term, such intervention forces do not 
show tangible results over the long term, and the impact of legitimacy is inconclusive in its 
assessment and could be subject of further research.  Because international peacekeeping 
is a relatively new phenomenon in international relations and civil conflict is becoming 
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more abundant across the globe, more data will be available for expanding upon the 
results described in this research. 
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Chapter 7: Sierra Leone 
 
Researchers use case study analysis to identify processes through specific and 
detailed analysis, otherwise eluding larger scale empirical research.  Traditionally, this 
method of analysis focuses on a single or limited set of subjects with an aim to describe 
and explain an observed phenomenon (Berg 2009: 317).  Key aspects of case study 
research include using a limited set of observations and a detailed examination of the 
subject (Berg 2009; Bogdan and Biklen 2003: 54).  Geertz (1973) most notably described 
the nature of case study analysis as “thick description.”  The use of highly detailed 
descriptions of limited data assists a researcher in studying the processes behind the 
phenomenon being studied (Weick 1995).  For the purpose of tracing the causal processes 
behind the efficacy of peacekeeping, case study analysis can be a useful tool.  The 
objective of case study is to advance the propositions that are not examined in large-n 
empirical studies.  Though the previous chapters presented multiple observations of 
peacekeeping in civil conflicts across different states, it is assumed that these 
observations are comparable.  Chapter 7 examines the case of Sierra Leone to trace the 
processes leading to successes and failures of different peacekeeping missions. 
Though case study analysis is a useful tool in social science research, two obstacles 
must be overcome when selecting a case: bias and counterfactual analysis.  First, it is 
imperative that there is no evidence of bias when third parties intervened in Sierra Leone.  
It is possible that third parties intervened in a situation they saw as an easy fix, thereby 
reducing the impact of their intervention on the outcome of the conflict.  Second, the case 
of Sierra Leone must show that alternative outcomes were possible in the conflict.  A case 
 160 
study may illustrate all of the variables under examination, but there must also be 
evidence that the explanatory variable(s) exacted the observed change on the outcome 
variable.  These obstacles associated with case study can be overcome with careful case 
selection that does not intentionally favor our prior hypothesis and is consistent with the 
objectives of the research (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 139-140).  
The civil war in Sierra Leone presents a suitable case for analysis for three 
particular reasons.  First, the involvement of the international community was not limited 
to one type of third party intervention.  Rather, international envoys, regional 
organizations, the UN, private security firms, and individual countries played significant 
roles as intermediaries in the civil war.  These interventions were met with varying 
degrees of success in the peace process.  Second, the conflict in Sierra Leone in the 1990’s 
illuminates the worst aspects of civil conflict with particular characteristics that make it 
especially difficult for the belligerents to reconcile.  Multiple factions, child soldiering, 
human rights abuses, war profiteering, and refugee problems all presented extraordinary 
challenges at the conclusion of civil war (See, for example, Walter 2004).  If an 
intervention force can overcome such challenges, it highlights the effectiveness of various 
international efforts and does not indicate a biased selection of intervention by the 
intermediaries.  Third, Sierra Leone has been at peace long enough so that substantive 
conclusions can be drawn concerning the effectiveness of the international efforts to 
reconcile the country.  While peace is often defined as an absence of violence, 
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reconciliation efforts in Sierra Leone included constitutional reform, economic 
development, democratic elections, and truth and reconciliation panels. 24    
 The civil war in Sierra Leone presents a unique instance in which multiple actors in 
the international community became involved in a hostile situation with varying degrees 
of success.  Since the research examines the effectiveness third party interventions, it is 
imperative that a case study on civil war show how third party interventions changed the 
course of the war.   Third party interventions will be examined in Sierra Leone, including 
UN special envoys, the private South African security firm Executive Outcomes, the 
regional organization Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG), the United Nations Assistance Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and the 
British military intervention in Operation Palliser.  The different strategies, operations and 
resources brought by the outside interventions help distinguish how effectively the 
interventions maintained peace. 
 Furthermore, the conflict in Sierra Leone proved to be an extraordinarily 
devastating.  The international community did not send peacekeeping missions with the 
expectation that the country would easily be pacified.  Civil wars that have more 
casualties and cause more economic damage to a country are more difficult to end.  High 
mortality rates and economic devastation diminish a country’s capacity for self 
governance (Doyle and Sambanis 2006).  Sierra Leone’s economic dependence on 
diamond exports also complicated a resolution in the civil war.  Dependence upon primary 
                                                 
24
 Though democratic elections do not necessarily mark the endpoint of a civil war, it signaled a peaceful 
transition of government in which former rebels were successfully integrated into the political process.  
Additional indications for sustained peace in Sierra Leone include: the demobilization of 75,000 ex fighters, 
the return of approximately half a million refugees and internally displaced persons, and the organization In 
other words, in addition to an absence of violence, active steps were being taken insure a functioning state.   
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commodity exports, like diamonds, increases rent seeking behavior in countries, making 
them susceptible to coups and prolonged civil wars (Collier 2007: 32-36; Collier, Hoeffler, 
and Soderbom 2004).  Since Sierra Leone is associated with many of these difficulties that 
make peace less likely, this case is a “hard case.”  In other words, if international 
intervention can influence peace in a country suffering from as many structural difficulties 
as Sierra Leone, one can reasonably infer intervention forces did not selectively pursue an 
easy target in conflict management and that peacekeeping made a difference in the 
outcome.   
 Additionally, Sierra Leone is a good case for study because the civil war ceased for 
an extended period of time.  This is important for two reasons.  First, one must be sure 
that the current break from active hostilities is not a temporary phenomenon.  This is a 
particular concern with cases of recent third party intervention.  Belligerents may use a 
third party intervention and subsequent ceasefires to rearm and resupply.  Sierra Leone 
has not engaged in sustained violence since late 2001, so the years of peace imply that 
there is not a temporary break in the civil war and that the peace process was 
consolidated (UN 2004: 10).  Second, part of the quantitative analysis examines the long 
term implications of third party interventions in civil wars and whether or not 
peacekeepers provide merely a stopgap in civil wars as suggested by Werner and Yuen 
(2005) or offer a more permanent solution to conflict by reorganizing how a country can 
properly function on its own.  Since the withdrawal of UNAMSIL in December 2005 
(Fortna 2008: 167; UN 2005), there has been a sufficient time frame to determine Sierra 
Leone’s capacity to govern itself without the security guarantees of a strong intervention 
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force.  An effective third party intervention must not merely escalate costs to such a point 
that continued conflict is irrational, but must also take active steps to reconcile the 
country and provide it with sufficient resources for self governance.      
History of the Conflict 
Abbreviated Timeline of Historical Events and Third Party Interventions in Sierra Leone 
 
1961: British grant independence to Sierra Leone. London Constitutional Conference 
 
1961-1967: Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) controlled government with Milton Margai 
as Prime Minister.  Upon his death in 1964, his brother Albert Margai controlled the SLPP.  
Siaka Steven’s All People’s Party (APC) formed as opposition. 
 
1967: The APC narrowly wins parliamentary elections and Brigadier Lansana orchestrates 
a coup to reinstate the SLPP. There is quickly a counter-coup led by Major Charles Blake. 
 
1968: A third coup led by the APC reinstates Stevens as head of government. 
 
1971: Siaka Stevens consolidates one-party rule and becomes Executive President. 
 
1985: Joseph Saidu Momoh appointed as APC successor upon Stevens’ retirement 
 
1987: Momoh declares state of economic emergency.  
 
1991 (Civil war begins):  RUF begins military campaign against Momoh in Eastern Sierra 
Leone under the leadership of Foday Sankoh.   
 
1992: Momoh deposed in military coup led by Valentine Strasser.  A military junta 
controls the government of Sierra Leone.25 
 
1995: Executive Outcomes hired by Strasser’s military junta to repel the RUF. 
 
1996: Strasser overthrown by a military coup led by Brigadier General Julius Maada Bio. 
  First free elections held since 1967 in Sierra Leone (February).  Ahmad Tejan Kabbah 
elected and the RUF does not participate.  Kabbah agrees to the Abidjan Peace Accord but 
the RUF and military thwart peace efforts (November). 
 
                                                 
25
 This military government was also called the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC).  Members of 
the NPRC later overthrew Strasser in 1996.  I will refer to the period from 1992 to 1996 as the Strasser junta. 
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1997: Military coup overthrows Kabbah (May).  Military government led by Major-General 
Koroma collaborates with the RUF and suspends the constitution.  UN imposes economic 
sanctions (October) 
 
1998: ECOMOG sends peacekeepers into Freetown to remove the RUF. 
 
1999: UN initiates negotiations between Kabbah and the RUF (May).  The Lomé Peace 
Agreement is signed, reinstating Kabbah, but granting significant political concessions to 
the RUF (July).  The UN Resolution 1270 authorizes UN intervention (October).  
 
2000: UNAMSIL peacekeepers deployed in support of the Lomé Agreement (January). 
ECOMOG withdraws forces from Sierra Leone (March-April). Many Nigerian troops remain 
to support UNAMSIL.  The RUF breaks the peace by capturing 500 UN peacekeepers and 
the British subsequently deploy military forces to Sierra Leone (May).  British engage in 
two significant military campaigns (Palliser and Barras).  UN increases its troop presence 
throughout the summer and fall. 
 
2002: Abuja Peace Agreement signed.  Elections held.  Peace persists. 
  
The civil war in Sierra Leone began in March 1991 when the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) launched a military offensive from the Liberian border attacking government 
forces.  However, the historical genesis of the political strife began much earlier.  This 
summary of the events surrounding the civil war demonstrate the inability for the 
government to properly function and the instability of the factions fighting for control of 
the country. 
Prior to 1962: British Colonial Rule 
 As a British protectorate for freed slaves, Sierra Leone functioned as a stable state 
despite diverse religious and ethnic populations (Brummel and Molgaard 2007; Woods 
and Reese 2008: 10).  The British created a colonial territory considered to be the 
education and commercial hub of West Africa.  Mineral wealth permitted the construction 
of schools, roads, and a modest health care system (Pratt 1999; Lord 2000: 2).  The 
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political stability of the country promoted Muslim, Christian, and animist religious sects to 
peacefully coexist during British rule.  The primary ethnic groups of Mende and Temne 
accounted for about two thirds of the population and cohabited with about 20 additional 
ethnic groups within the country (Roberson 2007: 2-3).26  Although there were ethnic 
divisions, ethnic tensions did not directly apply to Sierra Leone’s civil war in the 1990’s 
(Posner 2005: 257-259).  Rather, political competition and the prospective spoils from 
corrupted government institutions promoted a politically elite class and alienated much of 
the population (Woods and Reese 2008: 13-14). 
1962-1985: Post-Colonial Rule and The Presidency of Siaka Stevens 
After the British left the country, political power shifted to the Sierra Leoneans 
through political parties and governmental institutions.  Elections took place soon after 
independence in 1962 and Milton Margai of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) was 
elected Prime Minister.  However, Margai soon died in 1964, leaving a small ruling elite 
class which began to consolidate its economic and political power (Roberson 2007; Keen 
2005; Malan et al. 2002: 13; Williams et al. 2002).  Though ethnic ties strengthened 
Margai’s Mende relatives, Posner (2005) contends that hostility between ethnic factions 
played a minimal role in the onset of the civil war.27 
As patronage networks and graft exacerbated the disparities between elites and 
the rest of the public, citizens became increasingly dissatisfied with their political 
                                                 
26
 Religious and ethnic population data were researched and confirmed at CIA World Factbook 
(https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sl.html), the US Dept. of State 
(http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm), and the World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/country/sierra-
leone) 
27
 Rather, Posner attributes ethnic political factionalization in the nascent state to the multiparty structure of 
the political system.   
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leadership.  Public dissatisfaction over corruption within SLPP, led to the election of Siaka 
Stevens and his All People’s Congress (APC) Party in 1967 (Woods and Reese 2008: 11).  
Despite winning an election, several military coups from 1967 to 1968 were required to 
establish Stevens as president.  Stevens consolidated his political power by creating a 
single party republic under the APC and purging government of those not loyal to Stevens.   
Throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s, widening economic divisions among the elite 
class and general public led to widespread public dissatisfaction with the state.  Stevens 
and the APC’s political power resulted from their ability to generate revenues from the 
diamond trade and use the profits to invest in the military to repress dissent.  The APC 
became political faction personally loyal to Stevens, intimidated opposition groups, and 
promoted corruption through patronage networks (Williams 2002: 13;  Fortna 2008: 55).  
By diverting resource wealth from public state services and toward private benefactors, 
the APC bankrupted the government of Sierra Leone leading to general economic decline 
and an entrenched system of neopatrimonialism (Williams 2001: 143; Brummel and 
Molgaard 2007).   
1985-1991: The Presidency of Saidu Momoh and Precursor to Civil War 
Stevens retired in 1985 and Major General Joseph Saidu Momoh succeeded him as 
President of Sierra Leone.  Subsequent graft and corruption depleted state revenues and 
Sierra Leone suffered significant economic decline, prompting Momoh to declare a state 
of economic emergency in 1987.  The state could no longer pay most civil servants and 
the professional class fled the country (Adebajo 2002).  Fuel scarcity, currency 
devaluations, and electricity shortages fed popular unrest and led to the development of 
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numerous opposition movements, most notably the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and 
its leader Foday Sankoh.  The combination of weak governmental leadership, ineffective 
state institutions, and the development of an unstable economic class structure based on 
natural resource rents led to the breakdown of the state by 1991. Citizens turned to rebel 
groups for monetary and political support (Collier 2007: 32-35).   
The strengthening of the RUF and the outbreak of civil war became unavoidable 
for two reasons.  First, as corruption became entrenched within the government, citizens 
turned toward illicit methods to earn income and promote their wellbeing.  Williams 
(2001: 143) argues that, “corrupt patrimonial manipulation of educational and 
employment opportunities … increased the likelihood that those excluded from its 
benefits would use violence as a means of redress.”  Second, the RUF was supported by 
neighboring Liberia and its notorious warlord Charles Taylor.28  Charles Taylor had two 
motivations for supporting the RUF insurgency in Sierra Leone.  First, Taylor sought to 
finance his own war in Liberia and destabilize Sierra Leone by using the RUF to illegally 
smuggle diamonds from the resource rich area of Kono in Eastern Sierra Leone.  Along the 
smuggling routes, diamonds were exchanged for weaponry, providing war materiel for the 
RUF and valuable mineral resources for Taylor to finance civil war.  Second, the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Mohmoh’s government supported 
Taylor’s rival political party, the United Liberian Movement for Democracy. 29   By 
                                                 
28
 RUF leader Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor first met in Libya by Muommar Gaddafi who promoted 
revolutions throughout West Africa.  Sankoh joined forces with Taylor in Liberia and took part in the early 
stages of Liberia’s civil war in 1989 (Woods and Reese 2008:14).   
29
 ECOWAS used Sierra Leone as a supply route for its mission in Liberia and had an interest in maintaining 
use of the airport in Freetown.  Additionally, a contingent of 200 Guinean ECWAS troops can be credited 
with stopping the RUF advance across the Liberian border in 1991.  Because their mission focused on the 
Liberian war, it should not be considered an intervention in the Sierra Leonean civil war.   
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supporting a revolutionary movement in Sierra Leone, Taylor could disrupt material 
support from ECOWAS along the Sierra Leonean border and consolidate his control within 
Liberia (Brummel and Molgaard 2007; Woods and Reese 2008).  
1991-2002: The Civil War and International Interventions 
 
 
          Sources: CIA World Factbook; Woods and Reese 2008 
The civil war in Sierra Leone began in March 1991 when approximately 2000 RUF 
affiliated rebels30 captured Kailahun and Pujahun, towns near the eastern border with 
Liberia.  The stated intent of the RUF was to overthrow Momoh’s government.  The 
government’s inability to maintain order outside of Freetown prompted a military coup in 
1992 led by Captain Valentine Strasser.  
                                                 
30
 1600 of the rebels were members of Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).  
However, soon after the invasion, Taylor pulled his NPFL troops out of Sierra Leone, leaving the remaining 
RUF soldiers poorly manned and equipped (Woods and Reese 2008). 
Kono Region 
RUF Strongholds 
RUF Rebel 
Movements 
RUF Rebel 
Movements 
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The Strasser government took over a state in disarray.  The Sierra Leonean Army 
(SLA)31 army was poorly equipped, underpaid, numerically small, and highly undisciplined.  
Although the RUF offered a ceasefire, Strasser instead chose to channel state resources 
toward strengthening the army and defeat the RUF.  Beginning in 1992, the Strasser 
government promoted a rapid recruitment strategy to increase the size of the SLA from 
3,700 to 17,000 (Woods and Reese 2008; 27-28).  The war consumed all of the state’s 
resources.  Furthermore, the RUF deprived the government of its primary source of 
revenue in diamonds by occupying the eastern areas near Kono and bribed SLA officers to 
ignore RUF activity.  Strasser needed outside support but the UN considered the conflict 
an internal problem and did not intervene (Keen 2005: 91-92).   
In late 1994, the Strasser government hired the South African mercenary company 
Executive Outcomes to push the RUF out of the diamond rich east of Sierra Leone.  
Executive Outcomes proclaimed their global mission was to stabilize the legitimate 
governments against rebels, but Executive Outcomes tended to focus their interventions 
on countries rich in mineral wealth demonstrating that their interests remained 
monetary.  The government of Sierra Leone paid Executive Outcomes for their military 
services and awarded diamond mining rights to firms linked to the company.  Executive 
Outcomes cleared the RUF out of the Kono region and river regions south of Bo and 
Kenema after approximately 1 month with only a few hundred mercenary soldiers.  
Executive Outcomes brought sophisticated military equipment and highly trained 
personnel to support the SLA, restored order in Freetown, and reestablished government 
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 Under Stevens and Momoh the army was called the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF).  
Strasser changed the name to the Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) to reflect his strategy of reforming the military.   
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control over the diamond mines of Kono (Brummel and Molgaard 2007; Woods and Reese 
2008).   
After Executive Outcomes helped establish order, the international community 
pressured Strasser to hold democratic elections.  Strasser’s need for international support 
compelled him to oblige and the relative peace provided by Executive Outcomes 
permitted elections to take place.  However, elections were difficult to organize since the 
RUF still occupied pockets of the countryside and factions within the SLA often 
collaborated with the RUF.  Though Strasser announced multiparty elections, he was 
removed from power by another military coup led by his defense minister Brigadier Julius 
Maada Bio prior to the elections in February 1996.  Though elections probably should 
have been suspended, the UN threatened sanctions and Executive Outcomes threatened 
to withdraw if elections did not proceed as planned. 
After the 1996 Presidential election, the military ceded power to the winner, 
former United Nations Development Program official, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah.  Kabbah’s 
primary objective was to negotiate a peace between the government and the RUF and 
diplomatic negotiations had been taking place with the assistance of UN appointed Special 
Envoy Berhanu Dinka (Ethiopia) working in conjunction with the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) and ECOWAS.    Those negotiation efforts continued for 8 months after 
Kabbah’s election.  The RUF and the government agreed to all of the conditions except for 
two points: the RUF wanted all foreign troops (Executive Outcomes) out of the country 
immediately and a vice presidency for Sankoh.  When negotiations broke down, Kabbah 
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ordered the SLA and Executive Outcomes to attack the RUF headquarters near Bo in 
October 1996.   
The aggressive military campaign forced Sankoh back to the bargaining table.  He 
admitted defeat and signed the Abidjan Peace Accord in November 1996, but extracted 
an important concession that the contract with Executive Outcomes be allowed to expire.  
While the government and the RUF both made promises to disarm and demobilize, they 
would be monitored by a joint government and RUF commission.  Executive Outcomes 
left the country.   
Sankoh had no intention of maintaining the peace agreement.  Rather, he used the 
agreement to remove Executive Outcomes and remobilize his guerilla campaign.  The 
security vacuum left by Executive Outcomes allowed the RUF to reassert its control over 
the eastern parts of the country and again trade diamonds for weapons.  A RUF radio 
message intercepted by the SLA in January 1997 confirmed that Sankoh did not intend to 
keep adhere to the agreement and two months later he was detained for purchasing 
weapons in Nigeria (Woods and Reese 2008: 34).   
The Abidjan Agreement did not last and by mid 1997 another military coup lead by 
Major General Paul Koroma and supported by members of the RUF deposed Kabbah’s 
government.  The coup forced Kabbah into exile in Guinea and returned the country to 
civil war (UN 2005).  The Koroma military junta32 returned Sierra Leone to a closed, one 
party political system by suspending the constitution, banning public demonstrations, and 
outlawing competing political parties.  When the elected government of Sierra Leone 
                                                 
32
 This government was also called the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). 
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remained in exile and military rule repressed civil and political freedoms, the international 
community began to focus more attention on Sierra Leone.  Koroma’s government also 
collaborated with the RUF, offering Sankoh a vice chairmanship within the junta.   Sankoh 
accepted and brought RUF soldiers into Freetown to support the junta.  The joint 
Koroma/RUF government in June 1997 represented the height of lawlessness in Sierra 
Leone.  All government services ceased, infrastructure within the country was destroyed, 
and the citizens of Sierra Leone were terrorized. 
Attempts at stabilizing the country and implementing a workable peace came 
when UN and ECOWAS envoys attempted to broker an agreement restoring democratic 
governance and a ceasefire.   In October 1997, ECOWAS representatives and the chairman 
of the military junta met in Conakry, Guinea to negotiate and, eventually, agreed upon a 
peace accord calling for a ceasefire between the military and Kabbah.  The agreement 
would be monitored by ECOWAS and UN military observers.  Though the Conakry peace 
plan was accepted by Kabbah and publicly embraced by the junta, the military privately 
objected to the interpretation of the “combatants” who were to be disarmed (Fyle 2000: 
111-112).  After the Kabbah government refused to sign the peace deal, the UN Security 
Council and ECOWAS increased their pressure by imposing targeted diplomatic and 
economic sanctions on the Koroma government.  ECOWAS33 troops enforced the 
sanctions from a base north of Freetown (Lungi) where the Kabbah government still 
maintained a presence.       
                                                 
33
 The monitoring group in Sierra Leone hereafter referred to as “ECOMOG,” the acronym representing the 
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group. 
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 A combination of public discontent, international pressure, and collusion between 
the military and rebels destabilized the military junta by February 1998.  Public protests 
against the government and general disorder spread by RUF soldiers required ECOMOG 
troops impose order to Freetown.  “Operation Tigerhead,” spearheaded by ECOMOG 
infantry troops gained control of Freetown.  Koroma’s and RUF resistance to international 
forces was costly.  In an effort to minimize casualties, ECOMOG forces allowed 
Koroma/RUF forces safe passage out of the Freetown to the eastern city of Kailahun 
(Woods and Reese 2008: 44).   
By March 1998, Kabbah was reinstated as President, however, poor logistics and 
stretched supply lines forced ECOMOG to take defensive positions around Freetown.  This 
defensive posture allowed the RUF to reorganize their forces in the east.  Additionally, 
ECOMOG’s lack of policing capability led to “vigilante justice” in the capital. Many civilians 
sought retribution against Koroma collaborators (Report 2004: 295).   
The UN Security Council lifted the oil and arms embargo and strengthened UN 
security personnel in Sierra Leone, establishing in June 1998 the United Nations Observer 
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) (UN 2005).  UNOMSIL appointed UN Special Envoy 
Francis Okelo to head the mission. The mission was designed to monitor and disarm 
combatants and restructure security forces within the country (commonly referred to as 
Disarmament/Demilitarization, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)).  UNOMSIL 
teams promoted internal security sector reform within the government of Sierra Leone 
and sought to verify any human rights abuses taking place.  However, these teams 
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remained unarmed, numerically small, and movement was restricted to locations secured 
by ECOMOG.  The need for a stronger peacekeeping force soon became evident. 
 In December 1998, fighting within Sierra Leone intensified.  The RUF remobilized 
their army and planned an attack on Freetown, seeking revenge.  Though ECOMOG had 
been instrumental in removing the rebels from Freetown, they did not have control 
outside of the capital.  In January 1999 ten-thousand RUF combatants disguised as 
civilians infiltrated Freetown in a revenge campaign they called “Operation No Living 
Thing.”  This period marked the most widespread and intense violence of the civil war 
with ECOMOG troops resorting to undisciplined tactics and indiscriminate killing in an 
attempt to subdue the violence.  The following months produced heavy fighting, a RUF 
takeover of Freetown and forced the evacuation of UNOMSIL (Roberson 2007; Woods and 
Reese 2008).   
 ECOMOG troops eventually succeeded in restoring order to Freetown and 
reinstated the civilian government by April 1999.  However, ECOMOG troops were under 
considerable strain as Nigeria, the primary contributor of military personnel, began to 
withdraw forces.  To prevent a resumption of violence, peace negotiations resumed for a 
new ceasefire.  UN Special Representative Okelo and representatives of ECOWAS 
organized negotiations in May 1999 in Lomé, Togo.  After weeks of negotiations, the Lomé 
Agreement was signed, pledging an end of hostilities and a government of national unity 
incorporating both Kabbah’s civilian government and the RUF.  The Lomé Agreement 
made major concessions to the RUF, including immunity for its leadership, political 
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representation, and multiple cabinet appointments in the new government (Keen 2005: 
250-252).   
 Under the Lomé Agreement, the factions pledged an end to violence and the 
international community committed to help rebuild the country.  In October 1999, 
UNOMSIL was disbanded by the Security Council and a new UNAMSIL mission replaced it 
under UN Resolution 1270.  While UNOMSIL was designated as an “observation” mission, 
UNAMSIL changed the UN presence to an “assistance mission.”  UNAMSIL intended to 
assist the government in DDR efforts by providing a more robust peacekeeping presence 
in the country.  Unlike UNOMSIL, UNAMSIL included military personnel and was tasked 
with enforcing the Lomé Peace Agreement.   UNAMSIL was also designed to replace the 
ECOMOG forces leaving the country.  ECOMOG peacekeepers withdrew from Sierra Leone 
in March-April 2000 and by May 2000 turned over peacekeeping responsibilities to 
UNAMSIL, although some ECOMOG forces remained under the auspices of UNAMSIL 
(Woods and Reese 2008: 48).  In the next year, the size and scope of UNAMSIL expanded 
considerably by sending 11,000 peacekeepers to Sierra Leone.  The peacekeepers 
deployed to areas outside Freetown to disarm an estimated 40,000-50,000 rebel 
combatants (Woods and Reese 2008: 58).   
The volatility of the conflict in Sierra Leone and the composition of UNAMSIL made 
DDR a difficult task.  Struggles between RUF combatants and UNAMSIL peacekeepers took 
place throughout the spring of 2000.  RUF combatants prevented movement of 
peacekeepers in the countryside and refused to comply with disarmament.  Despite UNSC 
Resolution 1289 authorizing UNAMSIL to use military force to uphold the treaty, military 
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commanders did not change their rules of engagement (Woods and Reese 2008: 59-60).  
The ceasefire under the Lomé Agreement ended in May 2000 when the RUF renounced 
the treaty (the same day that ECOWAS transferred operations to UNAMSIL), took 
approximately 500 UN peacekeepers hostage along with their equipment and began to 
move RUF forces toward Freetown. 
This renewal of violence sparked international media outrage and prompted Great 
Britain to send a military force for a civilian/non-combatant evacuation operation known 
as “Operation Palliser.”  In May 2000, the British secured the main airport in Lungi, then 
moved to secure Freetown, facing heavy resistance from the RUF (Leatherwood 2001).   
Contingents of the RUF attacked British forces, but were repelled with overwhelming 
force.  As the British intervention force established a better foothold within the country, 
British soldiers engaged in low intensity operations throughout the country and helped 
reorganize the SLA into the more professionalized Republic of Sierra Leone Army (RSLA) 
(Roberson 2007: 7).   UNAMSIL reached a deployment of approximately 11,000 
peacekeepers authorized in February 2000.  By March, 2001 17,500 UN peacekeepers 
would be authorized to deploy to Sierra Leone.  By comparison, the British sent 
approximately 1,000 troops to subdue violence, but 5,000 troops for all operations 
(Leatherwood 2001; Collier 2007: 129).   With British and UNAMSIL security assistance, 
the RSLA resumed policing responsibilities in the capital. 
 Throughout the summer of 2000, British-led peacekeeping forces secured larger 
areas of Sierra Leone and displaced RUF forces.  The British immediately cleared insurgent 
areas surrounding the capital and left UNAMSIL and RSLA soldiers in defensive positions 
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to hold territory.  Most of the British soldiers left Sierra Leone by June 15, 2000, but left 
behind 200 British peacekeepers to train and support the RSLA.  At the end of May 2000, 
UNAMSIL increased their numbers to 13,000 under UN Security Council Resolution 1299.  
UNAMSIL and the RSLA displayed more aggressive tactics to resist the RUF and exerted 
control over larger parts of the country.  When a local militia captured and turned over 
Foday Sankoh to the British, leaving Issa Sesay to take command of the RUF, the RUF was 
significantly weakened and was willing to negotiate with UNAMSIL and the Kabbah 
government (Woods and Reese 2008: 64).          
 By October 2000, RUF efforts to reorganize and mount attacks failed because 
international forces took coordinated and multilateral action to isolate the rebels.  
Effective intelligence-sharing with the Guinean government helped the Guineans secure 
the northern border, thus denying the RUF safe havens.  The British navy engaged in 
military exercises, demonstrating the British commitment to support UNAMSIL (Woods 
and Reese 2008: 72-73).  By 2001, UNAMSIL increased its numbers to 17,500 and moved 
further outside of Freetown to secure a majority of the country.  Furthermore, diplomatic 
pressure mounted against Charles Taylor which forced him to cut off monetary support 
for the RUF.  UNSC Resolution 1343 targeted RUF funding by outlawing trade in rough 
diamonds.   
Finally, the RUF signed a final ceasefire with the government of Sierra Leone in 
November 2001 in Abuja, Nigeria.  By 2002 the UN had successfully disarmed 70,000 
combatants and returned rebel fighters to civil society.  By isolating the RUF, removing its 
sources of funding, and aggressively moving disarm the combatants, international 
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peacekeepers tipped the balance of the civil conflict in Sierra Leone and promoted a 
peace agreement that was accepted by the belligerents.    
Third Party Interventions: Increasing Costs of War & Validating 
Commitments 
 
Figure 7.1 
 
The conflict in Sierra Leone included multiple interventions and failed peace 
agreements before a sustainable negotiated treaty was reached in Abuja, Nigeria (2001).  
The intervention forces altered the cost structures for the belligerents and represented 
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engagement to curtail violence, but are less threatening to sovereignty.  Figure 7.2 places 
Sierra Leone’s third party actions according to its strength to use force and its ability to 
threaten and provoke nationalist zeal.  Executive Outcomes represents a less legitimate, 
but more unconstrained force, whereas the diplomatic envoys are a constrained, but 
unthreatening force.  The belligerents and interventions will be described based on their 
contribution in stabilizing Sierra Leone’s civil war.  Each intervention will be analyzed 
based on the overall strength of the mission, the mission’s capacity to credibly relay 
information and the overall legitimacy of the mission.   
Figure 7.2 
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capabilities shifted between the combatants due to changes in internal cohesion and 
outside support.  Furthermore, the goals and resolve of the primary actors were clarified 
over time.  These changes in the power dynamics of the conflict complicated the 
bargaining behavior throughout the course of the war leading to recurrences of conflict 
after fragile periods of peace.   
The two primary adversaries in Sierra Leone will be described in the context of 
their motivations, capabilities, and tactics which altered their bargaining strength in 
pursuing a stable outcome in the war.  For most of the 1990’s, the RUF’s capacity to 
destabilize Sierra Leone outweighed the government’s capability to maintain order, thus, 
making a negotiated settlement to the war unlikely.  The ability of the RUF to operate 
with impunity in the most resource-rich areas of Sierra Leone escalated their capability 
and reduced their desire for compromise.  Similarly, the government was inherently weak 
due to frequent coups, the weak geographic base it controlled, and its limited financial 
means to pay soldiers.  Since international actors sought to deal with the legitimately 
elected government of Sierra Leone, they would have to improve the government’s 
capacity to force the RUF to negotiating table. 
The government forces of Sierra Leone did not display an ability to enforce the 
terms of their agreements with the rebels.  Although provisions in the peace agreements 
included favorable terms for the RUF, the RUF chose to break the peace agreements to 
assert more control.  The Lomé Agreement provided amnesty for all rebels and key 
government posts for its leadership.34  The fractiousness of government forces led the 
                                                 
34
 The specific concessions included reserved cabinet posts which included the Chairman of the Board of the 
Commission for the Management of Resources.  Lomé Agreement Part 2: Article IV, Part III: Article IX 
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RUF to believe that they could exert power through war rather than a negotiated peace.  
The SLA was “notoriously ill-trained and ill-equipped (Fortna 2008: 56).”  After three 
months without pay in 1992, soldiers in the SLA toppled the Mohmoh government in a 
coup.  Even after the fall of the Momoh government, Sankoh indicated through radio a 
willingness to negotiate with the Strasser government. 
However, the successful coup emboldened Strasser.  He believed that by 
increasing the size of the force by about 12,000 over four years, the government would be 
in a better position to suppress the rebels.  The RUF soon occupied the diamond rich 
region of Kono and used the illegal diamond trade to fund their army.  The Strasser 
government expected to be in a better bargaining position, but rapid conscription 
produced undisciplined and poorly paid soldiers.  Consequently, government soldiers 
engaged in acts of banditry and often colluded with the rebels for personal profit.  These 
early events reduced the government’s legitimacy and ability to promote their interests, 
while bolstering the strength of the rebels.  As a result, both factions reduced their 
willingness to accept a negotiated settlement and continued fighting.   
 Similarly, as the civil war progressed, the bargaining strength of the RUF reinforced 
their tactics and objectives.  Several factors permitted the RUF to advance their goals and 
increase their demands from the government.  Outside support, profits from illicit trade, 
and fear and intimidation strengthened the position of the RUF and emboldened the RUF 
to take aggressive actions to widen their scope of influence.  Prior to 1991, the RUF was 
only a small group of rebels numbering approximately one to four hundred Sierra 
Leoneans (Fortna 2008: 56; Woods and Reese 2008: 15).  However, support from rebel 
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leader and later President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, permitted the RUF to engage in more 
hostile and aggressive actions.35  Early in the civil war, the collaboration with Taylor 
provided the RUF with a base of operation, training, and personnel.  After the initial RUF 
assault in Sierra Leone, Taylor withdrew his personnel from the RUF, forcing Sankoh to 
conscript soldiers and seek alternative sources of funding.  However, Liberia continued to 
provide a market for the illicit trade of conflict diamonds, funding both the RUF and 
Taylor’s war.  Though Liberia had no significant diamond fields, Liberia’s diamond exports 
exploded in the 1990’s from the cross border trade of diamonds and weapons.  Spoils 
from war provided the RUF funding and motivation to expand their demands, ultimately 
making bargaining difficult and war likely.   
In addition to outside support and financing, the RUF used fear and intimidation of 
local populations to inhibit public opposition and enhance their political aims in the 
process.  They amputated limbs to frighten the local population who had supported 
Kabbah and democratic elections.  Ibrahim Fofana, a miner in the Kono region, described 
his encounter with the RUF in April 1998:  “They told us that we voted for Tejan Kabbah 
and it was because of our vote, it was why he won the election.  They said that by cutting 
off our hands, we would lose the capacity to actively participate in politics to elect anyone 
into government.”  Brutal war crimes and mutilation of civilians during the war paralyzed 
civilian resistance to the RUF and forced the population from strategically important 
regions of Sierra Leone (Brummel and Molgaard 2007: min 42).   
                                                 
35
 Charles Taylor has been found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity for his role in Sierra 
Leone’s civil war.  He denies all 11 charges against him mostly relating to the illegal trafficking of conflict 
diamonds.  His son was also convicted and sentenced for torture and conspiracy crimes that occurred under 
his father’s rule in Liberia and Charles Taylor pleaded for the release of RUF leader Foday Sankoh upon 
Sankoh’s initial arrest in 1998 (BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/50931.stm)  
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War is a method of revealing information among the combatants.  The civil war in 
Sierra Leone exposed the weakness of the government and the growing strength of the 
RUF.  At the outset of the war, the government refused to negotiate because it believed 
its military strength would be bolstered by conscription and that the RUF was relatively 
weak.  However, poor military training and inadequate pay proved to weaken the 
government.  At the outset of the conflict, it seemed a negotiated settlement would be 
possible, but the dynamics of the conflict pushed the government and the RUF further 
from acceptable compromise since continuing the conflict was profitable for the RUF.  The 
Strasser government refused to make concessions by the time intermediaries became 
involved.    
As the war progressed in the early 1990’s, the bargaining strength of the RUF was 
strengthened and the government weakened.  Government forces collaborated with the 
rebels and lawlessness in the eastern regions provided freedom of movement for rebel 
forces.  Only significant enforcement capability, international pressure, and reconciliation 
with the rebels would reestablish governmental authority within the country.  The 
intervention forces in Sierra Leone discovered this by trial and error.  Several intervention 
forces had international participation, but lacked the military strength.  Others had the 
military strength, but lacked the capacity to demobilize and repatriate fighters.  Peace 
could only endure when the outside intermediaries employed the combined strategies of 
military enforcement, negotiation, and DDR.   
The Role of Spoilers 
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 Rebel groups often profit from the spoils of war and seek to continue a conflict to 
maximize their profit and power.   Rebels in Sierra Leone certainly had reason to continue 
the civil war despite the favorable terms offered in negotiated settlements.  Controlling 
the diamond mining areas of Sierra Leone served two purposes for the rebel groups.  First, 
controlling the diamond fields enriched the RUF, allowing them to purchase weapons to 
extend the reach of their power.  Global Witness estimates that the RUF made between 
50-125 million dollars annually in the years that they controlled the diamond fields 
(Alexander Yeardsley [Senior Researcher, Global Witness] in Brummel and Molgaard 
2007).  Additionally, controlling the diamond fields deprived the government of vital 
resources it needed to fund its own military and public services.  Depleting government 
revenues led to its inability to pay soldiers in the military.  This caused many of the 
soldiers in the army of Sierra Leone to collaborate with the rebel forces, further 
destabilizing the country (Brummel and Molgaard 2007).  The weakened government of 
Sierra Leone compromised its strength.  Distraught soldiers overthrew the Kabbah 
government in the 1997 coup, allowing unchecked power for the RUF in both the 
countryside and within Freetown.   
While the RUF initially claimed to promote political freedoms for the people of 
Sierra Leone, the rebel’s true motive was wealth.   “The RUF said that it was fighting 
against military rule and they were for democracy and they wanted peace and 
development, but when… there was an elected government, they kept fighting (Ian Smillie 
[Research Coordinator, Partnership Africa-Canada] in Brummel and Molgaard 2007: min 
56).”  The most obvious military campaign designed around enriching the RUF was called 
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“Operation Pay Yourself” by the RUF.  While Freetown was largely free of violence until 
1997, the military junta invited the RUF into the city to confiscate civilian property. “We 
went house to house; looting.  We took belongings, demanded money, and sometimes 
killed two or three of their family members…” “It was a war of stealing, grabbing, and 
taking illegally what you never worked for (Former child soldier and Dr. Edward Nahim 
[Director of Mental Health Services, Sierra Leone] in Brummel and Molgaard 2007: min 
45).”  The RUF would eventually be driven away from Freetown by ECOWAS forces, but 
quickly returned to the diamond fields in the east.  When total control of the country 
became too costly for the rebels, they returned to the diamond-rich countryside pay for 
rearmament.  The RUF eventually returned to Freetown in January 1999. 
While the RUF military campaign was publicly justified by political grievance and by 
a concerted attempt to improve their bargaining position, their underlying motives 
remained greed.   “When you’re dealing with a group as anarchic and as murderous as the 
RUF, it was unlikely that they were ever going to settle for half the cake.  They wanted full 
power (Ian Smillie [Partnership Africa-Canada] in Brummel and Molgaard 2007: min 55).”  
Given the ulterior motives of the RUF, not only was there little that could be offered 
through negotiation that would placate them, but it was unlikely that they would follow 
through with a peace settlement.  This became evident with the collapse of the Lomé 
Peace Agreement.  For peace to persist in Sierra Leone, the RUF had to be crippled 
militarily and cut off from their sources of funding.  Eventually, the British/UNAMSIL peace 
enforcement mission accomplished that and greater global cooperation regulating the 
illicit trade of diamonds made it more difficult for conflict diamonds to further fund rebels 
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in Sierra Leone.  Until that end, peacekeeping missions were unsuccessful in permanently 
stabilizing the country. 
Executive Outcomes 
 The 1994 introduction of Executive Outcomes was a product of the Strasser 
government’s efforts to defeat the RUF.  Executive Outcomes, the South African private 
security firm directly attacked the RUF, supported the SLA in military operations, and 
trained soldiers within the SLA.  Executive Outcomes received a total of $1.8 million per 
month from the government of Sierra Leone for their services (Wood and Reese 2008).36  
Their pay was also contingent on securing Sierra Leone’s Kono diamond fields, thereby 
removing the RUF’s capacity to finance their war.  Their deal with Strasser’s government 
included collaboration with Diamond Works, a private diamond mining company.  
Executive Outcomes secured the diamond mining areas and Diamond Works used local 
labor to mine and export the diamonds, returning 37.5% of the profit to the government 
of Sierra Leone.  While Executive Outcomes removed the RUF’s revenue source, it also 
took public revenue that the government needed to operate the country.  Essentially, the 
insertion of Executive Outcomes to remove the RUF replaced rent seeking RUF insurgents 
with stronger rent seeking military entrepreneurs.   
With the promise of diamonds as pay, Executive Outcomes cleared the RUF out of 
the Kono region within one month and maintained order in the region (Brummel and 
Molgaard 2007).  Furthermore, Executive Outcomes located rebels in hiding, trained 
soldiers in the SLA, and funded a public information campaign supporting the government 
                                                 
36
 The average Executive Outcomes soldier was paid $3500/month. 
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of Sierra Leone (Woods and Reese 2008).  When Executive Outcomes became involved in 
the conflict, the SLA had a sizeable army of approximately 17,000, but these soldiers were 
poorly trained, uneducated, undisciplined, and in many cases criminals (Gberie 2005: 76).  
Executive Outcomes brought 3,500 highly trained soldiers, air support, a radio 
interception system, night vision technology, and light weaponry.  Within two weeks, 
Executive Outcomes pushed the RUF 60 miles outside of Freetown and by January 1996, 
the RUF presence was limited to Kailahun (Gberie 2005; Woods and Reese 2008). By 
November 1996, the SLA and Executive Outcomes crippled the RUF to a point that left the 
RUF with few choices outside of negotiating what became the Abidjan Peace Agreement.   
However, two provisions of the Abidjan Peace Agreement appeared problematic.  
The RUF demanded the removal of all foreign troops and the country’s vice presidency.  
After the terms offered were deemed unacceptable to the government, Executive 
Outcomes attacked and captured the RUF headquarters outside Bo.  The RUF dropped 
their demand for political representation, but maintained their demand that Executive 
Outcomes’ contract not be renewed.  Although Executive Outcomes forced the RUF to the 
bargaining table, the peace settlement did not last because the former rebel soldiers were 
not sufficiently demobilized and reintegrated into civil society.  Upon the departure of 
Executive Outcomes, rebel fighters continued fighting against the government. 
After the elections in 1996, the UN urged the termination of the contract.  
Kabbah’s government only accepted the withdrawal of Executive Outcomes with the 
expectation that 750 UN troops would replace them.  The RUF was reluctant to accept UN 
peacekeepers and once Executive Outcomes withdrew, the RUF refused to allow UN 
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monitors to deploy (Fortna 2008: 67).37  The reluctance of the international community to 
enforce peace allowed the RUF to regain control of the outlying areas of Sierra Leone.   
Failings of Executive Outcomes 
Executive Outcomes effectively secured the Kono region and tilted the balance of 
power in favor of the government by maintaining a strong military presence.  However, it 
only served as a temporary measure to alter the incentives of the rebels.  With 500 
military advisers, 3,000 highly trained combat soldiers, and superior weaponry, Executive 
Outcomes restored order to Freetown, secured the RUF stronghold near Kono, and forced 
the RUF to negotiate for peace (Woods and Reese 2008: 30).  Executive Outcomes 
specialized in overwhelming their adversary with military force, rather than promoting 
political participation and governmental reform.  Unsurprisingly, the 1996 elections were 
marred by a military coup and voter intimidation efforts by the RUF.  Through 
negotiations, the RUF extracted concessions for the removal of foreign troops and once 
this impediment was removed, the RUF no longer had incentive to live with their 
negotiated concessions.   
Executive Outcomes took some measures to promote a secure transition in 
preparation for their departure.  They provided training, intelligence, and equipment to 
the SLA.  They also significantly weakened the RUF, forcing them to make concessions to 
the government.  However, Executive Outcomes did not demobilize the RUF and did little 
to promote a functioning, legitimate government in Sierra Leone.  The RUF maintained its 
                                                 
37
 Sankoh had strong rejections of the entire UN system, evident in his refusal to negotiate with the UN 
special envoy, and mistrusted international agencies in their ability to offer adequate protection to rebel 
leaders (Bright in Lord 2000: 4).  However, it is equally plausible to contend that Sankoh sought to remove 
all foreign forces from Sierra Leone to improve his strategic military advantage.   
 189 
base of operations, continued to receive outside support from Taylor’s regime, and had 
formal representation in the government’s peace commission to challenge any allegation 
of impropriety made against them.  Furthermore, critics allege that the only incentive for 
Executive Outcomes was monetary (Woods and Reese 2008).  There was no expectation 
of internal government reform.  Despite overwhelming military success, Executive 
Outcomes could did not promote a functioning state capable of maintaining peace (Howe 
1998).   
Once Executive Outcomes left the country, the unbalanced status quo led to 
renewed violence and a resurgence of the RUF in 1996.  The involvement of Executive 
Outcomes summarizes the contention by Werner and Yuen (2005), who argue that 
outside interventions in civil wars only temporarily alter the incentive structures of 
belligerents.  Once the third party is removed, the dispute will again become violent if the 
opposing sides remain mobilized and do not share a common desire to adhere to the 
negotiated agreement. 
Diplomatic Envoys 
The UN Special Envoys that intervened in Sierra Leone had different problems.  
The envoys had diplomatic authority, were able to communicate with both sides 
effectively, and came from respected international organizations, but lacked an 
enforcement capability.  Their interests rested entirely upon reconciling the belligerents 
without committing the tools to make noncompliance costly for the belligerents.  Despite 
successfully negotiating a peace agreement, the envoys were unable to get both parties to 
commit to its implementation and recurrence of civil war resulted.   
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The first UN envoy led by Berhanu Dinka (Ethiopia) attempted to mediate the 
conflict in Sierra Leone in 1996.  The civil war reached a stalemate and elections 
confirmed Kabbah as President (Gberie in Lord 2000).  Kabbah, as a former UN official, 
had a good relationship with the international community, but had an inherent mistrust of 
Sankoh and the RUF.  Sankoh had little credibility, but held advantages in organization and 
funding over the fledgling government.  It was also evident that contingents of the SLA 
were collaborating with the RUF, undermining the authority of the government.   
The RUF was able to obtain its primary objective when negotiating the Abidjan 
Peace Accord which stipulated the removal of Executive Outcomes from Sierra Leone.   
The military coup that removed the Kabbah government effectively ended the peace (UN 
2005), but Sankoh’s willingness to accept the agreement was questionable from the start.  
First, the RUF continued fighting during the negotiations, signaling little intent to carry out 
the terms of the peace agreement.  Second, Sankoh refused to allow the 750-man UN 
peacekeeping unit from deploying to the region once Executive Outcomes had removed 
their forces from the country (Hirsch 2001).  Third, the composition of the National 
Commission for the Consolidation for Peace (NCCP) did not provide effective oversight for 
compliance with the terms of the Abidjan Peace Accord.  The government and the rebels 
were responsible for self policing within a Joint Monitoring Group.  The Joint Monitoring 
Group had an equal number of members from the RUF and the government.  The group 
was tasked with implementing DDR and required a majority consensus to report violations 
of the peace agreement.  Consequently, any disagreement over compliance with 
demobilization amounted to a stalemate on the committee.  Eventually, the rebels and 
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the military began collaborating and violence escalated, culminating in the May 1997 coup 
(Woods and Reese 2008). 
The second UN envoy, a group lead by Francis Okelo (Uganda) in 1997, was less 
ambitious, but also unsuccessful to negotiate a long term peace.  Okelo’s diplomatic 
mission attempted to persuade Koroma’s military junta to relinquish control of the 
government and reinstate Kabbah as President.  At the time, Kabbah was in exile in 
neighboring Guinea after Koroma’s coup.  Koroma’s government imposed heavy 
restrictions on civil rights, access to information, and curbed political parties.  He also 
openly collaborated with the RUF, which promoted lawlessness in Sierra Leone.  The 
international community reacted to Koroma’s government with three successive 
responses: dialogue, sanctions, and military intervention.  The Okelo envoy represented 
the first phase of an escalating strategy by the international community, but failed to 
persuade the junta to step down. Ultimately, military intervention from ECOWAS was 
necessary to restore order.   
At this point, the belligerents did not appear willing or interested in negotiating a 
peace agreement.  The Okelo Envoy was able to negotiate terms for agreement that 
protected the political status of the RUF and immunity for the leaders of the junta.  In 
return, the Kabbah government would be restored to power and the implementation of 
the peace process previously agreed upon in the Abidjan Peace Accord would begin in 
October 1997 (UN 1997).38   Despite negotiating an agreement, Koroma soon determined 
that he would be able to restore order on his own within 2-4 years (Woods and Reese 
                                                 
38
 This peace plan, known as the Conakry Peace Plan (Oct. 1997), was negotiated both by the UN envoy and 
ECOWAS.  Koroma soon reneged on the plan and it was never implemented.     
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2008).  He would not make the concessions necessary for a negotiated peace when he 
suspected his bargaining position would improve in the future and the treaty was never 
implemented. 
The Security Council reacted to the failure in diplomacy by imposing an oil and 
arms embargo in October 1997.  ECOWAS was authorized to monitor the implementation 
of the embargo.  The UN recognized that the diplomatic envoys did not carry the 
monitoring or sanctioning capability to force compliance between the belligerents.  The 
embargo appeared to have some effect, since it got the junta back to the bargaining table 
within a few weeks.  Once the elected government was restored,  the sanctions were 
removed (UN 2005).   
Failings of the Envoys 
Although the envoys fostered dialogue among the belligerents, they required an 
element of force to implement the agreements.  Both of the diplomatic envoys were 
successful in securing agreements, but could not enforce compliance.  Involving a third 
party peacekeeping force to implement these agreements would have fulfilled two 
purposes: applied additional costs to committing to the agreements and provided better 
oversight to insure compliance.  Implementing the Abidjan Peace Accord contained goals 
for DDR, but was heavily reliant on self policing.  The composition of the self policing 
mechanism of the NCCP highlights the need for outside intervention.  The NCCP was 
equally composed of representatives from both primary factions without a tiebreaking 
mechanism or a standard for suitability to be a representative on the commission.  The 
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commission was destined to be composed of unsavory figures unable to agree on 
implementing the peace agreement (Bangura 1997).   
The peace agreements negotiated by the UN envoys had reasonable intentions, 
but lacked the force necessary to insure compliance with the agreement.  The addition of 
a peacekeeping force along with the agreements would have changed the dynamic of 
compliance among the belligerents.  First, the structural problems associated with the 
NCCP would not have been an issue.  The NCCP was structured with each of the primary 
belligerents having equal representation on the commission with no tiebreaking 
procedure.  Furthermore, the inclusion of possible war criminals on the commission 
prevented the commission from tackling possible humanitarian issues (Woods and Reese 
2008:33-34).  An intervention force would have provided an impartial and objective 
assessment of compliance with the terms of the Abidjan Peace Accord and consisted of 
members that both parties could trust.  Second, inclusion of a peacekeeping mission 
would have constituted a costly signal to both the combatants and the international 
community.  Such a signal is a method of “tying the hands” of the leadership and “sinking 
costs” toward its implementation (Fearon 1997).  Rather than presenting these costly 
signals of intent, the envoys presented little tangible evidence that the international 
community was willing to pay the costs necessary for enforcing a peace.  Since the 
combatants had so little at stake, they had little to lose when the agreements ultimately 
failed. 
ECOWAS (ECOMOG): How Regional Peacekeepers Performed 
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 ECOWAS was the regional organization with the earliest presence in Sierra Leone, 
but the numerically small size and limited mandate of its forces reduced its security 
impact to the immediate area surrounding Freetown.  Furthermore, the unwillingness to 
provide troops by Nigeria signaled to the rebels that they could wait out the peacekeepers 
as they did Executive Outcomes.  The involvement of a regional organization like ECOWAS 
increased the international involvement and legitimacy in the peacekeeping mission; 
however, ECOWAS brought limited peacekeeping resources into the conflict and did not 
support peace enforcement with demobilization efforts.  The failings of ECOWAS 
stemmed from its inability to credibly enforce commitments from the combatants.   
 ECOWAS first deployed forces in Sierra Leone in 1992, but did not become 
engaged in Sierra Leone’s civil war until 1997.  ECOWAS arrived in Sierra Leone to support 
their mission to assist government forces in neighboring Liberia.  ECOWAS used the Lungi 
airport (Freetown) as a supply base for troops stationed along the Liberian border.  
ECOMOG’s presence in Sierra Leone during the early 1990’s was limited to the airport, key 
supply route areas, and the Liberian border region.  However, when the Abidjan 
Agreement fell apart and Sierra Leone descended into chaos under Koroma, the ECOMOG 
peacekeeping mission became costlier and exposed its limited capability to maintain 
peace (Woods and Reese 2008: 40-42). 
While the presence of ECOWAS reduced the control of the rebel groups, it could 
not curtail their activities outside of Freetown.  The peacekeeping contingent was forced 
on several occasions to stabilize parts of Freetown when the city was infiltrated by the 
rebels.  Although ECOWAS peacekeepers had an enforcement capability in Freetown, 
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rebel groups rearmed and remobilized outside the city.  Despite their ability to stabilize 
the government security forces and avert greater chaos from rebel attacks, ECOWAS was 
unable to substantially alter the costs of war for the rebel forces.  Continuing the war had 
a favorable cost-benefit ratio for the rebels, making peace negotiation unlikely.  Rather, 
ECOWAS was only able to prevent the RUF from achieving their most preferred goal of 
complete control of Sierra Leone, reducing human suffering, and possibly averting total 
state collapse in Sierra Leone.   
 The ECOWAS peacekeeping contingent (hereafter, ECOMOG) was largely 
supported by Nigerian troops until June 1998.  12,000 of the 13,000 ECOMOG troops were 
from Nigeria (Adebajo 2002: 91).  The involvement of Nigeria had several motives.  First, 
Sani Abacha’s regime in Nigeria sought to reduce its international isolation by becoming 
an active participant in peacekeeping, second, peacekeeping provided both valuable 
military training for Nigerian troops and lucrative opportunities for corruption and theft, 
finally, Nigeria wished to contain such regional conflicts, hoping that they could prevent 
spillover into their own country and playing the role of regional hegemon (Adebajo 2002: 
92; Fortna 2008: 71).  These incentives provided ECOMOG enough motivation to curtail 
violence, but not enough to promote public trust, secure the country, and reestablish a 
functioning government.   
 ECOMOG pushed violence away from the capital rather than ending the conflict.  
After the 1997 military coup, the primary responsibilities of ECOMOG troops were to 
defend Freetown and ensure the implementation of the oil and arms embargo against the 
ruling military junta.  ECOMOG helped negotiate Abidjan Peace Plan, requiring a ceasefire 
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(monitored by ECOMOG) and the return of the Kabbah government from exile.  Although 
the junta privately agreed to the Abidjan Peace Plan, it publicly renounced it and it was 
never implemented. Instability within the military junta and RUF collaboration/bribery 
among government soldiers emboldened the rebels.  Once again in 1998, rebel forces 
attacked Freetown, but ECOMOG troops successfully expelled them.  When the fighting 
subsided, Kabbah was reinstated as President and the rebels continued to rearm in the 
countryside due to the lifting of the oil and arms embargo (Brummel and Molgaard 2007; 
UN 2005).  
 While the violence in 1998 prompted new diplomatic efforts between the Kabbah 
government and rebels, the peacekeeping force still lacked the enforcement mandate and 
capability to maintain order throughout Sierra Leone.  Though ECOMOG could secure the 
elected government of Sierra Leone, it did not take measures to weaken the rebels or 
strengthen government forces to a point that the country could stabilize.   
ECOMOG also had to deal with internal difficulties within the peacekeeping force.  
When Nigerian leader Abacha died, Nigeria returned to democratic rule and  Nigerians 
were less willing to shoulder the high casualty and economic costs of the peacekeeping 
mission in Sierra Leone (Rashid 2000: 1; Fortna 2008: 58).  The cost of operations was 
reported to be a million dollars per day and hundreds of Nigerian soldiers lost their lives 
as a result of hostile action (Fortna 2008: 58).  Once Nigeria announced that it would soon 
withdraw its forces, the international community sought to fast track the peace process 
and find replacements for the departing Nigerian peacekeepers.  This marked the 
beginning of the departure of ECOMOG and the increasing involvement of the UN.   
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UNOMSIL deployed 70 unarmed observers to Sierra Leone while ECOMOG was still 
present, but UNOMSIL also had a limited mandate to observe conditions for “voluntary” 
disarmament, rather than enforce a peace agreement.  UNOMSIL was deployed to 
support the Conakry Agreement, which was never implemented because the Koroma 
government backed away from it and Sierra Leone returned to violence shortly afterward 
(Nuarmah and Zartman 2004). 
Failings of ECOMOG 
 The failure to secure peace in Sierra Leone by ECOMOG was due to its inability to 
overcome commitment problems in the civil conflict.  ECOMOG sought a negotiated 
resolution while the bargaining position of the government was weak and the 
international community did not sufficiently signal its willingness to escalate its 
peacekeeping presence in Sierra Leone.  It did not possess the capability to sufficiently 
force the rebels to accept an agreement, nor did Nigeria want to accept the costs of a 
protracted peacebuilding mission.  As a result, the rebels reneged on agreements and 
continued to engage in violence throughout the country.   
 The bargaining position of the RUF was strong relative to the government, so there 
was very little incentive for the RUF to make concessions when negotiating a peace.  
ECOMOG demonstrated the ability to secure Freetown, but little else beyond the western 
peninsulas of Freetown and Lungi.  They conceded strategic geographic areas to the RUF 
in the east allowing rearmament, financed through illegal diamond mining.  Normally, 
permitting a rebel force to operate in remote, landlocked areas of the country would limit 
its ability to operate, however, the collaboration with Charles Taylor and the smuggling 
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routes through Liberia gave the RUF the ability to collect weapons and revenues despite 
the international economic sanctions.  The capacity to operate in this environment further 
illustrates the importance of peacekeeping operations to collaborate with neighboring 
countries during a mission.   
 The strength of ECOMOG forces could not compel the RUF to fully commit to an 
agreement.  Despite successful enforcement missions near Freetown (Operation 
Sandstorm and Operation Tigerhead), the ECOMOG soldiers were not equipped to 
overwhelm the RUF outside of the city.  Poor road conditions and a lack of air support 
inhibited troop movements in the east of the country and cut off supply lines.  
Consequently, ECOMOG soldiers found themselves ill equipped and short on supplies 
(Report 2004).  The supply and logistical difficulties required ECOMOG to take up 
defensive positions around Freetown, rather than secure the rest of the country.  Rebel 
groups used this advantage to remobilize their forces, capture women and children to use 
as human shields, and overwhelm the ECOMOG forces in their attempts to reoccupy 
Freetown.  RUF tactics of disguising themselves as civilians and using civilians as human 
shields led ECOMOG forces to capture and kill anyone suspected of being linked with the 
RUF.  Additionally, morale among ECOMOG soldiers remained low as a result of extended 
deployments and low pay.  Many soldiers resorted to extortion and smuggling to 
supplement their incomes.  There is also evidence that ECOMOG soldiers engaged in war 
atrocities.  Poor discipline and morale hurt ECOMOG’s credibility as an intermediary 
among the local population (Woods and Reese 2008: 46, 49). 
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The attempts at peace negotiations did not provide a credible signal of resolve 
from ECOMOG to the belligerents.  Up to this point, negotiation led the RUF to believe 
that the international community was unwilling to assume the costs necessary for 
enforcing a peace.  Consequently, the RUF concluded that that their future bargaining 
position would improve over time.  Several explanations account for the RUF’s confidence 
in their bargaining position.  First, the timid escalation of commitment by ECOMOG 
signaled that there was very little desire to strengthen its mission in Sierra Leone.  After 
all, ECOMOG had a presence in Sierra Leone since 1990, but did not assert a robust role 
Sierra Leone’s conflict until 1997.  Additionally, ECOMOG’s mandate limited its mission to 
reinstalling Kabbah as President.  Once that objective was achieved, ECOMOG did not 
extend the scope of its peacekeeping operations.  Second, the involvement of ECOWAS 
was an example in which transparent democratic institutions failed to benefit 
peacekeeping.  Nigeria, as the primary contributor of ECOMOG soldiers, conveyed their 
desire to withdraw troops from Sierra Leone.  Intervention in Sierra Leone cost Nigeria a 
million dollars per day and upset many citizens in the newly democratic country (Adebajo 
2002).  Transparency, in this case, indicated to the RUF that the citizens of Nigeria were no 
longer willing to shoulder the costs of intervention in Sierra Leone.     
The conclusion of ECOMOG’s mission marked the commencement of the UN’s 
peacekeeping mission mandated by the Lomé Peace Accords in July 1999.  The 
government of Sierra Leone made numerous concessions to the RUF and the international 
community signaled its unwillingness to force the hand of the rebels with a robust military 
presence.  Consequently, the RUF began the implementation phase of the Lomé 
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Agreement in a strong bargaining position and a belief that the international community 
was not willing to commit itself to the civil conflict.  Despite the generous concessions to 
the RUF under the Lomé Agreement, the RUF still had incentives to renege on the 
agreement.  A stronger intervention force and signal of resolve from the international 
community would be required to reduce the incentives for defection by the RUF.  
UNOMSIL/UNAMSIL: Peacekeeping and Enforcement Capability 
 
 The UN played a substantial role in consolidating peace in Sierra Leone.  However, 
its contribution to a lasting peace came less from its military presence and more from its 
role as a neutral and credible intermediary.  The military resources and personnel that the 
UN committed did not amount to much more than that which ECOMOG had withdrawn 
from the country.  Lacking a cohesive and robust peace enforcement contingent, Sierra 
Leone became violent once again despite the presence of UN peacekeepers.  The UN 
provided the peacekeeping effort with a perception of legitimacy and neutrality which 
primarily helped implement DDR, but depended on British security guarantees.  These 
qualities helped to impose a lasting settlement after security was established.  The UN 
was ultimately successful in Sierra Leone, but it required British security guarantees in 
order for its demobilization efforts to succeed.   
 Though the UN authorized ECOMOG’s mission in Sierra Leone, it took over 
peacekeeping responsibilities following the Nigerian withdrawal.  UNOMSIL had been 
authorized as an observer mission in June 1998 with no enforcement capability.  The 
maximum number of observers authorized by the Security Council under UNOMSIL was 
210.  Thus, fighting continued while UNOMSIL was present and all UN personnel were 
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evacuated during the December 1998 rebel offensive on Freetown.  After ECOMOG 
recaptured Freetown and the Lomé Peace Agreement was negotiated in May 1999, the 
belligerents requested an expanded role for the UN peacekeeping mission.  In October 
1999, UN Security Council Resolution 1270 authorized a new peacekeeping mission 
creating UNAMSIL and increasing the number of military personnel to 6,000.  By February 
2000, that number was revised to 11,100 military personnel to oversee the Lomé Peace 
Agreement.  UNAMSIL included a mandate for a larger peacekeeping force, as well as 
additional responsibilities in civil affairs and civilian police (UN 2005).   
Despite the increase in size and scope of the UNAMSIL mission, it was not 
prepared to stop violence in Sierra Leone if the Lomé Agreement was breached.  UNAMSIL 
was authorized as a peace enforcement mission; however, the force did not present a 
credible deterrent to the rebels.  When UNAMSIL was authorized, it was expected that a 
majority of the ECOMOG forces would remain, but the ECOMOG forces (primarily Nigeria) 
intended for UNAMSIL to replace them as peacekeepers (Woods and Reese 2008: 59).  
From the beginning of the mission, RUF ceasefire violations were frequent and UN access 
was denied to strategically important rebel strongholds (Fortna 2008: 59).  The 6000 
UNAMSIL peacekeepers initially deployed in early 2000 avoided the rebel controlled 
diamond fields of Eastern Sierra Leone.  This limited their ability to weaken the RUF and 
remove their primary motivation for continuing the war.  The logistical and supply 
problems that plagued ECOMOG were exacerbated under UNAMSIL due to 
inconsistencies of command and control structures, language barriers, and even stolen 
military equipment (Woods and Reese 2008: 57).   
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UNAMSIL also had significant difficulty establishing itself as a credible 
intermediary.  Because UNAMSIL had to contend with an estimated 40-50,000 armed 
combatants in Sierra Leone, the size of the force was increased to 11,100 (total), although 
half of that force came from remaining Nigerian ECOMOG troops.  The Nigerian troops 
operated autonomously and caused unease among the RUF who did not trust them 
(Woods and Reese 2008: 58).  As the UN force expanded its mission, Sankoh denounced 
the UN mission as “illegal and inconsistent with the Lomé Agreement” and obstructed UN 
deployment into the diamond fields of Eastern Sierra Leone (Bright 2000: 2).  The UN 
mission in Sierra Leone effectively collapsed in May 2000 when the RUF violated the 
ceasefire agreement by killing numerous UN peacekeepers and taking 500 hostages.   
The rebels took such actions assuming the determination of the international 
community was weak and that a resumption of violence would insure a withdrawal of 
peacekeepers as had happened in Somalia and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994, respectively.  
The signals displayed by international community indicated that there was little interest in 
a costly and protracted mission and the UN mission did not establish itself as a robust 
presence from the outset.  Soldiers arrived in sporadic intervals, military equipment was 
routinely lost in transit and the commanding General Jetley (India) did not wish to engage 
in an enforcement mission (Hirsch 2001: 157; Malan, Rakate, and McIntyre 2002: 14; 
Fortna 2008: 137).  The transition from ECOMOG to UNAMSIL left a temporary security 
vacuum and credibility gap for the incoming peacekeeping force, since the UN mission had 
not been militarily tested and the Nigerian and Indian39 contingents argued over areas of 
                                                 
39
 India was the second largest contributor of peacekeepers to Sierra Leone with approximately 3000 soldiers 
(four battalion-sized elements).   
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responsibility (Bright 2000: 1; Fortna 2008: 138).  Despite the favorable terms granted to 
the RUF under the Lomé Agreement, it had reason to believe that it could improve its 
status in the country by breaking the peace agreement and attempting to assert control 
over the whole country.   
The commitment of the international community proved to be stronger than the 
RUF expected.  Since UNAMSIL’s peacekeeping contingent essentially replaced the 
ECOWAS military forces in size, it could not forcefully deter RUF aggression.  However, 
international reaction to the RUF’s hostile actions, informed rebels that the international 
community would not sit idly in the midst of another failed state.  UNAMSIL’s mandate 
was almost immediately revised to “deter and where necessary, decisively counter the 
threat of RUF attack by responding robustly to any hostile actions or threat of imminent 
and direct use of force (UN 2000).”  The new mandate provided clear language that the 
UN forces would take preventative and reactive measures to enforce peace in Sierra 
Leone under Chapter VII.  Later, the involvement of the British military in Sierra Leone 
further clarified the commitment of the international community and that they would not 
hesitate to provide a deterrent force in the future (Fortna 2008: 138).   
Rather than deterring the international community, renewed violence 
demonstrated the need for a robust peacekeeping force with a stronger enforcement 
mandate.  Televised Images of RUF war atrocities and reports that corporations profited 
from the trade in conflict diamonds reinforced public support to strengthen the 
peacekeeping mission rather than withdraw it.  Fortna (2008) reveals in several interviews 
of British and UNAMSIL officials that the RUF breaking of the ceasefire turned out to be a 
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blessing, because it provoked an immediate response by the British who sought a larger 
role in the UNAMSIL peacekeeping operation.    
UNAMSIL deterred hostile acts by the rebels, but it also restrained government 
forces from attempting acts of retribution when rebel forces were repelled.  In an 
interview with Behrooz Sadry, the Acting Special Representative to the Secretary General 
of UNAMSIL, he made it clear that the UN actively prohibited the SLA from taking 
advantage of the weakened position of the rebel groups insuring that violence did not 
recur on the part of the government forces (Fortna 2008: 139).  Although UNAMSIL was 
unable to prevent a recurrence of war, it reduced the destruction caused by the breach of 
the peace. 
Failings and Successes of UNAMSIL 
In February 2000, the initial UNAMSIL troop contingent of 6000 proved insufficient 
to curtail violence and the surprise removal of most Nigerian troops made conditions 
worse.  The UN recognized that the situation was deteriorating and passed Resolution 
1289 increasing the number of troops in Sierra Leone and allowed more forceful 
responses to enforce compliance with DDR (UN 2000: paragraph 10).  Despite 
authorization to use more forceful tactics of disarmament, General Jetley refused to 
change UNAMSIL rules for engagement.  After multiple instances of provocation, the RUF 
began to recognize that UNAMSIL would not respond with force and became bolder in 
noncompliance with demobilization.  By April 2000, the ECOMOG forces had completely 
withdrawn and the RUF became openly hostile toward UNAMSIL, taking 500 
peacekeepers hostage (approximately 300 Kenyans and 200 Zambians).  On the surface, 
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UNAMSIL seemed to be a failed mission since it did not stop a recurrence of violence in 
Sierra Leone.  However, once the commitment of the international community was 
established by enacting stronger peace enforcement mission, the UN presence in Sierra 
Leone proved to be crucial in restraining violence and reorganizing the country into a 
functioning state.   
From November 2000 to March 2001, the existence of a strengthened 
peacekeeping contingent was, perhaps, the only thing that kept Sierra Leone from 
collapse.  The strengthening of UNAMSIL and the backing of the British incapacitated the 
RUF, but the UN still favored bringing rebel groups into the political process.  In order to 
do that, UNAMSIL coordinated DDR and Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Sierra Leone with 
the British, ensuring that the vacuous security structure would be filled with a capable and 
legitimate domestic security force.  Fortna (2008) describes the efforts of UNAMSIL and 
the British as a friend vs. foe effort, with UNAMSIL negotiating to bring the RUF into the 
political process and the British waiting in the wings advocating a more aggressive 
approach.   
Trust among the belligerents was an important component of UNAMSIL’s 
contribution to the peacekeeping effort in Sierra Leone.  Early in the UNAMSIL’s mission, 
DDR camps were underequipped, resembled POW camps, and were staffed by Nigerian 
troops (Woods and Reese 2008: 58).  Unsurprisingly, combatants were reluctant to 
participate in the disarmament process (Chawla 2000).  In order to promote successful 
DDR, UNAMSIL had to convince RUF leaders that they could accomplish more through 
participating in the political process, rather than undermining it.  UNAMSIL General 
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Opande describes convincing RUF leader Issa Sesay that his security was dependent upon 
UNAMSIL’s ability to provide it (Fortna 2008: 139).  UNAMSIL focused on security 
measures including the disarmament of approximately 75,000 ex-combatants and SSR in 
the form of rebuilding Sierra Leones police and military.  Each soldier that submitted to 
the DDR process underwent a 6 week program of job retraining and was provided food, 
clothing, shelter, and transport to anywhere in the country in exchange for his weapon 
(Woods and Reese 2008: 58).  Furthermore, the UN was responsible for providing 
logistical support and public information campaigns on national elections, repatriation of 
a half a million refugees, establishing of truth and reconciliation commissions, and leading 
a coordinated effort to eliminate international trade in conflict diamonds.   Multilateral 
action in post conflict management of Sierra Leone prepared the country for a sustainable 
future after the civil war. 
While UNAMSIL was an integral part of the establishment of peace in Sierra Leone, 
it needed the backing of a force willing to relay the resolve of the international 
community.  The British intervention force in Sierra Leone served this purpose.  While 
some have contended that UNAMSIL illustrated the failures of international peacekeeping 
efforts, since it only succeeded after the British intervention, neither intervention force 
can claim full credit for the success of the mission (Roberson 2007).  UNAMSIL depended 
upon the military strength provided by the British and the British depended upon the 
multilateral capabilities of UNAMSIL.  The mantra of foreign policy has often been “speak 
softly and carry a big stick.”  The success of peacekeeping in Sierra Leone is often credited 
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to the “big stick” of British intervention, but likely would not have lasted without the 
trusted “voice” of UNAMSIL.  
Great Britain  
 
 The enforcement capability of a peacekeeping operation is often the point of 
emphasis in peacekeeping effectiveness, however analysis of the conflict in Sierra Leone 
illustrates that it is not sufficient to permanently end a civil conflict.  Executive Outcomes 
was as a highly capable military force.  Yet, when Executive Outcomes occupied 
strategically important territory limiting the conflict, its one-dimensional coercive capacity 
for peace in Sierra Leone evaporated upon its departure.  Alternatively, the UN envoys 
intended to facilitate a peace between the belligerents were also ineffective since they 
lacked the coercive capability to enforce the terms of the agreements and could do little 
to stop the belligerents from shirking.  The inability of the UNAMSIL to solely police Sierra 
Leone became evident when 500 UN peacekeepers were taken hostage and many were 
killed in April-May 2000 attempting to patrol the diamond mining areas of Kono (Malan, 
Rakate, and McIntyre 2002).  It was at this time that Britain deployed a rapid reaction 
force of 1300 troops called Operation Palliser.  A majority of the British forces were 
withdrawn within 6 weeks, leaving UNAMSIL to remain as the primary peacekeeping force 
(Williams 2001).  While the British involvement proved to be an integral component in 
pacifying Sierra Leone, it depended upon the UN as a neutral intermediary with the ability 
to persuade the belligerents to commit to the agreement and implement DDR.   
 The British sent troops to Sierra Leone to support the UN mission after the 
collapse of the Lomé Agreement in April 2000.  Although the terms of Lomé were highly 
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favorable toward the RUF and its leadership, the RUF believed that they could gain more 
from fighting than from cooperation.  The involvement of the British was the clearest 
indication that the RUF was mistaken in that assumption.  The British operation in Sierra 
Leone represented a classic example of counter insurgency (COIN) strategy with signs of 
success evident with a few weeks of the commencement of the operation (Roberson 
2007).  First securing the airport and area surrounding Freetown, the British intervention 
forces allowed the UN and SLA forces to reestablish defensive positions.  Britain’s primary 
role in the mission was Security Sector Reform (SSR) by helping reconstitute the SLA as the 
Republic of Sierra Leone Army (RSLA).  With a more disciplined and trained army, the 
British then played a supportive role in helping the RSLA assert control over the eastern 
parts of the country under rebel control.  In Freetown, the British forces gained the 
confidence of the citizens of Sierra Leone from regularly patrolling, participating in 
military exercises, promoting public information campaigns, and the arresting of Foday 
Sankoh (Roberson 2007).  Effectively displaying strength and empowering the local 
security forces were the primary components of the successful British COIN strategy.   
 The strength of the British response came from adding the boots on the ground 
outside of UNAMSIL’s strict rules of engagement and the domestic push from the Labor 
government’s focus on promoting peace and prosperity in Africa.  As a democratic regime, 
Britain effectively conveyed their foreign policy intent in Sierra Leone to mount a robust 
and concerted enforcement mission in the civil war.  While democracies are often 
credited with taking forceful military action at the outset of conflict and signaling the 
intent of their foreign policy, they are less likely to accept sustained costs of conflict over 
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time (Mueller 1974; Lake 1992; Martin 2000).  Public acceptance of the British mission 
and the Labor government’s desire for a strong foreign policy in the third world permitted 
the British military to endure sustained costs over time to pacify Sierra Leone.  However, 
operating as a support force to the UN allowed the British to avoid protracted 
commitments to peacebuilding operations that would have most likely sapped public 
support over time.   
While the British government was initially hesitant to commit forces to Sierra 
Leone after the collapse of the Lomé Agreement, several criteria motivated the British to 
become involved.  First, the UK was a former colonial ruler in Sierra Leone gave Britain a 
greater sense of responsibility to a country that it had current and historical links.  Second, 
the failure of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1998 to prevent British arms from 
being sent to Sierra Leone in breach of UN sanctions increased this sense of responsibility 
among the British.  Finally, failure of the UN mission in Sierra Leone would have 
undermined British foreign policy as a permanent member of the Security Council.  Britain 
had a moral obligation to assist UNAMSIL and prevent failure of the UN mission 
(Connaughton 2000; Williams 2001).  
After the success of Operation Palliser, the British allowed the RSLA and UNAMSIL 
to operate autonomously and successfully to promote DDR.  In June 2000, the main body 
of the British contingent left the country and only 200 British soldiers remained to train 
the RSLA.  However, the resolve of the British military was tested when a splinter rebel 
faction known as the West Side Boys took eleven Royal Irish Regiment soldiers hostage.  
The British forces responded quickly and decisively with Operation Barras.  That 
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constituted a significant offensive military operation for two reasons.  First, the operation 
was the first offensive counterinsurgency operation of its kind in Sierra Leone and, 
second, it presented a clear signal of resolve that the international commitment to Sierra 
Leone could not be broken with hit and run acts of hostility (Roberson 2007: 8).  Despite 
the relatively short and limited period of British involvement, the British peacekeeping 
contingent permitted UNAMSIL to increase their numbers and reinforced the 
international commitment to pacifying Sierra Leone from those seeking to spoil the efforts 
of bringing peace to Sierra Leone. 
 Most important to the collective peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone was the 
ability for the British to deter spoilers in the peace process.  Despite an effective COIN 
strategy in Western Sierra Leone and British support for a humanitarian mission, the 
escalation of British forces posed risks for two reasons.  First, the existence of an outside 
force, portrayed as occupiers, could bolster popular local opposition to the peacekeepers 
and swell the ranks of the rebels.  Second, democratic governments are more responsive 
to audience costs and even small scale attacks against such forces could have a much 
larger affects on public opinion at home (Pape 2005).  As a result, the British kept their 
intervention limited, but assertive.  Had the British backed away from the mission in Sierra 
Leone, it would have conveyed weakness by the international community toward the 
mission in Sierra Leone, emboldening the rebels to take further steps to derail the peace 
process.   
Contributions from the British 
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 The British involvement in Sierra Leone provided the perception of strength to 
curtail violence, dissuade spoilers, and display commitment by the international 
community toward peacekeeping efforts.  Although the British force only took offensive 
military action against the RUF in two instances (Operation Palliser and Barras), they 
provided a visible military threat and added an intelligence capability to the UN mission.  
The British forces, by patrolling, were able to visibly project strength toward the rebel 
populations.  Their presence on the ground was able to expose rebel weaknesses.  The 
British forces helped identify sources of rebel funding through the illegal diamond trade 
and the external connection to Charles Taylor’s government in Liberia in this illicit trade.  
Subsequent international sanctions on the diamond trade in West Africa cut off the 
primary source of funding for the RUF rebels (Roberson 2007: 62-64). 
The British presence in Sierra Leone was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
for peace.  As a former colonial ruler in Sierra Leone, permanent member of the Security 
Council, and established global military power, Great Britain had both the capability and 
resolve to police country and authoritatively impose a cessation of violence.  Some have 
characterized Britain’s role in Sierra Leone as “part COIN, part war fighting, peacekeeping, 
and peacebuilding (Griffin 2005: 216).”  However, Britain’s real contribution to the 
peacekeeping mission was establishing credibility in the mission and reestablishing the 
UN’s prominent role in post conflict reconstruction insuring that future commitments 
would be honored and a just order would return to the country.  Collier (2007: 128) 
describes the British intervention in Sierra Leone as “a model for military intervention… 
cheap, confident, and sustained.”  Visible and decisive military engagement, although 
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brief, signaled their intention to support the UN.  Britain had the strength to alter the 
status quo for the belligerents, but depended on the credibility of the UN to insure 
acceptance of a new government.   
Democratic institutions and public information campaigns influenced the 
international commitment to the conflict.  Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) like 
Global Witness and Partnership Africa-Canada promoted awareness campaigns and 
brought attention to the role of conflict diamonds in funding the civil war in Sierra Leone.  
In many cases, diamonds were directly traded for weapons. In January 2000, Partnership 
Africa-Canada produced a report linking the illicit diamonds trade to the war in Sierra 
Leone and documented the brutal human rights abuses taking place in the country to 
acquire diamonds.  It also exposed the smuggling routes in Liberia, use of fake invoices, 
and the role multinationals like DeBeers played in the purchasing of conflict diamonds. 
(Brummel and Molgaard 2007).     
Publicizing the issue gained the attention of the diamond industry and audiences 
in countries dependent upon global consumer demand for diamonds.  The diamond 
industry and diamond exporting countries were worried that bad publicity might inspire a 
consumer boycott in the western world.  Consequently, DeBeers discontinued buying 
diamonds on the open market and more than 70 countries approved the UN-sponsored 
Kimberly Process Certification Schemes.  Under the Kimberly process, diamonds are 
tracked and certified from their point of origin to the stores in which they are sold to 
insure that they are not illegally smuggled from conflict areas. It is estimated that less 
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than 1% of diamonds on the market today can be considered conflict diamonds (Brummel 
and Molgaard 2007).   
Information was a weapon against the RUF because democratic audiences reacted 
to events in Sierra Leone.  Linking conflict diamond sales to the mass atrocities in Sierra 
Leone influenced the international community to take more forceful action and motivated 
international cooperation to closely regulate the international sale of diamonds.  The 
international community successfully cooperated to remove the primary source of 
funding for the RUF, crippling its capability and motivation to continue fighting.  
Information campaigns promoted by NGOs targeted democratic audiences who 
influenced their leadership to take action and prompted multinational corporations to 
adjust their business practices.  These actions illustrate the impact that civil society has in 
promoting forceful and multilateral peace enforcement in civil wars. 
Alternative Explanations for Post Conflict Peace in Sierra Leone 
 
 The Abuja Agreement and the reinstatement of the popularly elected government 
signified the end of hostilities in Sierra Leone.  The British and UNAMSIL interventions 
successfully implemented security sector reform, oversaw elections, and facilitated 
government transition.  However, alternative explanations for an end to the war should 
be considered.  As an alternative to peacekeeping, the war in Sierra Leone could have 
plausibly ended as a result of exhaustion, the military victory by the government, or the 
death of the RUF’s charismatic leader.   
 The first alternative explanation for the end of military hostilities in Sierra Leone 
may be exhaustion.  There is no doubt that civil war in the 1990’s had taken a tremendous 
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toll on the people of Sierra Leone; the will and resources for war may simply have run out.  
The UN and other international organizations estimate that more than 50,000 people died 
during the 10 year civil conflict and nearly half the population was at some point 
displaced.  Despite the heavy toll of the war, the rebel forces showed signs that they 
would continue fighting.  Rebels attempted to hide in the mountainous areas near Guinea 
and continue to attack peacekeepers until the Guinean government took measures to 
better police its border.  Yet, war begets war.  Collier (2007: 26-27) finds that “the 
experience of having been through a civil war roughly doubles the risk of another 
conflict.”  
 Second, peace in Sierra Leone may have been a result of victory by the 
government.  When one side is overwhelmingly defeated, it has few bargaining chips and, 
consequently, must take whatever deal is handed to them.  The increasing presence of 
peacekeepers and the removal of funding may have demoralized the RUF so that it could 
no longer mount a serious military campaign.  However, this was not entirely the case in 
Sierra Leone.  While the RUF was dismantled as a rebel and criminal network, it was not 
completely eliminated.  Most of the members of the RUF were not held accountable for 
war crimes and were allowed to form a political party after the war.  If they lacked all 
ability to bargain after the war, they would not have been granted any political rights.   
Another alternative explanation for permanent cessation for civil war in Sierra 
Leone could have been the cult of personality and wealth that accompanied Foday 
Sankoh.  There is no doubt that Sankoh was the primary instigator of the rebel cause in 
Sierra Leone and the timing of his death coincided with the implementation of permanent 
 215 
political concessions.  It is possible that the imprisonment of Sankoh left the RUF without 
leadership and guidance to continue their war.  However, splinter factions such as the 
“West Side Boys” who kidnapped British and RSLA soldiers demonstrated that they were 
capable of operating autonomously from the RUF leadership.  Splinter factions operated 
less like organized rebel movements and more like local criminal gangs.  While Sankoh 
inspired much of the RUF cause, government corruption and wealth inequality 
destabilized the country and promoted the conditions necessary for a rebel movement 
(see Collier 2004).  
Accomplishing Peace: Confidence Building through Intermediaries 
 
Theory suggests that third party interventions help clarify bargaining space among 
the belligerents and alleviate concerns about committing to peace.  It is tempting to look 
at the case of Sierra Leone and conclude that the strong response by the British prompted 
the collapse of the RUF and rebel groups.  This would give the impression that the 
strength of the intermediary is the most important component of a peacekeeping mission. 
However, that was only one element of the peacebuilding process for Sierra Leone.  There 
are several inferences that can be drawn from the peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone.   
The case study leads to several conclusions.   First, peacekeepers need to be 
resolute in curtailing violence and convey that signal to the peacekept.  International 
leaders must be willing to commit resources to prevent violence and reintegrate the state.  
The peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone that proved most successful were those that 
had a strong resolve, rather than a strong military capability.  Neither the British, nor 
Executive Outcomes had overwhelmingly powerful forces committed to their 
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peacekeeping mission, but they were highly motivated to subdue the violence in Sierra 
Leone.  The Nigerians were less resolute in their mission as a part of ECOMOG.  Despite 
sending approximately 12,000 troops and spending large sums on the mission, the 
peacekeepers controlled little outside of Freetown and withdrew their forces at their 
earliest opportunity.  Having strong capability when engaging in a peacekeeping mission is 
important, but equally important is having the right interests at stake.   Executive 
Outcomes was motivated by profit, which motivated them to pacify the country, but did 
not motivate them to reform the security and government structures.  The UN sought to 
stabilize the country with the intention of making it function properly.  To achieve this, 
the UN negotiated peace treaties, assisted with reforming the military and police, set up a 
legal framework to manage war crimes, and oversaw elections.  Due to these substantive 
changes, Sierra Leone has not experienced significant violence since the signing of the 
Abuja Accord.   
A second lesson drawn from the peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone is that 
signals matter.  The perception of the British forces changed the willingness of the RUF to 
engage in hostile actions.  It took only one significant military operation (Operation 
Barras) to effectively signal serious intent to halt violence and the RUF got the message.  
After that, the British allowed the UN and the RSLA to patrol the countryside and the RUF 
avoided hostile actions out of fear for retribution from the British.  The RUF habitually 
reneged on their commitments to peace agreements and took advantage of their relative 
strength.  The intermediaries continued to offer concessions to the RUF, hoping that they 
would eventually be placated.  It was clear early on that the RUF were deceitful in their 
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negotiations for peace. Based on their financial incentives, history, and relative strength, 
the collapse of the Lomé Agreement should have been evident.  Peacekeeping missions 
must be both effective at interpreting and relaying credible signals. 
Finally, international cooperation and coordination is important.  Once violence is 
defused, a peacekeeping mission must address the underlying grievances associated with 
the conflict and implement governmental components of a functioning state.  This cannot 
be done without a concerted effort by the peacekeepers to relay information among the 
belligerents and coordinate a unified response by the international community.  Despite 
the isolation of the RUF, the UN still had to convince them that they were better off under 
the new government and demobilize.  Additionally, the UN had to convince the new 
government not to repress and punish former rebels. Furthermore, because it was 
evident that conflict diamonds were funding the rebels, the international community had 
to coordinate the Kimberly Process to regulate the international diamond trade.  Isolating 
Sierra Leone’s rebels required coordination and cooperation from neighboring countries.  
Liberia stopped trafficking conflict diamonds and the Guineans increased their border 
patrols to prevent rebels using cross border safe havens.  A considerable amount of 
international cooperation is required within and without a country to demobilize after a 
civil war.    
The analysis of Sierra Leone provides important lessons about the importance of 
both peacekeeping and peacekeepers.  The civil war would have likely persisted without 
the introduction of peacekeepers and it could not have been permanently stopped 
without the right peacekeeping mission as well.  Despite the involvement of special 
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envoys, a private security firm, and a regional organization, violence continued.  It took a 
coordinated effort by the UN and Great Britain to employ clear signals of strength to deter 
spoilers, facilitate cooperation, demobilize the belligerents, reestablish a legitimate 
government, and implement a lasting peace agreement. 
Comparing the Case Study and the Empirical Results 
 
 The findings from the case study on Sierra Leone can be compared to the results 
from the empirical analysis to determine a broader understanding of why peacekeeping 
works or does not work in civil conflicts.  First, conclusions can be drawn about the 
strength and the legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission.  Second, the importance of an 
intermediary acting as a facilitator of communication between the belligerents is evident.  
Third, the role that democracies can play as peacekeepers is clarified.  Finally, the case 
study clarifies the importance of neighboring countries in a civil conflict.  Comparing the 
empirical results and the findings in the case study clarifies the theory on peacekeeping 
success in civil wars. 
 The case study on Sierra Leone reaffirms that a strong peacekeeping force can 
keep warring factions from resuming conflict, but the peacekeeping efforts must also be 
directed at DDR to prevent future recurrences of conflict.  The results of the empirical 
analysis show that stronger peacekeeping missions deter violence better during the 
mission, rather than after the departure of the peacekeepers.  In Sierra Leone, this finding 
is better illustrated by the intervention of Executive Outcomes.  Executive Outcomes 
could deter rebel forces, but did not permanently alter the incentives to return to war 
after their departure.  Consequently, the civil war resumed when Executive Outcomes 
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departed.  The British intervention was equally strong in its enforcement capability and 
successfully deterred violence from the rebel fighters.  However, war did not recur after 
the British departure because of the concurrent DDR and security sector reform of the 
RSLA forces by UNAMSIL.  While the British forces helped deter violence, UNAMSIL altered 
the conflict environment by disarming rebels and training the RSLA security forces.    
 The case study also confirms that an outside peacekeeping force must work to 
continue dialogue as the bargaining structure in the conflict changes.  The empirical 
results show that when a treaty is negotiated during a peacekeeping mission, the factions 
are more likely to settle their dispute and remain at peace.  If war is a breakdown of the 
bargaining process, a third party peacekeeping mission must facilitate communication to 
continue the bargaining process.  The case study on Sierra Leone reaffirms this 
contention, but identifies the necessity of bargaining in good faith.  The intermediaries in 
Sierra Leone’s civil war were able to negotiate multiple treaties (Conakry, Abidjan and 
Lomé) between the rebels and the government.  However, in each instance, one of the 
belligerents reneged on the agreement.  Despite the failed attempts at negotiation, each 
successive peace negotiation built upon the previous negotiation.  For instance, the 
Abidjan Agreement required compliance with disarmament to be self reported by the 
belligerents.  Without an independent monitoring institution, noncompliance went 
unreported.  Future agreements required peacekeeping forces to monitor compliance.  
The success of the peacekeeping forces can be explained both through the intervention 
forces’ abilities to curtail violence as well as the continual efforts to communicate and 
negotiate between the warring factions.  Despite the large amount of enforcement 
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capability required from the peacekeepers in Sierra Leone, the final outcome of the war 
was eventually resolved through a negotiated peace agreement.   
The empirical results show that when democracies lead peacekeeping missions, 
there is a greater likelihood for peace both before and after the peacekeeping mission.  
However, the case study shows that transparency of democratic institutions and a 
democratic leadership’s sensitivity to audience costs can be beneficial and detrimental 
when displaying resolve.  When Nigeria transitioned to a democratic state, the leadership 
was much more sensitive to the escalating costs of the peacekeeping mission under 
ECOMOG.  As a result, there was significant pressure to withdraw from the peacekeeping 
mission, resulting in the transfer of peacekeeping authority to UNAMSIL and a 
remobilization effort by the RUF.  However, the involvement of the British peacekeeping 
force showed that democracies can also use audience costs to their benefit.  Two factors 
motivated the British government to act forcefully in Sierra Leone.  First, publicity 
associated with war atrocities prompted a response on humanitarian grounds.  Second, 
the new Labor government was elected on a foreign policy platform directed at reducing 
war and poverty in third world countries pressuring it to respond to the situation in Sierra 
Leone.   The British leadership had incentive to become involved as an intermediary and 
their military responses in Sierra Leone presented credible signals to the rebels that they 
would not withdraw like Nigeria.     
 Finally, a comparison of the empirical results and the case study illustrate the 
importance of neighboring countries to promote long term peace.  The empirical models 
show that when contiguous countries lead a peacekeeping mission, peace will likely 
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persist during and after the mission.  The argument for using this variable was that 
neighboring countries could bring more resources to civil war and they had a greater 
incentive to end the conflict.  However, the case study in Sierra Leone shows that 
neighboring countries do not have to be directly involved in the peacekeeping mission to 
affect the outcome.  Illicit trafficking weapons through Liberia kept the RUF armed during 
the civil war and mountainous jungles near the Guinean border provided refuge and cover 
for the RUF.  However, when Charles Taylor was deposed in Liberia and the UN 
coordinated with Guinea better monitoring along the border, the RUF was denied supply 
and safe haven.  The denial of safe haven along the border regions of Sierra Leone 
prevented the RUF from hiding, waiting and rearming. 
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Chapter 8: How Peacekeeping Works 
 
 The primary goal of the dissertation was to identify factors that contributed to the 
success of peacekeeping operations in civil conflicts.  With the increase in civil conflicts 
globally and their high rates of recurrence, identifying practices that produce the best 
outcomes is a worthwhile pursuit (Heldt and Wallensteen 2005; Collier et al. 2008).  The 
most popular method for insuring that civil conflicts cease permanently involves outside 
intervention by way of peacekeeping.  Prior research shows that third party interventions 
improve peaceful outcomes in civil conflicts (Walter 2002; Fortna 2008), but little research 
actually tests how intermediaries promote more stable post conflict environments.  The 
central question of this research project is what makes intermediaries better peace 
brokers?  
Scholars identify three causal mechanisms that promote effective peacekeeping 
missions.  First, intervention by a third party increases the expected costs of resuming 
conflict.  Should the belligerents resume fighting, they must contend with each other as 
well as the intervening forces, making resumptions of violence costlier actions.  Second, 
outside intermediaries provide credible sources for signaling and relaying information.  
Civil conflict can be exacerbated by an inability to trust the intentions of adversaries and 
credibly commit to agreements.  Intermediaries can bridge the gaps between foes, 
develop mutually acceptable agreements, and monitor/implement the terms of 
agreements once negotiated.  Finally, third parties can represent the will of the 
international community.  Civil conflicts often test the limits of human rights and the 
international community feels compelled to curtail mass atrocities.  By bringing mass 
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atrocities to light and uniformly condemning them through action, the international 
community can discredit and isolate those that support the worst outcomes of civil 
conflict.  It was expected that peacekeeping missions representing these theoretical 
qualities produced the best opportunities for post conflict peace.   
The theoretical arguments on third party intervention were categorically tested 
against the outcomes peacekeepers produce in post civil conflict scenarios from 1945-
2006.  Peacekeeping missions were measured in their capacity to militarily subdue the 
warring factions, the informational transparency of peacekeepers’ domestic institutions 
and written agreements, and the international legitimacy credited to the mission.  The 
impact of these causal mechanisms is linked to recurrences of violence upon arrival of 
peacekeepers.  Furthermore, the immediate and long term effects of a peacekeeping 
operation are contrasted by examining outbreaks of violence while the peacekeepers are 
present and within the year after their departure.  By using these metrics one can identify 
which missions successfully reduce violence temporarily and permanently.  Testing the 
success of these missions is accomplished through empirical modeling and case study. 
The empirical model tests how peacekeeping best pacifies civil conflicts in the 
immediate and long term.  The theoretical contentions all indicate some empirical support 
to theory, but not all of the hypotheses can be accepted.  The hypotheses relating to the 
strength of the intervention force show minimal evidence strength of the third party 
intervention reduces the likelihood for recurrences of conflict in civil wars.  Hypothesis 1 
predicts that greater numbers of peacekeepers sent to the mission should deter 
resumptions of violence both during and after the peacekeeping mission.  The empirical 
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results do not show that more peacekeepers deployed reduced the likelihood for 
recurrences of violence.  Hypothesis 2 cannot be accepted, either.  The empirical analysis 
does not consistently show that the involvement of a P5 member of the Security Council 
or a former colonial ruler reduce recurrences of violence in a peacekeeping mission.  The 
empirical results for Hypothesis 3 display results counter to the expectation.  The 
empirical results show that the involvement of a major power in mediation increases the 
likelihood for recurrences of violence in a civil war.  Hypothesis 4 is supported by the 
empirical data.  The regression analysis shows that the involvement of contiguous 
countries in a peacekeeping mission reduces the likelihood for recurrences of violence 
both during and after a peacekeeping mission.    
The strongest finding in the empirical model is that peacekeeping missions that act 
as better facilitators of transparent and credible information are more likely to sustain 
peace.  Two of the three variables related to signaling transparency in the peacekeeping 
mission reduce the likelihood for recurrences of violence.  The empirical data support 
Hypothesis 5, suggesting that peacekeeping missions led by democracies reduce the 
likelihood for recurrences of conflict.  Furthermore, the empirical data support Hypothesis 
7, suggesting that treaties negotiated during a peacekeeping mission reduce the likelihood 
for recurrences of violence.  Hypothesis 6 is not supported by the empirical data.  The 
data do not show that ceasefire agreements signed before the arrival of a peacekeeping 
mission reduce recurrences of conflict.  However, the contrast in the data between 
treaties negotiated before the arrival of the peacekeepers and during the peacekeeping 
mission demonstrates the impact that peacekeeping missions have when facilitating 
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negotiation.  Peacekeeping missions that effectively relay information and continue the 
bargaining process among the disputants after the fighting stops, promote the best 
outcomes in civil conflict.  The greatest strength in a peacekeeping mission appears to be 
its ability to present credible and transparent signals between the belligerents.   
The empirical data are less supportive of the proxies estimating the legitimacy 
associated with a peacekeeping mission.  The data do not support Hypothesis 8, which 
contends that UN mandated missions should reduce recurrences of violence during and 
after a peacekeeping mission.  During a peacekeeping mission, the data show that 
recurrences of violence are more likely when a mission is mandated by the UN.  Another 
measurement for legitimacy associated with a peacekeeping mission included the number 
of states contributing peacekeepers to a mission.  The empirical data show that more 
states contributing troops to a peacekeeping mission reduce the likelihood for violence 
during the mission, but not after the peacekeepers leave.  Therefore, Hypothesis 9 can 
only be partially accepted.  As a result, the empirical data do not substantially support the 
theory peacekeeping missions with more international support produce more peaceful 
outcomes.   
Though the empirical model provides valuable insight into the success of 
peacekeeping missions, the measurements may not fully explain the theoretical 
contentions.  The case study of intervention in Sierra Leone’s civil war clarifies the causal 
mechanisms at work and analyzes effects unseen in the empirical model.  Sierra Leone 
presents an excellent model for analysis because numerous peacekeeping missions were 
deployed in the civil war, exacting multiple outcomes.  Peacekeeping contingents 
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composed of soldiers from Great Britain, ECOWAS, the UN, and a private security 
company intervened in the conflict.  A peacekeeping force composed of UN peacekeepers 
and backed by the British were able to subdue the rebel factions and support a 
functioning government in Sierra Leone.    
The case study in Sierra Leone reinforces the importance of strong signaling 
capability by peacekeeping contingents and highlights important components that are 
elusive in the empirical model.  First, the importance of signaling strength is important in 
curtailing immediate violence.  Though British troops engaged in few military operations, 
they presented a credible signal of strength to the rebel factions.  Next, the importance of 
local cooperation is clarified.  The empirical model showed that neighboring state 
involvement is important and the case study reinforced that finding since better patrolling 
of the border regions in Guinea and Liberia contributed to the prevention of rebel groups 
seeking refuge in neighboring states.  Finally, successful peacekeeping is a 
multidimensional effort.  Changes in capability prevented violence from reigniting while 
peacekeepers were present, but efforts in DDR by the UN and pressure by NGOs to reduce 
trafficking of conflict diamonds altered the cost-benefit structure for belligerents, insuring 
that peace would remain after the departure of peacekeepers.    
The results of the study answer the research question by examining peacekeeping 
missions and their resulting outcomes.  The study illustrates that a strong intervention is 
necessary to deter future conflict, but that a viable system for communication and 
signaling is required for sustained peace after the removal of the peacekeeping mission.  
“Intervening successfully isn’t so much a matter of how many troops and planes you use, 
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it’s about mustering decisive power –military, diplomatic, legal, economic, moral – while 
avoiding the casualties and collateral damage that discredit the mission” (Clark 2011). 
Directions for Future Research 
 Any research model contains imprecision and imperfections.   One must 
acknowledge where the imperfections exist and how they might be rectified in future 
work.  Some of the possibilities for imprecision include measurement error and dual 
causality.  While these imperfections must be considered and identified, they do not 
invalidate the research model.  Rather, the imperfections present opportunities for 
further research.  Identifying imperfections in the research model help clarify the 
boundaries of the findings and consider directions for future research.   
 The first concern with the research model involves possible measurement 
imprecision.  The measurement for long term peacekeeping success might require more 
time to fully evaluate peacekeeping effectiveness.   The use of 1 year after the departure 
of peacekeepers was used for three reasons.  First, the data were readily available.  
Second, if belligerents were waiting for the peacekeeping contingent to leave, 1 year is 
sufficient time to resume war.  Third, the measurement of 1 year provides added 
insurance that if civil war does recur; it remains a product of unresolved issues related to 
the civil war.  However, alternative measurements could be used to determine 
peacekeeping success.  Further work could use the number of years of continuous peace 
after the departure of a peacekeeping mission.  Rather than identifying a dichotomous 
dependent variable indicating recurrences of violence or not, using a continuous variable 
could show factors that promote continuous years/months of stable peace.   
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 A second concern with the research model presenting an opportunity for further 
research involves multiple impacts of a peacekeeping mission.  Peacekeeping missions are 
multifaceted events and the impacts of a military campaign, a diplomatic campaign, and a 
humanitarian campaign cannot easily be analyzed separately and the empirical model 
treats all of the variables as independent entities.  In reality, the variables impact each 
other.  The case study on Sierra Leone attempted to resolve many of the issues related to 
the multiple affects an outside intervention can have in a civil conflict.  However, 
additional empirical models using interaction variables could show if any of the 
explanatory variables in the model only promote peace when other variables are present.  
For instance, a democracy may only be a suitable peacekeeper in the presence of a peace 
treaty.  The combination of transparent institutions and a transparent mandate could 
reinforce the success of a peacekeeping mission.  Further research could identify variables 
in the model that influence each other.   
  Finally, peacekeeping is not the only form of intervention into a civil 
conflict.  Additional research could analyze the effects of economic sanctions on isolating 
belligerents in a civil war.  Identifying the impact of intervention through diplomacy could 
impact outcomes of civil wars.  The international community can take numerous courses 
of action to alter the costs and benefits of belligerents or “shame” them into accepting a 
compromise.  Media coverage may impact civil war recurrence by casting light on war 
crimes.  Intervention into a civil conflict can take multiple forms and further research 
should reflect the multidimensional aspects of international intervention into civil 
conflicts. 
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Ultimately, this research intends to supplement the work of Doyle and Sambanis 
(2000; 2006), Walter (2002) and Fortna (2008).  While these research studies identify the 
influence and impact of peacekeeping, further research should investigate how local 
populations view and understand peacekeeping operations.  Future research would have 
to incorporate field studies in countries undergoing peacekeeping operations to 
document local attitudes.   
Policy Implications: Isolate, Mitigate, and Integrate 
 Research on politics should have some practical importance to guide future 
policies.  Policymakers often feel compelled to act in civil wars, but must understand the 
implications of taking action.  The policy implications for the current research suggest that 
there are three actions by which peacekeepers should produce immediate and lasting 
peace in civil conflicts.  Peacekeepers must isolate the belligerents in civil conflict, 
mitigate the dispute, and integrate the belligerents into a functional government and 
society.  These steps also mirror the current US COIN strategy implemented in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (See: US Army Field Manual 3-24).  By enacting these sequential steps in a 
peacekeeping mission, third party intermediaries can insure the best possibility for 
peacekeeping success.    
 Isolating the conflict freezes the disputants from engaging in acts of hostility and 
allowing for reliable negotiation to take place.  The results of the empirical study show 
that during a peacekeeping operation, it is important to employ an intermediary that can 
credibly signal intent to apply force if necessary.  However, the finding is better supported 
in the case study by demonstrating that limited military action by the British could signal 
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to defecting rebels that failure to comply with their agreements would escalate what 
costs they could expect to incur.  Furthermore, some groups in civil conflicts do not prefer 
peace to war (spoilers) and military force must neutralize the threats such groups pose to 
the peace process.  Combined these findings suggest that having the support of a strong 
state that exhibits its willingness to intervene can successfully freeze a conflict to allow for 
negotiation to take place in a civil conflict.   
 Obtaining the cooperation of neighboring states helps to further isolate the 
belligerents.  Gaining support of neighboring countries may help provide cultural appeals 
during negotiation, but also cuts off supply routes so that belligerents cannot use a 
temporary ceasefire to rearm themselves.  In the empirical models on peacekeeping 
success, the results show that involvement of a contiguous state significantly reduces the 
likelihood for recurrences of conflict.  These findings are evident during and after a 
peacekeeping mission, indicating that the involvement of neighboring countries deters 
conflict during and after a peacekeeping mission.  The case study supports this finding.  
Neighboring countries were important in providing locations for negotiating ceasefires, 
but after Liberia and Guinea successfully closed their borders and prevented smuggling 
and safe haven to the rebels could the conflict be effectively frozen.  Furthermore, 
isolation from implementing the Kimberly Process prevented rebels from gaining ground 
from illegal sources of revenue.  When intervening in a civil conflict, policymakers should 
gain the diplomatic and operational support of neighboring countries.   
 Once the belligerents in a civil conflict have been isolated, intervention force must 
address the grievances related to the civil dispute.  It is not enough to apply credible 
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pressure to compel a ceasefire.  A forum and dialogue to settle the political disputes in a 
conflict must be facilitated by an intermediary.  The findings demonstrate that signaling 
transparency is important for an intermediary when addressing a civil conflict.  
Democratic peacekeepers produce better chances for successful peacekeeping theorized 
by the transparency of their institutions.  Transparency can be established by putting 
ceasefire agreements in writing.  The empirical analysis compares ceasefire agreements 
developed by the belligerents and treaties signed during a peacekeeping mission.  Treaties 
negotiated in the presence of a peacekeeping force lead to better prospects for peace.  
The logistical regression results show that peacekeeping success is more likely when 
treaties are negotiated in the midst of peacekeepers than when they are negotiated 
among the belligerents on their own.  The case of Sierra Leone illustrates that even in the 
midst of honest brokering through an intermediary; the intermediary must credibly signal 
its commitment to implementing the agreement.  The RUF believed that the international 
community was not committed to enforcing the terms of the Lomé Agreement until the 
British intervened.  Negotiating an agreement in the midst of credible security guarantees 
help belligerents mitigate a civil conflict.   
 The final stage in a peacekeeping mission must include an integration of the 
disputing factions into the new government.  Once political reconciliation has been 
achieved, the factions must militarily demobilize.  Demobilizing a civil war removes the 
capacity for war to resume.  Because a leap of faith is required to effectively demobilize, 
belligerents are much more likely to trust a neutral intermediary.  At this stage of the 
peace process, trust and neutrality are valuable assets and the UN has the credibility and 
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capability to successfully implement and monitor the DDR process.  The UN is perceived 
as a neutral arbiter, beyond the scope of nationalistic causes.  As the Libyan rebel 
opposition leader, Abdel-Hafidh Ghoga,  states “if it is with the United Nations, it is not a 
foreign intervention (Fahim and Kirkpatrick 2011: A11).” Although UN intervention 
increases the likelihood for recurrences of war during a mission, the empirical analysis 
shows it has a better record after peacekeepers leave.  This indicates that the legitimacy 
of a UN mission has staying power in peace agreements.  The findings on Sierra Leone 
further support this notion.  The UN had logistical problems early in the mission, but 
provided a much better arbiter for DDR.  Executive Outcomes and the Nigerian-led 
ECOMOG forces could subdue violence, but did not command enough trust among the 
belligerents to successfully promote demobilization and reintegration of rebel factions.     
The peacekeeping process in civil wars can be compared to a medic applying first 
aid.  The first priority of peacekeeping as well as medicine is to stabilize the condition of 
the patient.  Peacekeepers accomplish this task by isolating the belligerents’ capacity to 
wage war.  However, a medic’s job does not end there.  Recovery requires rehabilitation.  
Violence may cease in a civil conflict but hostility remains.  An intermediary must 
negotiate political grievances and promote practices of good governance to insure public 
confidence.  With commitment problems and informational asymmetries alleviated, 
belligerents will be more willing disarm and sink costs toward peace.  A peacekeeping 
force must signal the willingness to subdue a civil conflict, but must also take the steps 
necessary to promote a functioning state if conflict is to permanently cease.     
Copyright     2013     Barrett J. Osborn 
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Appendix A 
Year Country Peacekeeping Mission 
1947 Dutch East Indies UN Good Offices Committee (GOC) military observation mission 
(Indonesia) 
1947 Greece UN military observation mission - UNSCOB (Greece) 
1948 Costa Rica OAS peace observation mission (Costa Rica) 
1949 Dutch East Indies UN Commission on Indonesia (UNCI) military observation mission 
1950 S. Korea UN Commission on Korea (UNCOK) military observation mission 
1952 Greece Balkan Subcommittee of the UN Peace Observation Commission 
(POC) military observation mission 
1954 Vietnam (Fr) International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC - 
Vietnam) 
1954 Laos (Fr) International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC - 
Cambodia) 
1954 Cambodia (Fr) International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC - Laos I) 
1955 Costa Rica OAS peace observation mission (Costa Rica) 
1958 Lebanon UN Observer Group in Lebanon - UNOGIL 
1960 Congo-Kinshasa UN Operation in the Congo - ONUC 
1962 Laos International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC - Laos II) 
1963 Cyprus British peacekeeping mission (Cyprus) 
1963 N. Yemen UN Yemen Observation Mission - UNYOM 
1964 Cyprus UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus - UNFICYP 
1964 Tanzania Nigerian peacekeeping mission (Tanzania) 
1964 Congo-Kinshasa Nigerian peacekeeping mission (Congo-Kinshasa) 
1965 Dominican Rep. UN Mission for the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) 
1965 Dominican Rep. OAS Inter-American Peace Force - IAPF (Dominican Republic) 
1967 N. Yemen LAS military observation mission (North Yemen) 
1970  Jordan LAS military observation mission (Jordan) 
1973 S. Vietnam International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS - South 
Vietnam) 
1976 Lebanon LAS Symbolic Arab Security Force - SASF (Lebanon) 
1976 Lebanon LAS Arab Deterrent Force - ADF (Lebanon) 
1979 Chad Nigerian peacekeeping mission (Chad) 
1979 Britain/Rhodesia Commonwealth Monitoring Force - CMF (Rhodesia) 
1980 Chad OAU peacekeeping mission (Chad) 
1981 Chad OAU peacekeeping mission (Chad) 
1982 Lebanon Multinational Force - MNF I (Lebanon) 
1982 Lebanon Multinational Force - MNF II (Lebanon) 
1983 Grenada OECS Caribbean Peacekeeping Force - CPF (Grenada) 
1987 Sri Lanka Indian Peace Keeping Force - IPKF (Sri Lanka) 
1988 Afghanistan UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan - UNGOMAP 
1988 Angola UN Angola Verification Mission - UNAVEM I 
1989 S. Africa/Namibia UN Transition Assistance Group - UNTAG (Namibia) 
1989 Nicaragua International Commission for Support and Verification - CIAV/UN 
(Nicaragua) 
1989 Nicaragua International Commission for Support and Verification - CIAV/OAS 
(Nicaragua) 
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1990 Mozambique Joint Verification Commission - JVC (Mozambique) 
1990 Liberia ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG - Liberia) 
1990 Nicaragua UN Observers Group in Central America - ONUCA (Nicaragua) 
1991 Cambodia UN Advanced Mission in Cambodia - UNAMIC 
1991 Yugoslavia/Croatia EC Monitoring Mission (ECMM-Croatia) 
1991 Yugoslavia/Slovenia EC Monitoring Mission (ECMM-Slovenia) 
1991 Iraq (Kurdish) US-led multinational force in Iraq/Operation Provide Comfort 
1991 Morocco/W. Sahara UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara - MINURSO 
1991 Angola UN Angola Verification Mission - UNAVEM II 
1991 Djibouti French military observation mission (Djibouti) 
1991 Rwanda OAU Military Observer Team - MOT (Rwanda) 
1992 Cambodia UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia-UNTAC 
1992 Georgia/Ossetia Joint Peacekeeping Force - JPF (Georgia/Ossetia) 
1992 Moldova Russia, Ukraine, Moldova military observation mission (Moldova) 
1992 Moldova Moldovan Joint Force - MJF (Moldova) 
1992 Bosnia-Herzegovina UN Protection Force (UNPRFOR - Bosnia-Herzegovina) 
1992 Croatia/Serbians UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR - Croatia) 
1992 Macedonia OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje (Macedonia) 
1992 Macedonia UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR - Macedonia) 
1992 Mozambique UN Operation in Mozambique - ONUMOZ 
1992 Djibouti French peacekeeping mission (Djibouti) 
1992 Somalia UN Operation in Somalia - UNOSOM I 
1992 Somalia US-led Unified Task Force - UNITAF/Operation Restore Hope 
(Somalia) 
1992 Rwanda OAU Neutral Military Observer Group - NMOG I (Rwanda) 
1992 El Salvador UN Observer Mission in El Salvador - ONUSAL (military division) 
1993 Cambodia UN military observation mission (Cambodia) 
1993 Georgia/Abkhazia UN Observer Mission in Georgia - UNOMIG 
1993 Tajikistan CIS peacekeeping mission (Tajikistan) 
1993 Liberia UN Observer Mission in Liberia - UNOMIL 
1993 Somalia UN Operation in Somalia - UNOSOM II 
1993 Rwanda OAU Neutral Military Observer Group - NMOG II (Rwanda) 
1993 Rwanda UN United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR) 
1993 Rwanda UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda - UNAMIR 
1993 Burundi OAU Observation Mission in Burundi (OMIB) 
1994 Papua New Guinea South Pacific Peacekeeping Force - SPPF/Operation Lagoon (Papua 
New Guinea) 
1994 Georgia/Abkhazia CIS peacekeeping mission (Georgia/Abkhazia) 
1994 Georgia/Ossetia OSCE Monitoring Mission (Georgia/Ossetia) 
1994 Bosnia-Herzegovina Western European Union Police Force (WEUPF - Bosnia-Herzegovina) 
1994 Tajikistan UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan - UNMOT 
1994 Rwanda French-led multinational force/Operation Turquoise (Rwanda) 
1994 Rwanda US humanitarian protection mission/Operation Support Hope 
(Rwanda) 
1994 Haiti US-led Multinational Force/Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti) 
1995 Sri Lanka Canada, Netherlands, Norway observation mission (Sri Lanka) 
1995 Bosnia-Herzegovina NATO Implementation Force-IFOR/Operation Joint Endeavor (Bosnia-
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Herzegovina) 
1995 Bosnia-Herzegovina UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina - UNMIBH 
1995 Croatia/Serbians UN Confidence Restoration Operation - UNCRO (Croatia) 
1995 Macedonia UN Preventive Deployment Force-UNPREDEP (Macedonia) 
1995 Angola UN Angola Verification Mission - UNAVEM III 
1995 Haiti UN Mission in Haiti - UNMIH 
1996 Philippines OIC Monitoring Team (MT-Philippines/MNLF) 
1996 Bosnia-Herzegovina NATO Stabilization Force-SFOR/Operation Joint Guard (Bosnia-
Herzegovina) 
1996 Croatia/Serbians UN Transitional Authority in East Slavonia - UNTAES (Croatia) 
1996 Croatia/Serbians UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka - UNMOP (Croatia) 
1996 Haiti UN Support Mission in Haiti - UNSMIH 
1997 Papua New Guinea Truce Monitoring Group - TMG (Papua New Guinea) 
1997 Albania Italian-led Multi-National Protection Force - MNPF (Albania) 
1997 Iraq (Kurds) Turkey-led Peace Monitoring Force-PMF (Northern Iraq) 
1997 Sierra Leone ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG - Sierra Leone) 
1997 Angola UN Observer Mission in Angola - MONUA 
1997 Central African Rep. Inter-African Monitoring Mission - MISAB (Central African Republic) 
1997 Comoros/Anjouan OAU Observer Mission in Comoros-OMIC I 
1997 Guatemala UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) 
1998 Papua New Guinea Peace Monitoring Group - PMG (Papua New Guinea) 
1998 Yugoslavia/Kosovo OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission - KVM 
1998 Yugoslavia/Kosovo NATO Kosovo Verification Mission - KVM 
1998 Macedonia EC/EU Monitoring Mission (ECMM/EUMM-Macedonia) 
1998 Sierra Leone UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone - UNOMSIL 
1998 Guinea-Bissau ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG - Guinea-Bissau) 
1998 Lesotho SADC peacekeeping mission/Operation Boleas (Lesotho) 
1998 Central African Rep. UN Mission on the Central African Republic-MINURCA 
1999 Indonesia/East 
Timor UN Assistance Mission in East Timor - UNAMET 
1999 Indonesia/East 
Timor International Force for East Timor - INTERFET 
1999 Indonesia/East 
Timor UN Transitional Administration in East Timor - UNTAET 
1999 Solomon Islands Commonwealth Multinational Police Peace Monitoring Group - 
CMPPMG (Solomon Islands) 
1999 Yugoslavia/Kosovo UN Mission in Kosovo - UNMIK 
1999 Yugoslavia/Kosovo NATO Kosovo Force - KFOR 
1999 Sierra Leone UN Mission in Sierra Leone - UNAMSIL 
1999 Dem. Rep. of Congo UN Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo-MONUC 
1999 Dem. Rep. of Congo OAU military observation mission (Democratic Republic of Congo) 
2000 Solomon Islands Commonwealth Multinational Police Assistance Group - CMPAG 
(Solomon Islands) 
2000 Solomon Islands International Peace Monitoring Team - IPMT (Solomon Islands) 
2001 Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force - ISAF (Afghanistan) 
2001 Macedonia NATO peacekeeping mission/Operation Essential Harvest 
(Macedonia) 
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2001 Macedonia NATO peacekeeping mission/Operation Amber Fox (Macedonia) 
2001 Burundi South African Protection Support Detachment-SAPSD (Burundi) 
2001 Central African Rep. CEN-SAD peacekeeping mission (Central African Republic) 
2001 Comoros/Anjouan OAU Observer Mission in Comoros-OMIC II 
2002 Sri Lanka Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission - SLMM 
2002 East Timor UN Mission of Support in East Timor - UNMISET 
2002 Indonesia/Aceh Henry Dunant Centre - Aceh Monitoring Mission (HDC-AMM) 
2002 Macedonia NATO peacekeeping mission/Operation Allied Harmony (Macedonia) 
2002 Sudan/Anya-Nya Civilian Protection Monitoring Team - CPMT (Sudan) 
2002 Ivory Coast French peacekeeping mission (Cote d'Ivoire) 
2002 Central African Rep. CEMAC peacekeeping mission (Central African Republic) 
2002 Comoros OAU Observer Mission in Comoros-OMIC III 
2003 Afghanistan NATO - ISAF (Afghanistan) 
2003 Solomon Islands Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) 
2003 Macedonia EU Peacekeeping Force in Macedonia/Operation Concordia (EUFOR - 
Macedonia) 
2003 Sudan/Anya-Nya IGAD Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT-Sudan) 
2003 Liberia ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) 
2003 Liberia UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) 
2003 Ivory Coast ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) 
2003 Ivory Coast UN Mission for Cote d'Ivoire (MINUCI) 
2003 Burundi AU military observation mission (Burundi) 
2003 Burundi AU Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) 
2003 Dem. Rep. of Congo EU Interim Emergency Multinational Force in the DRC/Operation 
Artemis (IEMF-DRC) 
2004 Papua New Guinea UN Observer Mission in Bougainville (UNOMB) 
2004 Papua New Guinea Australian peacekeeping mission (Papua New Guinea) 
2004 Philippines OIC International Monitoring Team (IMT-Philippines/MILF) 
2004 Bosnia-Herzegovina EU Peacekeeping Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina/Operation Althea 
(EUFOR - Bosnia-Herzegovina) 
2004 Sudan/Darfur African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS I-Darfur) 
2004 Sudan/Darfur African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS II-Darfur) 
2004 Ivory Coast UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI) 
2004 Burundi UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) 
2004 Haiti US-led Multinational Interim Force (MIF-Haiti) 
2004 Haiti UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) 
2004 Colombia OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP-OEA) 
2005 Indonesia/Aceh EU Initial Monitoring Presence (IMP-Aceh) 
2005 Indonesia/Aceh EU Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) 
2005 Sudan/Anya-Nya UN Mission in Sudan - UNMIS 
2006 East Timor Australian-led Multinational Peacekeeping Force (East Timor) 
2006 East Timor UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) 
2006 Tonga Australian-led peacekeeping mission (Tonga) 
2006 Comoros AU Mission of Support to the Elections in the Comoros-AMISEC 
2006 Dem. Rep. of Congo EU Force in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUFOR-DRC) 
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Appendix B 
 
Year Country UN Mandate Lead State PK Ongoing Military Hostilities (Ongoing: 
2006-2008) 
1947 Dutch East Indies Yes US No  
1947 Greece Yes US No  
1948 Costa Rica No .. No  
1949 Dutch East Indies Yes US No  
1950 S. Korea Yes Australia No  
1952 Greece Yes UK No  
1954 Vietnam (Fr) No India No  
1954 Laos (Fr) No India No  
1954 Cambodia (Fr) No India No  
1955 Costa Rica No .. No  
1958 Lebanon Yes Norway No  
1960 Congo-Kinshasa Yes Sweden No  
1962 Laos No India No  
1963 Cyprus No UK No  
1963 N. Yemen Yes Sweden No  
1964 Cyprus Yes India Yes No; Diehl et al. (1996), p.686 
1964 Tanzania No Nigeria No  
1964 Congo-Kinshasa No Nigeria No  
1965 Dominican Rep. Yes India No  
1965 Dominican Rep. No US No  
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1967 N. Yemen No .. No  
1970  Jordan No Egypt No  
1973 S. Vietnam No Indonesia No  
1976 Lebanon No Egypt No  
1976 Lebanon No Egypt No  
1979 Chad No Nigeria No  
1979 Britain/Rhodesia No UK No  
1980 Chad No Congo-Brazzaville   
1981 Chad No Nigeria No  
1982 Lebanon No US No  
1982 Lebanon No France No  
1983 Grenada No Jamaica No  
1987 Sri Lanka No India No  
1988 Afghanistan Yes Finland No  
1988 Angola Yes Brazil No  
1989 S. Africa/Namibia Yes India No  
1989 Nicaragua Yes .. No  
1989 Nicaragua No Argentina No  
1990 Mozambique No .. No  
1990 Liberia No Nigeria No  
1990 Nicaragua Yes Spain No  
1991 Cambodia Yes France No  
1991 Yugoslavia/Croatia No .. No  
1991 Yugoslavia/Slovenia No .. No  
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1991 Iraq (Kurdish) No US No  
1991 Morocco/W. Sahara Yes Canada Yes No; No known violence in past 2 
years. 
1991 Angola Yes Brazil No  
1991 Djibouti No France No  
1991 Rwanda No .. No  
1992 Cambodia Yes Australia No  
1992 Georgia/Ossetia No Russia Yes Yes; Resumption of violence 
8/2008 
1992 Moldova No Russia No  
1992 Moldova No Russia Yes No known violence in past 2 years 
1992 Bosnia-Herzegovina Yes Canada No  
1992 Croatia/Serbians Yes India No  
1992 Macedonia No .. Yes No known violence in past 2 years 
1992 Macedonia Yes Norway No  
1992 Mozambique Yes Brazil No  
1992 Djibouti No France No  
1992 Somalia Yes Pakistan No  
1992 Somalia No US No  
1992 Rwanda No Nigeria No  
1992 El Salvador Yes Spain No  
1993 Cambodia Yes Bangladesh No  
1993 Georgia/Abkhazia Yes Denmark Yes Yes; Resumption of violence 
8/2008 
1993 Tajikistan No Russia No  
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1993 Liberia Yes Kenya No  
1993 Somalia Yes Turkey No  
1993 Rwanda No Nigeria No  
1993 Rwanda Yes Canada No  
1993 Rwanda Yes Canada No  
1993 Burundi No Tunisia No  
1994 Papua New Guinea No Australia No  
1994 Georgia/Abkhazia No Russia Yes Yes; Resumption of violence 
8/2008 
1994 Georgia/Ossetia No Russia Yes Yes; Resumption of violence 
8/2008 
1994 Bosnia-Herzegovina No .. No  
1994 Tajikistan Yes Jordan No  
1994 Rwanda No France No  
1994 Rwanda No US No  
1994 Haiti No US No  
1995 Sri Lanka No .. No  
1995 Bosnia-Herzegovina No US No  
1995 Bosnia-Herzegovina Yes Denmark No  
1995 Croatia/Serbians Yes Jordan No  
1995 Macedonia Yes Finland No  
1995 Angola Yes Brazil No  
1995 Haiti Yes US No  
1996 Philippines No Indonesia No  
1996 Bosnia-Herzegovina No US No  
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1996 Croatia/Serbians Yes Belgium No  
1996 Croatia/Serbians Yes Sweden No  
1996 Haiti Yes Canada No  
1997 Papua New Guinea No New Zealand No  
1997 Albania No Italy No  
1997 Iraq (Kurds) No Turkey No  
1997 Sierra Leone No Nigeria No  
1997 Angola Yes Zimbabwe No  
1997 Central African Rep. No Gabon No  
1997 Comoros/Anjouan No .. No  
1997 Guatemala Yes Spain No  
1998 Papua New Guinea No Australia No  
1998 Yugoslavia/Kosovo No US No  
1998 Yugoslavia/Kosovo No US No  
1998 Macedonia No .. Yes No known violence in past 2 years 
1998 Sierra Leone Yes India No  
1998 Guinea-Bissau No Togo No  
1998 Lesotho No South Africa No  
1998 Central African Rep. Yes Gabon No  
1999 Indonesia/East Timor Yes Australia No  
1999 Indonesia/East Timor No Australia No  
1999 Indonesia/East Timor Yes Philippines No  
1999 Solomon Islands No Fiji No  
1999 Yugoslavia/Kosovo Yes Denmark Yes No known violence in past 2 years 
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1999 Yugoslavia/Kosovo No US Yes No known violence in past 2 years 
1999 Sierra Leone Yes India No  
1999 Dem. Rep. of Congo Yes Senegal Yes Yes; Resumption of Violence 2007 
PRIO data 
1999 Dem. Rep. of Congo No Algeria No  
2000 Solomon Islands No Fiji No  
2000 Solomon Islands No Australia No  
2001 Afghanistan No UK No  
2001 Macedonia No Britain No  
2001 Macedonia No Germany No  
2001 Burundi No South Africa No  
2001 Central African Rep. No Libya No  
2001 Comoros/Anjouan No .. No  
2002 Sri Lanka No Norway Yes Yes; Resumption of violence 
1/2008 
2002 East Timor Yes Thailand No  
2002 Indonesia/Aceh No Thailand No  
2002 Macedonia No Italy No  
2002 Sudan/Anya-Nya No US Yes Yes; Resumption of violence 2007 
PRIO data 
2002 Ivory Coast No France Yes Yes; Resumption of violence 
11/2004 
2002 Central African Rep. No Gabon Yes Yes;  
2002 Comoros No .. No  
2003 Afghanistan No Germany Yes Yes; Resumption of violence 
2006-2008 PRIO data 
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2003 Solomon Islands No Australia Yes No known violence in past 2 years 
2003 Macedonia No France No  
2003 Sudan/Anya-Nya No Kenya Yes Yes; Resumption of violence 2007 
PRIO data 
2003 Liberia No Nigeria No  
2003 Liberia Yes Nigeria Yes No known violence in past 2 years 
2003 Ivory Coast No Senegal No  
2003 Ivory Coast Yes Bangladesh No  
2003 Burundi No Tunisia No  
2003 Burundi No South Africa No  
2003 Dem. Rep. of Congo No France No  
2004 Papua New Guinea Yes Guyana No  
2004 Papua New Guinea No Australia No  
2004 Philippines No Malaysia Yes Yes; Resumption of violence 
2007-2008 PRIO data 
2004 Bosnia-Herzegovina No Britain Yes No known violence in past 2 years 
2004 Sudan/Darfur No Nigeria No  
2004 Sudan/Darfur No Nigeria Yes Yes; Resumption of violence 2007 
PRIO data 
2004 Ivory Coast Yes Benin Yes Yes; Resumption of violence 2004 
2004 Burundi Yes South Africa No  
2004 Haiti No US No  
2004 Haiti Yes Brazil Yes No known violence in past 2 years 
2004 Colombia No Argentina Yes No known violence in past 2 years 
2005 Indonesia/Aceh No Netherlands No  
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2005 Indonesia/Aceh No Netherlands Yes No known violence in past 2 years 
2005 Sudan/Anya-Nya Yes India Yes Yes; Resumption of violence 2007 
PRIO data 
2006 East Timor No Australia Yes No known violence in past 2 years 
2006 East Timor Yes Philippines Yes No known violence in past 2 years 
2006 Tonga No Australia No  
2006 Comoros No South Africa No  
2006 Dem. Rep. of Congo No France No  
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